2014-00160033-CU-OR

Target Corporation vs. National Paradigm Foundation

Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Filed By: Baldock, Michael

Plaintiff Target Corporation’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is unopposed and is
granted

Defendant was personally served with the moving papers and summons and complaint
on April 24. No opposition has been filed although it was due on April 30, 2014.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has established that it is entitled to a preliminary
injunction.

“To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence
of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued
pending an adjudication of the merits. Past California decisions further establish that,
as a general matter, the question whether a preliminary injunction should be granted involves two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the
merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or
denial of interim injunctive relief.” ( White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) The
greater the showing on one factor, the lesser the showing must be on the other. (Butt
th
v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4 668, 678.) When the dispute involves the
interplay of free speech and property rights, the analyses of likelihood of success on
the merits and harm are the same. “In the unique setting of free speech rights versus
private property rights, this harm analysis is the same as the analysis concerning the
likelihood of success on the merits.” (Bank of Stockton v. Church of Soldiers of the
th
Cross of Christ (1996) 44 Cal.4 1623, 1631 [disapproved in part on other grounds in
th
Albertson’s Inc. v. Young (2003) 107 Cal.App.4 106, 124].)

Plaintiff has shown that it is likely to succeed on its civil trespass claims.

Target has presented evidence that National Paradigm Foundation, a California
corporation, solicits donations from Target’s guests nearly every day at two Target
stores in Sacramento. The Target stores are not public forums in which expressive
activity is protected. Defendant’s solicitors set up just outside the main entrance or
exit, remain for most of the day, and implore Target guests to hand over cash
donations. (Buelna Declaration) Target uniformly prohibits solicitors from being on
store property. Although Target employees have repeatedly notified Defendants of the
no-solicitation policy, defendant continues to seek donations. Target typically receives
approximately 12 customer complaints per store per day when Defendant’s solicitors
are present. Target will suffer irreparable harm unless Defendants are enjoined from
continuing their conduct. (Buelna Declaration)

Target Corporation prohibits solicitors from any organization from soliciting on store
property. (Rusch Decl. at para. 15.) Solicitors on Target store property typically are
provided a copy of Target’s solicitation policy, told they are trespassing on private
property, and politely asked to leave. Although Defendants have been advised of the
no-solicitation policy on numerous occasions, they have regularly refused to leave
Target’s property and continued to solicit customers. (Buelna 26 Decl. at paras.12-13.)

The California Supreme Court has held that, “A private sidewalk in front of a customer
entrance to a retail store in a shopping center is not a public forum for purposes of
expressive activity under our state Constitution’s liberty-of-speech provision.” (Ralphs
Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8 (2012) 55 Cal.4th
1083, 1104) (emphasis added). This confirmed previous rulings from the California
Court of Appeal holding that Target stores in particular are not public forms under
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979) 23 Cal.3d 899, 910 (hereinafter, ”
Pruneyard”), affd., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980) 447 U.S. 74, and that
expression in front of Target stores is therefore not protected. (Van v. Target Corp.
(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388-91.) “[W]ithin a shopping center or mall, the areas
outside individual stores’ customer entrances and exits, at least as typically configured
and furnished, are not public forums under this Court’s decision in Pruneyard, supra,
23 Cal.3d 899.” (Ralph’s Grocery Company v. United Food and Commercial Workers
th
Union Local (2012) 55 Cal.4 1083, 1091.)

The Target decision follows a long line of cases granting various forms of relief,
including preliminary injunctions, based upon determinations that political activists and
solicitors entering the private premises of individual retailers are nothing more than
trespassers without free speech rights who may be excluded at the retailer’s choosing.
(See, e.g. Trader Joe’s, Inc. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th
425; Albertson’s v. Young (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 106; Slevin v. Home Depot (N.D.
Cal. 2000) 120 F.Supp.2d 822.) This legal conclusion applies equally to free-standing
stores, as can be seen in Costco Companies v. Gallant (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 740,
and to individual stores existing within a larger commercial shopping center, as seen in
Albertson’s v. Young , supra, 107 Cal.App.4th 106.

In deciding whether to enter a preliminary injunction, the Court must evaluate two
interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits at trial,
and (2) the interim harm that the applicant will likely suffer if preliminary relief is not
granted, as compared to the likely harm that the opposing party will suffer if the
preliminary injunction issues. (See, e.g., Langford v. Superior Court (Gates) (1987) 43
Cal.3d 21, 28.) One of these two factors may be accorded greater weight than the
other depending on the applicant’s showing. (See Common Cause v. Bd. of
Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 447.)

Target has established that it will prevail on the merits, and the defendant has filed no
opposition showing that the location of the solicitation has the characteristics of a
public forum. Target is entitled to an order enjoining Defendants from directly or
indirectly using property operated as a Target store to solicit donations.

The Court will sign the proposed formal order upon the posting of a bond in the
amount of $1,000 (not the requested $100.) Proof of posting of the bond shall be
presented on or before May 15, and the order will be signed upon proof of posting of
the bond.