Filed 9/14/20 Marriage of Ehirim CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of DOMINIC and BIBIAN EHIRIM.

DOMINIC EHIRIM,

Appellant,

v.

BIBIAN EHIRIM,

Respondent.

E072397

(Super.Ct.No. FAMRS1200537)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Khymberli S.Y. Apaloo and Michelle H. Gilleece, Judges. Affirmed.

Dominic Okechukwu Ehirim, in pro. per., for Appellant.

Gordon Lawyers, Christiaan J. Gordon and Errol J. Gordon, for Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

This is the second appeal by appellant, Dominic Ehirim, in this martial dissolution proceeding. In the first appeal (In re Marriage of Ehirim (October 12, 2017, E063531) [nonpub. opn.] [2017 Cal.App.Unpub. LEXIS 6990] (Ehirim I)), this court affirmed the January 25, 2016 judgment of the family court (the 2016 judgment), adjudicating the rights of Dominic and his former spouse, respondent, Bibian Ehirim, in various assets and liabilities, among other issues.

After this court issued its decision in Ehirim I, the parties each filed requests for orders (RFO’s), both asking the court to divide approximately $60,000 in community investment account balances, held in Bibian’s name, that were not adjudicated in the 2016 judgment. (Fam. Code, § 2556. ) In her RFO, Bibian also asked the court to offset the investment account balances by approximately $45,000 in alleged community credit card debts Bibian paid with her separate property funds following the parties’ April 8, 2009 separation.

In her RFO, Bibian also asked the court to: (1) determine the balance of an approximate $17,000 equalization payment that Dominic owed Bibian for his purchase of her community share of the parties’ marital residence (the Skyridge Lane residence); (2) enter qualified domestic relations orders (QDRO’s), dividing the parties’ defined benefit pension plans, which the 2016 judgment ordered the parties to cooperate in preparing; (3) grant Bibian “full management and control” over Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 529 accounts for the parties’ children; and (4) award her and her counsel attorney’s fees and sanctions for Dominic’s litigation conduct and failure to make a good faith effort to resolve the post-2016 judgment issues. (§§ 271, 2030.)

During a December 17, 2018 trial on the issues raised in the parties’ RFO’s, Dominic refused to participate and left the trial before it concluded. Only Bibian testified and presented documentary evidence. On January 28, 2019, the court issued a judgment on reserved issues (the 2019 judgment), adjudicating the issues raised in Bibian’s RFO.

Dominic now appeals from the 2019 judgment, raising multiple claims of error. He principally claims that the court was biased against him and denied him due process by ruling against him in his and Bibian’s pretrial discovery motions and in refusing his informal and unsupported requests to continue the trial. We find no merit to any of Dominic’s claims and affirm the 2019 judgment in its entirety.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

A. Background

Dominic and Bibian married in Nigeria in 1989 and separated on April 8, 2009. (Ehirim I, at *1-3.) They have three daughters now over the age of 18. (See Id. at *2.) Dominic petitioned to dissolve the marriage in 2012 (id. at *1), and the marriage was dissolved pursuant to the 2016 judgment.

Dominic and Bibian met in Nigeria in 1988. (Ehirim I, at *3.) Bibian was born in 1968, and Dominic is approximately 17 years older than Bibian. (Ibid.) Bibian had a high school diploma when she immigrated to the United States in 1990. (Id. at **3-4.) She later attended nursing programs, began working as a registered nurse in 1999, and earned a Bachelor of Science degree in nursing in 2006. (Id. at *4.) Since 1993, Dominic has worked as a transportation engineer for the State of California. (Id. at *9.)

B. Dominic’s Deposition Subpoenas Concerning Bibian’s Investment Accounts

On October 17, 2017, five days after this court issued its decision in Ehirim I, Dominic issued deposition subpoenas to six financial institutions seeking records concerning the community investment account balances that Bibian held around the time of the parties’ separation on April 8, 2009. Bibian’s counsel moved to quash each subpoena, in part on the ground that there was no pending RFO to adjudicate the division of any assets or liabilities not adjudicated in the 2016 judgment. (§ 2556.)

At a January 4, 2018 hearing on the motions to quash, the parties agreed that the court had reserved jurisdiction in the 2016 judgment over the division of community property bank and investment accounts in Bibian’s name. The court (Judge Apaloo) noted that there was no pending RFO to divide the omitted accounts, but if the court granted the motions to quash, then Dominic could reissue the subpoenas after he filed an RFO to divide the accounts. Thus, the court urged the parties to resolve their dispute concerning the scope of the subpoenas.

The parties then agreed in open court to limit the subpoenas to records showing Bibian’s bank and investment account balances on April 8, 2009, the date of the parties’ separation, at five financial institutions: Vanguard Group, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase Bank, T. Rowe Price, and Oakmark Funds. The court accordingly denied Bibian’s motions to quash the subpoenas to these five institutions, but granted her motion to quash the subpoena to “Kaiser Federal Bank/Home Street Bank,” after Dominic agreed to withdraw that subpoena. Neither party was awarded attorney’s fees, costs, or sanctions in connection with these orders.

C. The Parties’ RFO’s

In March 2018, Dominic filed an RFO seeking to divide the parties’ community investment account balances in Bibian’s name at the time of separation—the accounts at the five previously subpoenaed financial institutions, plus “Kaiser Federal Credit Union.” According to Dominic’s RFO, these six account balances totaled $65,672.08 on April 8, 2009. With 10 percent interest accrued over nine years, from April 8, 2009 to 2018, Dominic claimed Bibian owed the community $124,776.88, and he was entitled to one-half of that amount.

In April 2018, Bibian filed her own RFO, asking the court to find that she held a total of $60,836.79 in five investment accounts at the time of the parties’ separation: $44,028.24 at Vanguard; $12,401.65 at Oakmark Equity & Income Fund; $3,061.48 at T. Rowe Price; and $1,145.42 and $200, respectively, in two accounts at Washington Mutual Bank. Bibian conceded that Dominic was entitled to one-half of this $60,836.79 sum. But in her RFO she also asked the court to divide omitted community debts or obligations totaling $47,141.56 at separation. (§ 2556.) These consisted of four credit card balances totaling $44,467.56 (two at Chase, one at Bank of America, and one at Capital One), plus a $2,674 orthodontist bill for one of the parties’ children.

As noted, Bibian also asked the court to determine the balance of an equalization payment due to her for Dominic’s purchase of her community share of the Skyridge Lane residence, pursuant to a stipulation and order entered on October 26, 2016. She alleged that this equalization payment consisted of $17,084.31 in principal plus interest. She also asked the court to enter QDRO’s for the parties’ defined benefit pension plans, which the court had ordered the parties to cooperate in preparing through its court-appointed QDRO expert, Mr. Muir; to order Dominic to reimburse her for his share of the QDRO fees; to grant Bibian “full management and control” over I.R.C. section 529 accounts for the parties’ children; and to order Dominic to pay Bibian $15,000 in sanctions and attorney’s fees (§ 271) “due to his failure to make a good faith effort to resolve the issues” set forth in Bibian’s RFO.

In June 2018, Dominic filed a second RFO, which is not part of the record on appeal. The record indicates that, in his June 2018 RFO, Dominic asked the court to dismiss Bibian’s April 2018 RFO, or, alternatively, to set aside the 2016 judgment, due to Bibian’s failure to previously disclose the balances of the community investment accounts and credit card debts at separation. Dominic also sought attorney’s fees and costs.

At an August 2, 2018 hearing, the court (Judge Apaloo) set a trial, beginning on December 17, 2018, on the issues raised in the parties’ RFO’s. The court denied Dominic’s request to dismiss Bibian’s RFO, or to set aside the January 2016 judgment, based on Bibian’s failure to previously disclose the balances of the omitted community assets and debts. The court explained that any defenses Dominic may have to Bibian’s claims were “trial issues,” and Dominic had not shown that he had suffered any “actual prejudice” as a result of Bibian’s failure to earlier disclose the balances of the omitted community assets and debts.

Dissatisfied with the court’s ruling, Dominic asked the court, “what is the point [in] coming here if you’re [going to] rule against me,” and claimed that the court was consistently ruling against him because he was representing himself. Dominic asked Judge Apaloo to recuse herself, but she said she had no basis for doing so, and noted that another judge would be presiding at the trial.

D. The Parties’ Discovery Motions

1. Dominic’s Inspection Demand and Special Interrogatories to Bibian

Around August 8, 2018, after the December 17 trial date was set, Dominic served a demand for production of documents (the inspection demand) on Bibian’s counsel, seeking 31 categories of documents, including “bank records,” “income records,” “financial statements,” “credit card and charge account records,” “debts and liabilities,” and “living or household expenses” for the period January 1, 2008 through June 1, 2010. Around August 15, Dominic served a set of special interrogatories on Bibian’s counsel. Each interrogatory very generally sought “supporting information,” for the period January 2008 to June 2010, for various “contentions” or actions undertaken by Bibian concerning each issue raised in her April 2018 RFO. For example, the first interrogatory stated: “Please provide[] all SUPPORTING INFORMATION for YOUR contention that YOU had undivided community property debt for the specified time period.”

On September 13, 2018, Bibian’s counsel served an unverified response to the inspection demand, objecting to each category of the demand on the ground it was overbroad, sought irrelevant information, and invaded Bibian’s privacy. No records were produced in response to any of the demands. On September 19, Dominic wrote a letter to Bibian’s counsel asking to meet and confer concerning Bibian’s objections, and demanding further responses. On September 27, Dominic wrote a second letter to Bibian’s counsel, again attempting to meet and confer concerning Bibian’s objections to the inspection demand and her failure to serve any responses to the interrogatories.

In his September 27, 2018 letter, Dominic claimed Bibian’s responses to his inspection demand and his special interrogatories were both due on September 17. But the record does not include proofs of service for the discovery or otherwise indicate when or how either set of discovery was served. The record shows only that Dominic signed the inspection demand on August 8, 2018, and signed the special interrogatories on August 16. On October 16, Dominic filed an RFO and motion to compel further responses to his inspection demand, and to compel original responses to his special interrogatories. The motion included a request for costs and attorney’s fees.

2. Dominic’s Deposition Subpoenas Concerning Bibian’s Omitted Credit Card Balances, and Bibian’s Employment Records

On October 12, 2018 and November 3, 2018, Dominic served deposition subpoenas on Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and Capital One, seeking extensive records concerning the credit cards listed in Bibian’s RFO for the period of April 1, 2008 to April 30, 2010 (the credit card subpoenas). For example, the credit card subpoenas sought “signature cards, bank statements, cancelled checks, debit and credit memos” and “loans, to include applications, notes, mortgages, credit cards or other instruments of indebtedness.”

Around the same time, Dominic served another deposition subpoena on Bibian’s employer, Kaiser Permanente, seeking “all financial records” in Bibian’s name, “including payroll, wages, overtime, vacation, bonuses etc. for the period from April 1, 2009 to December 30, 2010” (the Kaiser subpoena).

Bibian moved to quash or limit each subpoena on the ground it was overbroad and invaded her privacy to the extent it sought records after the parties’ April 8, 2009 separation. Bibian also objected to each subpoena as seeking records not relevant to the issues identified in the parties’ pending RFO’s and to be determined in the upcoming December 17, 2018 trial. In November 2018, the court set a combined hearing on December 5, on Dominic’s motion to compel and Bibian’s motions to quash or limit the Kaiser subpoena and four credit card subpoenas.

3. The December 5, 2018 Hearing on the Parties’ Discovery Motions

(a) Dominic’s Motion to Compel

At the December 5, 2018 hearing, the court (Judge Gilleece) first considered Dominic’s motion to compel further responses to his inspection demand and original responses to his special interrogatories. Dominic claimed he served the inspection demand on August 10, that Bibian’s responses to it were due on September 10; he received unverified and “mostly evasive” responses, and on September 17 he requested further responses. Dominic did not mention his special interrogatories.

Bibian’s counsel, Mr. Gordon, explained that he objected to each category of the inspection demand and each special interrogatory as overbroad, and as invading Bibian’s privacy, because they sought extensive information concerning Bibian’s finances through April 30, 2010, more than one year after the parties’ April 8, 2009 separation. He emphasized that the relevant issue at the upcoming postjudgment trial was whether there were “missed assets and debts” that should be divided (§ 2556), and the inspection demand and interrogatories were not focused on that issue.

In response to Dominic’s complaint that Bibian’s responses to his inspection demand were unverified, Mr. Gordon correctly pointed out that responses did not require a verification by Bibian because they only contained objections; thus, they only required a signature by Bibian’s attorney. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.250.) Mr. Gordon also argued that Dominic’s motion did not comply with rule 3.1345 of the California Rules of Court, because it did not include separate statements, setting forth each inspection demand and special interrogatory, followed by Bibian’s “full response” to each demand and interrogatory. (Rule. 3.1345(c).)

Under rule 3.1345, no separate statement is required to be included in a discovery motion where no response has been given. (Rule. 3.1345(b).) But Mr. Gordon claimed he served responses to the special interrogatories the day before Dominic filed his motion to compel on October 16. Thus, Mr. Gordon argued that Dominic “had a duty” to file a revised motion to compel further responses to the interrogatories, if appropriate, with a separate statement. The record does not include a copy of Bibian’s (ostensibly late-served) responses to Dominic’s special interrogatories.

When the court asked Dominic to address why his motion to compel should not be denied based solely on its failure to include separate statements (rule 3.1345), Dominic explained that he was running out of time to file his motion before trial. He acknowledged that he received Bibian’s special interrogatory responses the day after he filed his motion, but he claimed that those responses were also “evasive as far as the scope of the motion.” He argued that the scope of his discovery requests and motion to compel were “not too broad because [Bibian] failed to file her credit card debt in the preliminary disclosure, and then it was a surprise to me [that] she introduced it when [Mr. Gordon] called me to his office [in February 2018] to try to resolve the case, and then she shows me the credit card debt of $50,000.” Through his inspection demand and interrogatories, he was trying “to get to the bottom” of when Bibian incurred the debt and when and how she paid it.

The court noted that it was not clear when Dominic served his discovery to Bibian and he did not file separate statements concerning Bibian’s responses to the inspection demand or to the special interrogatories (rule 3.1345) , although his letter requesting further responses to the inspection demand explained why he thought those responses were “deficient.” The court denied Dominic’s entire motion to compel based on its failure to include separate statements for both the inspection demand and the special interrogatories. (Ibid.)

Dominic then asked the court, “Shouldn’t the case be tried based on [its] merits?” The court explained that rule 3.1345 is designed to notify the opposing party and the court of the moving party’s arguments concerning why further responses are warranted. Dominic’s motion did not do that; that is, it did not include “[a] statement of the factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses, answers, or production as to each matter in dispute.” (Rule 3.1345(c)(3).)

(b) Bibian’s Motions to Quash or Limit the Credit Card Subpoenas

The court next considered Bibian’s motions to quash or limit Dominic’s four credit card subpoenas and Kaiser subpoena. Mr. Gordon argued that the credit card subpoenas were overbroad, both as to the time period and the types of documents requested. He noted that he had written to Dominic on October 25, 2018, asking him to limit the credit card subpoenas to records showing (1) the credit card balances on April 8, 2009, the date of the parties’ separation, and (2) the payments Bibian made on the credit cards after April 8, 2009; Dominic did not respond to him.

Mr. Gordon also told the court that Dominic had been difficult to work with regarding his earlier subpoenas concerning Bibian’s omitted investment account balances. He explained that, on January 4, 2018, before he began representing Bibian, her former counsel and Dominic agreed, in open court, to limit the investment account subpoenas to records showing the account balances on April 8, 2009, but the minute order from the January 4 hearing did not reflect the limitation. Then, sometime after the January 4, 2018 hearing, Dominic gave copies of the erroneous January 4 minute order to the records custodians at subpoenaed financial institutions, who then notified Bibian that they were going to produce all of the records described in the subpoenas. Mr. Gordon had to obtain a transcript of the January 4 hearing and give it to the custodians in order to notify them of the agreed-upon and court-ordered limitation to the subpoenas. Mr. Gordon said, “I bring all of that up to say [that Dominic] knows about the relevancy issue and about the date of separation issue and about the fact that [Bibian] objects to the production of records [showing] all of her financial transactions” after the April 8, 2009 separation date, on both relevancy and privacy grounds.

Mr. Gordon also pointed out to the court that he filed separate statements with each of his motions to quash and that Dominic’s opposition did not address “the scope issue.” Mr. Gordon clarified that Bibian did not object to the credit card subpoenas to the extent that they sought “records that cover the periods before the date of separation and payments subsequent to the date of separation.” Mr. Gordon asked the court to limit the Kaiser subpoena to Bibian’s payroll and other employment records generated before April 8, 2009.

The court then asked Dominic to explain the relevance of the records he was seeking in the Kaiser subpoena. Dominic explained that he wanted to know how much money Bibian earned after the April 8, 2009 separation date to enable her to pay the nearly $50,000 in credit card debts. He also wanted to know how and when Bibian’s omitted investment account balances “came about,” and when and for what purposes Bibian incurred the credit card debts. He claimed that, during the parties’ previous trial (in 2014), Bibian claimed she bought a new home with $125,000 of her separate property funds that she “had” within one year after the parties separation, and he was trying to discover how she had that $125,000 sum plus another $50,000 to pay the alleged community credit card debts after separation.

The court agreed with Dominic that records concerning any credit card debts that Bibian incurred before separation, and investment account money she saved before separation, were relevant to the issues to be determined at trial. But the court also noted that the employment records that Dominic was seeking through the Kaiser subpoena were irrelevant because there was no indication that Bibian’s preseparation income was in dispute during the 2014 trial. The court explained to Dominic that, unless he was alleging that Bibian misrepresented her preseparation income during the 2014 trial, her employment records were irrelevant. But any separate property that Bibian may have used to pay the community credit card debts was relevant.

At the conclusion of the December 5, 2018 hearing, the court granted Bibian’s motion to quash Dominic’s Kaiser subpoena and limited Dominic’s four credit card subpoenas to records related to credit cards debts Bibian incurred between April 1, 2008 (the earliest date requested in the credit card subpoenas) through April 8, 2009.

Dominic then asked how he would know when Bibian paid the credit card debts, and the court noted that it was Bibian’s burden to prove that she paid the credit cards with her separate property, in order to be entitled to offset those debts against the investment account balances. Mr. Gordon pointed out that the records custodians at the credit card records companies would need a copy of the order limiting the subpoenas “as soon as possible” because the trial was set for December 17, only 12 days later.

Next, Dominic told the court he was not going to be ready for trial. The court told Dominic that its December 5 order would direct the records custodians to provide the limited credit card documents “forthwith” so that Dominic would have them before trial, and if Dominic did not get the documents before trial, “we can talk about it then, but I’m not going to grant any continuances [of the trial] today.”

The court then ordered Dominic pay $3,892.50, in attorney’s fees and costs, to Mr. Gordon, in $200 monthly installments, beginning January 2, 2019, for the motions to quash or limit the Kaiser subpoena and credit card subpoenas. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2.) Mr. Gordon requested the $3,892.50 amount in his declaration supporting the motions to quash, and the court found that the amount was reasonable, given that Dominic did not agree with Mr. Gordon’s prefiling request to limit the scope of any of the subpoenas.

Dominic then complained to the court, “You know what, I’m not going to hold this trial. I’m not because I feel this Court is ruling against me all the time. I’m going to skip this trial.” (Italics added.) After the court completed the attorney’s fee order and confirmed the December 17 trial date, Dominic said, “I’m not coming back to this court.” He said he would be traveling at the time of trial, that he would be out of the country until the end of February, and he was “going to continue” the trial.

The court advised Dominic that if he was not present during trial, then he would not have “any argument” against any orders the court made that affected him. The court also noted that Dominic had not filed a motion to continue the trial, but if he filed and served one and the court found good cause for a continuance, it might continue the trial, “but right now that’s not before me, so I’m confirming the trial.” Dominic said, “All right. Okay,” and the December 5 hearing concluded.

E. The December 17, 2018 Trial

Dominic, representing himself, and Bibian, represented by Mr. Gordon, appeared in court for trial on December 17, 2018. After noting that the parties had “sort of dueling [RFO’s],” the court asked Mr. Gordon to begin. Mr. Gordon began by offering the court-appointed QDRO expert’s, Mr. Muir’s, QDRO evaluation and declaration into evidence. (Evid. Code, § 730.) Dominic then told the court that he was not ready for trial because he “never got the subpoenaed documents.”

The court (Judge Gilleece) reminded Dominic that the court had previously told him that it was not going to continue the trial, and asked Dominic whether he had called the records custodians to see when he could pick up the subpoenaed credit card documents. Dominic said he had been told that the documents were not ready because his request had not been made in time for the trial. The court said, “that’s why we went through the whole process to try to get them done before now.” Mr. Gordon said he “immediately wrote” to the credit card records custodians, with a copy of the court’s December 5 minute order, asking them to provide the documents “immediately,” but he had since not spoken with any of the custodians.

The court suggested to Dominic that he try to contact the custodians over the lunch hour to see when they could comply with the subpoenas. Dominic complained that he needed time to review the documents before he could be ready for trial. The court said, “this has been going on for a very long time,” and that the court was not going to continue the trial “for the discovery issue.” The court questioned whether it would be reasonable to continue the trial, given that Dominic had not “even tried” to ascertain when the custodians would produce the documents. Thus, the court denied Dominic’s request to continue the trial.

Dominic claimed he could not participate in the trial without the subpoenaed credit card documents, and he was being denied due process. The court responded, “I am not saying that you don’t get to have the documents. I have ordered those documents to be released to you and you can follow up, and if you want to submit an affidavit that says when the custodians of record[] say[] they are going to be available, I’ll consider that after lunch. But right now we are going to proceed.”

Dominic then objected to proceeding with the trial on the ground Mr. Gordon had not provided copies of the documents that Mr. Gordon intended to introduce at trial—in response to his discovery. Mr. Gordon pointed out that the court denied Dominic’s motion to compel, and, in any event, he gave Dominic “all of the documents” he intended to introduce at trial in April 2018, when he served Bibian’s RFO. Mr. Gordon also noted that Mr. Muir had given Dominic copies of the proposed QDRO’s. The court found that Dominic had “actual notice” of the documents Mr. Gordon intended to introduce, and overruled Dominic’s objection.

Mr. Gordon then introduced and explained the proposed QDRO documents, and called Bibian to testify. Dominic said, “I’m not participating in this trial.” The court said, “Okay,” and Bibian proceeded to testify.

Bibian first testified that, in the 2016 judgment, the court addressed the matter of investment accounts held in Bibian’s name, and reserved jurisdiction to determine the balance of those accounts, as well as community bank accounts and debts. Next, Mr. Gordon asked the court to take judicial notice of the 2016 judgment. When the court asked Dominic whether he had any objection, Dominic again said he was not participating in the trial and requested leave to “go home.” The court told Dominic he could leave if he wanted to, but the trial would proceed in his absence.

The court also told Dominic, “I’ve already told you that I’m not going to consider your [oral] motion to continue the trial. I don’t have a declaration. I don’t have a formal notice of the motion to continue pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure, and Mr. Gordon was not on notice that you were formally requesting a continuance today because of the subpoena issue.” The court also reminded Dominic that it was “going to make findings and orders based on the evidence,” and Dominic responded, “That’s fine.” Shortly thereafter, Dominic left the trial and did not return. Bibian continued to testify and present documentary evidence.

F. The Court’s Findings and Orders After Trial, and the 2019 Judgment

Following trial, the court made findings and orders, which were attached to the 2019 judgment. Among other things, the court found that $60,338.41 in “community assets” (the investment account balances) were not distributed by the 2016 judgment; that $44,467.56 in “community property credit card accounts” existed at the date of separation; that Bibian paid the credit card accounts “with her post-separation separate property income”; and that Bibian was therefore required to pay Dominic the sum of $7,936 (one-half of the $15,870.85 difference between $60,338.41 and $44,467.56). But the court also ordered that the $7,936 sum constituted an offset against the amount that Dominic owed Bibian pursuant to the 2019 judgment. The court found that Dominic owed Bibian $16,959.31 “as and for the balance of the equalization payment he was ordered to pay to her pursuant to the parties’ stipulation entered October 26, 2016” regarding Dominic’s purchase of Bibian’s interest in the Skyridge Lane residence, plus $125 for Dominic’s share of the appraisal fee associated with his refinancing of the residence, a total of $17,084.31. The court thus found that Dominic owed Bibian, “a net amount of $9,048.31.” ($17,084.31 minus $7,936.)

The court also found that Dominic had failed to pay Bibian $13,200 in sanctions “as ordered on March 29, 2017” and that this amount, plus interest at the legal rate from and after March 29, 2017, was due to Bibian. The court modified the 2016 judgment to award Bibian “full management and control” over three I.R.C. section 529 accounts held for the parties’ children, and directed Dominic to “forthwith cooperate” in taking “any and all action necessary” to transfer management and control of those accounts to Bibian. By a separate order, on December 17, 2018, the court entered a single QDRO concerning the division of the parties’ pension plans and made the QDRO “an integral part” of the 2016 judgment.

Lastly, the court ordered Dominic to pay Bibian $10,000 in sanctions (§ 271) and to pay Mr. Gordon’s law firm $19,993 of Bibian’s attorney’s fees “as and for additional sanctions” by March 17, 2019. (§§ 271, 2030.)

G. Dominic’s Subsequent RFO’s to Set Aside (1) the December 5 Order Denying Further Responses to His Discovery and (2) the 2019 Judgment

On December 14, 2018, Dominic filed an RFO (1) to set aside the December 5 order denying his October 2018 motion to compel further responses to his inspection demand, and (2) to reconsider its December 5 order awarding $3,892.50 in attorney’s fees and costs to Mr. Gordon for successfully moving to quash or limit the scope of Dominic’s Kaiser and credit card subpoenas. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2.) On January 11, 2019, Dominic filed another RFO, asking the court to set aside its findings and orders following the December 17, 2018 trial. The court (Judge Gilleece) heard and denied both RFO’s on March 20, 2019. Dominic appeals from the 2019 judgment.

III. DISCUSSION

Dominic claims the December 17, 2018 trial was “a farce” and “must be nullified in the interest of justice” because he was wrongfully denied pretrial discovery and due process both before and during the trial. More specifically, he claims that the court abused its discretion (1) in denying his motion to compel further responses to his inspection demand and original responses to his special interrogatories; and (2) in denying his requests, on December 5 and December 17, to continue the trial.

More generally, he claims the court was biased against him and denied him due process because it ruled against him on his motion to compel, on the motions to quash or limit his deposition subpoenas, and on his informal requests to continue the trial. He also challenges the court’s various sanctions and attorney’s fee and costs awards.

We find no merit to any of Dominic’s claims.

A. Dominic Has Not Shown He Was Prejudiced by the Denial of his Motion to Compel

Dominic claims he was wrongfully denied pretrial discovery because the court abused its discretion in denying his October 2018 motion to compel. As we have explained, the motion to compel had two parts: it sought further responses to Dominic’s inspection demand and original responses to Dominic’s special interrogatories. As noted, the court denied the motion to compel on the ground it did not include separate statements, as required by rule 3.1345.

Dominic correctly points out that he was not required to include a separate statement with his motion to compel original responses to the special interrogatories. (Rule 3.1345(c) [no separate statement required when no response has been provided to the request for discovery].) He also correctly points out that Bibian was late in serving her responses to his special interrogatories. Indeed, the record shows that Dominic served the interrogatories sometime in August 2018 but did not receive Bibian’s responses to the interrogatories until October 17, 2018, the day after he filed his motion to compel. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.260 [responses to interrogatories must be served within 30 days after interrogatories are served].) Thus, Bibian waived any objections to the special interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290.)

Dominic argues that the part of his motion to compel that sought further responses to his inspection demand complied with rule 3.1345, because it included what amounted to a separate statement. (See rule 3.1345(c).) The motion included a 14-page letter to Mr. Gordon, explaining why Dominic thought that Bibian’s objections to each inspection demand were “illogical and evasive” or were otherwise misplaced, and generally explaining why each demand sought relevant evidence.

In any event, Dominic’s entire claim fails because he has not shown that he was prejudiced by the court’s denial of either part of his motion to compel. When, as here, a party appeals from a judgment claiming error in the court’s pretrial discovery orders, the party “ ‘must “show not only that the trial court erred, but also that the error was prejudicial.” ’ ” (Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1020.) That is, the party must show that there is a reasonable probability that the “ultimate outcome would have been more favorable” to the party had the trial court not erred in its challenged discovery rulings. (Ibid; see Lickter v. Lickter (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 712, 740; see also Moore v. Mercer (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 424, 447-448; MacQuiddy v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1045-1046].)

Dominic has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that he would have realized a more favorable result at trial—in any respect—had the court granted all or either part of his motion to compel. First, the record does not include a copy of Bibian’s original responses to Dominic’s special interrogatories. Thus, Dominic has not shown what, if any, additional interrogatory responses he may have been entitled to receive but did not receive, and whether there is a reasonable probability that any such additional responses may have caused him to realize a more favorable result at trial.

Nor has Dominic shown that he was prejudiced by Bibian’s failure to produce any records in response to his inspection demand. The inspection demand was exceedingly broad. It sought numerous documents concerning Bibian’s income, assets, and debts from the period of January 1, 2008 through June 1, 2010.

The inspection demand very generally concerned the investment account and credit card account balances at separation. It was undisputed that the investment account balances at separation were community property, and the only issue to be determined at trial concerning the investment accounts was their balances at separation. The issues to be determined at trial concerning the credit card debts were (1) their balances at separation; (2) the sources of the credit card debts, and (3) whether Bibian paid the credit card debts with her separate property.

At trial, Bibian testified and adduced supporting documentary evidence that she had four credit cards (two at Chase, one at Bank of America, and one at Capital One), with balances totaling $44,467.56 at the time of the parties’ April 8, 2009 separation. She further testified that she incurred the credit card debts “during marriage” for “community purposes,” including for home improvements, clothes, shoes, and household items. She also showed that she paid off each of the four credit cards with her separate property income that she earned after the separation. The two Chase credit cards were fully paid in September 2012; the Bank of America credit card was fully paid in April 2013; and the Capital One credit card was fully paid in October 2010.

In this appeal, Dominic has not explained how any of the myriad and multiple records he sought in his inspection demand, and that he did not receive from Mr. Gordon before trial, might have assisted him in showing that the amounts of the credit card debts were not what Bibian claimed they were; that the credit card debts were not incurred for community purposes; or that the credit card debts were not paid with Bibian’s separate property funds. The inspection demand was not focused on any of these issues. Thus, Dominic has not shown that he was prejudiced by the denial of his motion to compel.

B. The Court Properly Denied Dominic’s Requests to Continue the Trial

Dominic claims that the court abused its discretion and denied him due process in denying his requests to continue the trial. We disagree.

Rule 3.1332(a) states that “the dates assigned for a trial are firm” and “[a]ll parties and their counsel must regard the date set for trial as certain.” Thus, trial continuances are “disfavored.” (Rule 3.1332(c).) The court is authorized to grant a request to continue a trial, only upon an “affirmative showing of good cause.” (Ibid.) In addition, a party seeking a trial continuance must request the continuance by a noticed motion or an ex parte application, with supporting declarations, and “as soon as reasonably practical once the necessity for the continuance is discovered.” (Rule 3.1332(b).)

“Circumstances that may indicate good cause” for a continuance include “a party’s excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts.” (Rule 3.1332(c)(6), italics added.) In ruling on a motion or application for a continuance, the court must consider “all the facts and circumstances that are relevant to the determination,” including, if applicable, “the availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance.” (Rule 3.1332(d)(4).)

“A trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny continuances,” and we review its denial of a continuance request for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 508.) We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s denials of Dominic’s requests to continue the trial. Dominic implicitly asked the court to continue the trial on December 5, 2018, after the court limited the scope of his credit cards subpoenas and he claimed he was not going to be ready for trial. He made a second oral request at the outset of the December 17 trial.

The court did not abuse its discretion in denying either of Dominic’s two informal requests to continue the trial. Dominic never filed a motion or ex parte application to continue the trial, with a declaration showing good cause. (Rule 3.1332(b).) Bibian and Mr. Gordon were ready for trial, and had no notice, before trial, of any request by Dominic to continue the trial or any grounds for a continuance.

The record also shows that the court did all that it reasonably could have done to help Dominic be prepared for trial. On December 5, 2018, the court ordered the records custodians to provide the subpoenaed credit card documents “forthwith” so that Dominic would have them before trial, and told Dominic that if he did not get the documents before trial, “we can talk about it then.”

But the court clarified that it would not grant a continuance unless Dominic filed and served a motion and demonstrated good cause. Then, when the parties and Mr. Gordon appeared in court for trial, Dominic complained that he was not ready because the records custodians had not produced any of the subpoenaed credit card documents. He said had been “been told” that the documents were not ready because his “requests” were not made in time for the documents to be produced before trial. But he did not explain why he did not file a motion or an ex parte application to continue the trial with a declaration showing good cause. In such a motion, he might have explained that he was unable to obtain the credit card documents before trial and asked the court to at least defer ruling on the division of the alleged community credit card debts until he was able to obtain the subpoenaed documents.

But Dominic did not do that. Instead, he indicated to the court that he had spoken with the credit card records custodians since December 5, but he did not give the court any estimate of when the credit card documents would be produced. When the court suggested he call the custodians during the lunch hour to find out when the documents would be produced, he ignored the suggestion and complained that he needed time to review the documents before he could be ready for trial. Given Dominic’s failure to ascertain, before trial, when or approximately when the credit card documents would be produced, and given Dominic’s failure to file a written motion or ex parte application to continue the trial on or before December 17, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dominic’s request to continue the trial on the day of trial.

The record also shows, and the court was ostensibly aware, that Dominic had ample time to prepare for the trial on the issue of the credit card debts but failed to do so. In April 2018, Bibian filed her RFO in part asking the court to divide precisely $44,467.56 in alleged community credit card debts. On August 2, 2018, the December 17, 2018 trial date was set. Dominic did not issue his credit card subpoenas until October 12, 2018 (three subpoenas) and November 3, 2018 (one subpoena). After Bibian moved to quash or limit each subpoena on November 7, 2018, the hearings on Bibian’s motions were advanced from January 3, 2019 to December 5, 2018, so that they could be heard on the same as Dominic’s motion to compel. Dominic could have but did not issue his credit card subpoenas long before October 2018 and November 2018. If he had issued the subpoenas shortly after April 2018, when Bibian filed her RFO, or shortly after August 2, 2018, when the December 17 trial date was set, it appears that he would have had the subpoenaed credit card documents long before the December 17 trial.

C. Dominic’s Claims of Judicial Bias Are Wholly Unsupported by the Record

Dominic generally claims that the court’s denials of his informal and unsupported requests to continue the trial, and its other rulings against him, show that the court was biased against him. We disagree.

In reviewing a claim of judicial bias, an appellate court determines whether the judge’s behavior was so prejudicial that it denied a party a fair trial or hearing. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112.) Nothing in the record remotely indicates that any of the court’s rulings against Dominic were based on judicial bias. A court’s rulings against a party, even if erroneous, do not alone establish bias. (Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 786.) And here, nothing in the record indicates that any of the court’s rulings against Dominic were based on judicial bias. To the contrary, the record shows that Dominic has consistently and subjectively construed the court’s rulings against him as based on judicial bias, without any basis in fact.

For example, on August 2, 2018, Dominic accused the court (Judge Apaloo) of denying his request to dismiss Bibian’s April 2018 RFO or set aside the 2016 judgment, not on the merits of his request, but on the ground he was self-represented. On December 5, 2018, after the court (Judge Gilleece) denied Dominic’s motion to compel, granted Bibian’s motion to quash Dominic’s Kaiser subpoena, and granted Bibian’s motions to limit Dominic’s credit card subpoenas, Dominic told the court he would not be appearing at trial because the court was “ruling against” him “all the time.” And, at trial on December 17, 2018, Dominic complained of being denied due process because the trial judge (Judge Gilleece) would not continue the trial.

Dominic also claims the court was biased against him because it allowed Bibian’s counsel, Mr. Gordon, to proceed first at trial, even though Dominic was the petitioner in this dissolution proceeding. Nothing in the record supports this claim. Trial courts have inherent and statutory authority, and broad discretion, to regulate the order of proof at trial. (People ex rel Reisig v. Acuna (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1, 23-24; Evid. Code, § 320.) Nothing in the record indicates that the court abused its discretion in asking Mr. Gordon to proceed first at trial. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 207 [trial court’s rulings on order of proof reviewed for abuse of discretion].)

D. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding Mr. Gordon $3,892.50 in Attorney’s Fees and Costs for Bibian’s Motions to Quash the Kaiser Subpoena and Limit the Credit Card Subpoenas (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1987.1, 1987.2.)

Courts have discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in moving to quash or limit a subpoena, “if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2.) We review the trial court’s award of discovery sanctions for abuse of discretion. (Vasquez v. California School of Culinary Arts, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 35, 40-41.)

The court awarded Mr. Gordon $3,442.50 in attorney’s fees and $450 in costs (a total of $3,892.50), for having successfully moved to quash Dominic’s Kaiser subpoena and limit the scope of Dominic’s credit card subpoenas (the motions to quash).

Dominic claims this was an abuse of the court’s discretion because Mr. Gordon falsely told the court that Dominic did not respond to a “meet and confer” letter that Mr. Gordon sent to Dominic before Mr. Gordon filed the motions to quash. This claim is a red herring, because Dominic never agreed to limit the scope of any of his deposition subpoenas in response to Mr. Gordon’s “meet and confer” request.

In support of the motions to quash and requests for attorney’s fees and costs, Mr. Gordon submitted declarations stating that he wrote to Dominic in October 2018, before he filed the motions, asking Dominic to limit the scope of the credit card subpoenas “to charges prior to the date of separation.” In his declarations, Mr. Gordon claimed he did not receive a response to his letter from Dominic. Instead, on November 2, 2018, he received another credit card subpoena, which indicated to him that Dominic had “no intention” of limiting the scope of the subpoenas or discussing the matter “in an appropriate meet and confer.”

At the December 5, 2018, hearing on the motions to quash, Mr. Gordon confirmed that Dominic did not respond to his “meet and confer requests.” Dominic disagreed and adduced a copy of an email that he sent to Mr. Gordon, on October 28, 2018, in response to Mr. Gordon’s meet and confer letter. The court said it was “tak[ing]” Dominic “at his word” that he sent the email to Mr. Gordon, but the court also asked Dominic, “But you didn’t agree [to limit the scope of the subpoenas]; correct?” Dominic did not answer the court’s question. Mr. Gordon said he did not recall seeing Dominic’s October 28 email, although he did not deny that Dominic sent it. The email was not attached to Dominic’s opposition to the motions to quash.

The court issued the $3,892.50 attorney’s fee and cost award on the ground that the motions to quash were necessary, given that Dominic did not agree, in his October 28 email or at any other time, to limit the scope of his subpoenas before the motions to quash were filed. The court said, “Mr. Ehirim, I tend to agree with Mr. Gordon and as a result of the subpoenas being issued and not limited or withdrawn, I am going to award attorney’s fees [and costs] in the amount requested by Mr. Gordon.” This was not an abuse of the court’s discretion. Given the limited issues to be tried, the Kaiser and credit card subpoenas were “oppressive” in scope. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.2.) Thus, the court reasonably determined that Dominic did not have “substantial justification” to refuse to limit the scope of any of his subpoenas and oppose the motions to quash in their entirety. (Ibid.)

E. Dominic Has Not Shown that The Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding Bibian $13,200 in Sanctions Against Dominic on April 4, 2017 (§ 271)

The 2019 judgment includes a finding that Dominic failed to pay Bibian the $13,200 in sanctions “as ordered on March 29, 2017,” and that “said amount is due, plus the interest at the legal rate from the date of said Order.” Dominic claims the court abused its discretion in awarding Bibian $13,200 in sanctions. (§ 271.) We review an award of sanctions under section 271 for abuse of discretion and reverse “only if, considering all of the evidence viewed more favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order.” (In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1225-1226.)

“A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Dominic has not affirmatively shown error. Specifically, he has not shown that the court abused its discretion in issuing the $13,200 sanctions order.

1. Relevant Background

The record indicates that, on March 29, 2017, a hearing was held on two RFO’s that Bibian filed on July 29, 2016 and September 9, 2016. The record does not include a reporter’s transcript of the March 29, 2017 hearing or copies of the two RFO’s that the court considered at the hearing. But at the hearing, the court took the matter under submission, and issued the $13,200 sanctions order on April 4, 2017. The April 4 order includes a two-page attachment explaining the $13,200 sanctions order.

The April 4, 2017 order indicates that, in her July 2016 RFO, Bibian sought sanctions against Dominic (§ 271) for his failure to cooperate in completing QDRO’s for the parties’ pension plans. In her September 2016 RFO, Bibian sought sanctions against Dominic for his failure to cooperate in arranging the sale of the parties’ Skyridge Lane residence. In the 2016 judgment, the court ordered the parties to cooperate with the court’s appointed QDRO expert, Mr. Muir, in preparing QDRO’s for each of the parties’ defined benefit pension plans. The 2016 judgment also ordered the parties’ Skyridge Lane residence to be sold, and the proceeds divided equally between the parties, but the 2016 judgment also allowed Dominic to “buy out” Bibian’s interest in the residence.

The April 4, 2017 order indicates that, for many months after the 2016 judgment was entered, Dominic failed to cooperate in completing the QDRO’s and in arranging the sale of the Skyridge Lane residence. On July 25, 2016, before Bibian filed her July 2016 RFO, the court entered a second order to “effectuate the sale of the home.” On October 26, 2016, Dominic agreed to “settle” the QDRO matter and to “reset the timing of the sale” of the Skyridge Lane residence.

The April 4, 2017 order also indicates that the March 29, 2017 hearing on Bibian’s July 2016 and September 2016 RFOs was continued several times. Before the hearing, Bibian filed an updated income and expense declaration, a property declaration, and an attorney’s fee declaration. Dominic filed a response to the July 2016 RFO concerning the QDRO’s, but he did not file a response to the September 2016 RFO concerning the sale of the Skyridge Lane residence. He also did not file an income and expense declaration or property declaration concerning Bibian’s sanctions requests, although the hearing on Bibian’s pending RFOs for sanctions was continued in order to give him an opportunity to do so.

In the April 4, 2017 order, the court ordered Dominic to pay Bibian a total of $13,200 in sanctions (§ 271), comprised of $15,000 less $1,800 that Bibian owed Dominic “for the equalization of an automobile.” The court found that the resolution of the QDRO matter and the sale of the Skyridge Lane residence had been “significantly delayed” due to Dominic’s “uncooperative stance.” The court also found that “there should have been no need” for Bibian to have filed her June 2016 and September 2016 RFOs, months after the 2016 judgment was entered on January 25, 2016, concerning either the QDRO’s or the sale of the Skyridge Lane residence.

The court also found that Dominic’s uncooperative “behavior” was “specifically the kind meant to be addressed by an order for [section 271] sanctions.” Dominic “not only failed to comply with multiple court orders, [two] of which were for the same thing, but he also failed to comply with the rules of court regarding the provision of an Income and Expense Declaration. The court also believes it is appropriate for sanctions to be made in consideration of the amount of attorney’s fees [$15,783] expended by [Bibian]” in pursuing her June 2016 and September 2016 RFO’s.

2. Analysis

In claiming that the court abused its discretion in issuing the $13,200 April 4, 2017 sanctions order, Dominic raises various arguments, none of which are supported by the record on appeal. Among other things, he argues that, regarding the sale of the Skyridge Lane residence, the parties had “an implied agreement” “to wait for the outcome” of his appeal in Ehirim I before they “would work together to generate a balance sheet of the community property to determine who will pay who what.” Nothing in the record supports this claim.

Dominic also claims that, at the March 29, 2017 hearing, he told the court that he had not been served with Bibian’s income and expense declaration, and that the court would not allow him sufficient time to review the declaration or to prepare his own income and expense declaration. He also claims that, by the time of the April 4, 2017 sanctions order, he had refinanced the Skyridge Lane residence and had paid Bibian most of her community share of the residence, and given that circumstance the $13,200 sanctions award imposed an unreasonable financial burden on him. (§ 271. ) None of these arguments are supported by the record. The record shows that the court gave Dominic ample opportunity to show that the $13,200 sanctions order would impose an unreasonable financial burden on him, but he did not do so.

Dominic argues that Bibian’s “dirty hands” precluded her from seeking the $13,200 in sanctions, because she did not pay him his “share of the sale of the Honda Accord as she was ordered to pay by the court on February 13, 2015, and on the judgment of January 25, 2016.” Neither the court’s February 13, 2015 statement of decision, which was issued following the parties’ 2014 trial, nor the 2016 judgment, ordered Bibian to pay Dominic any amount in relation to a Honda Accord.

In any event, the record indicates that the $1,800 offset to the $15,000 in sanctions award, which resulted in the net sanctions award of $13,200, was to compensate Dominic for his share of the Honda Accord. Indeed, in claiming that Bibian did not compensate him for his share of the Honda Accord, Dominic argues, “[t]his defect cannot be cured by any offset,” and cites the April 4, 2017 sanctions order, where the court stated it was reducing the $15,000 sanctions award by $1,800 to compensate Dominic “for the equalization of an automobile.” Dominic’s claim indicates that the $1,800 offset was to compensate him for his share of the Honda Accord.

F. Dominic Has Not Shown that the Court Abused its Discretion in Denying his Request to Dismiss Bibian’s April 2018 RFO or to Set Aside the 2016 Judgment

Dominic claims the court violated his due process rights and section 2107 when, on August 2, 2018, the court denied his request to dismiss Bibian’s entire April 2018 RFO, or to set aside the 2016 judgment. He claims he was entitled to this relief because Bibian failed to disclose her community investment account balances and the community credit card debts in her preliminary and final declarations of disclosure, before the 2014 trial that resulted in the court’s February 13, 2015 statement of decision and the 2016 judgment.

Section 2107 requires the court to set aside a judgment if a party has failed to comply with “all disclosure requirements” of chapter 9 of the Family Code (§ 2100 et seq.). (§ 2107, subd. (d).) But as the court noted in denying Dominic’s request to dismiss Bibian’s April 2018 RFO or set aside the 2016 judgment, any defenses (e.g., nondisclosure, laches) that Dominic may have had to Bibian’s April 2018 RFO claims were “trial issues” to be determined at the upcoming December 17, 2018 trial. Dominic refused to participate in the trial and left the trial shortly after it began. He had ample opportunity to raise his nondisclosure and laches defenses at trial, but he did not do so. Thus, it was not a lack of due process but solely Dominic’s own actions that prevented him from raising these important issues at trial.

The record also indicates that, if Bibian failed to disclose anything to Dominic, it was the amounts or balances, at the time of separation, of the community investment accounts and the credit card accounts, not the existence of those accounts. In the 2016 judgment, the court reserved jurisdiction “over the issue of community credit card debt” and the division of Bibian’s investment account balances at the time of separation. (Ehirim I, supra, at *52-53.)

In Ehirim I, Dominic argued that, in the 2016 judgment, the court “should have divided equally the proceeds from the parties’ bank accounts and Bibian’s brokerage accounts at T. Rowe Price, Vanguard, and the Oakmark Funds.” (Ehirim I., supra, at *52.) In response, we noted, “the court did not rule that it would never divide the community property funds in these accounts. Rather, it ruled that it had no evidence of these account balances at the time of separation in April 2009, and it could not, therefore, determine what equalization payments might be necessary. It expressly retained jurisdiction over the issue, in the event that a party could show the value of these accounts at the time of separation and request a proper division.” (Ehirim I., supra, at *52-53, italics added.)

G. Substantial Evidence Supports the $10,000 in Sanctions and $19,993 in Sanctions and Attorney’s Fees, Awarded Against Dominic in the 2019 Judgment

Lastly, Dominic challenges the portion of the 2019 judgment awarding Bibian $10,000 in sanctions (§ 271) and awarding Mr. Gordon $19,993 in attorney’s fees and sanctions. (§§ 271, 2030.) He claims the court did not follow the provisions of section 271 in making either award.

Again, we review an award of sanctions under section 271 for abuse of discretion, and we review any findings of fact that formed the basis of the sanctions award for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Corona, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1225-1226.) In making the challenged awards, the court found that Dominic had “unduly delayed resolution” of the case and had caused Bibian to incur unnecessary attorney’s fees to resolve “this post-Judgment matter” by failing to engage in good faith efforts to resolve the postseparation issues, and by making “unreasonable” demands on Bibian to settle the outstanding issues, including: (1) by demanding that she waive her right to collect the $13,200 in sanctions that the court had previously awarded her; (2) by demanding that she waive her interest in Dominic’s CalPERS pension plan and the balance of the equalization payment that was due to her for the Skyridge Lane residence; and (3) by threatening “that he would keep this litigation going for ten (10) years if she did not accede to his demands.” The court also found that Dominic “made repeated oral requests to continue the trial on the post-judgment issues without complying with Court rules and procedures,” and that his “litigation conduct” had “frustrated the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” (§ 271.) The record amply supports these factual findings and shows that the sanctions and attorney’s fees awards were made in accordance with sections 271 and 2030. The awards were not an abuse of the court’s discretion.

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Bibian shall recover her costs on appeal. (Rule 8.278.)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

CODRINGTON

J.

Parties and Attorneys
In re the Marriage of Dominic and Bibian Ehirim
Case Number E072397
Party Attorney

Dominic O. Ehirim : Appellant
14780 Skyridge Lane
Chino Hills, CA 91709 Pro Per

Bibian Ehirim : Respondent
Christiaan Joseph Gordon
Gordon Gordon Lawyers APC
1200 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 608
Los Angeles, CA 90017

Errol Jay Gordon
Gordon Gordon Lawyers APC
1200 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 608
Los Angeles, CA 90017