2010-00091514-CU-OE

Annica Hagadorn vs. Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department

Nature of Proceeding: Dawn Douglas’ Pitchess Motion Purs to Evidence Code Section 1043 &

Filed By: Wong, Alice W.

Plaintiff Dawn Douglas’ Pitchess Motion is granted/denied as follows: Evidence
Code sections 1043, 1045.

Defendant shall produce for in camera review the documents responsive to Requests
for Production Nos. 4, 6, 7, and 8. The motion is denied as to Requests for
Production Nos. 1 and 2 on the ground plaintiff made no effort to limit the scope of
documents but rather sought the entire personnel files of Maness and Beezley.
Defendant also is ordered to produce for in camera review the documents responsive
to Special Interrogatories Nos. 14, 17, and 21. The motion is denied, without
prejudice, as to the remaining Special Interrogatories (Nos. 12, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 25,
26, 27) as these interrogatories do not refer to documents and therefore cannot be the
subject of an in camera review.

The Defendant shall obtain a date and time for the in camera hearing after meeting
and conferring with plaintiffs’ counsel. The date of the in camera hearing shall be
stayed for a period of at least 30 days to allow plaintiff Annica Hagadorn to file another
Pitchess motion curing the defects. It is preferable to have one in camera review for
this case rather than piecemeal in camera reviews.

At the time of the in camera review, the court will review the records in the presence of
a court reporter and the custodian of records must be present. The custodian shall be
prepared to identify and verify the completeness of the records. Neither counsel for
plaintiff nor counsel for defendant in this case may be present. The custodian of
records may be represented by his or her own counsel not from the same firm as
defendant’s counsel.

Plaintiff Dawn Douglas has been employed as a Deputy Sheriff for 22 years and is
currently a lieutenant at the main jail. She alleges that she was subjected to race and
gender discrimination as well as harassment/hostile work environment and retaliation
for complaining about discrimination by Defendant. Plaintiff contends she was denied 15 positions from February 2006 through September 2009 that were required to obtain
the rank of Captain, and that less qualified male lieutenants were given the positions.
Plaintiff alleges that she was retaliated against for reporting that Captain Maness
engaged in preferential treatment and inappropriate relationship with Deputy Beezley.
Douglas received reports from co-plaintiff Keillor about the alleged inappropriate
relationship between Maness and Beezley and that Beezley was being given
preferential treatment. Douglas contends that Maness demoted her and replaced her
with a less qualified Caucasion male.

The documents sought include the entire personnel files of Maness and Beezley,
evaluations of Beezley,complaints about the relationship between Maness and
Beezley , training provided to them regarding discrimination , and communications
between Maness and Beezley. The Declaration of Wong and the Declaration of
Lieutenant Dawn Douglas establish the materiality of the information requested.

A party seeking discovery of a peace officer’s personnel records must establish that
the information sought is relevant and material to the claims in order to establish the
“good cause” for overcoming the privacy concerns in such records. (Evid. Code §
1043; see also City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 83.) The
moving party at all times has the burden of proof (Evid. Code § 500.) While averments
of counsel in the supporting declaration may be made on “information and belief,” such
averments must furnish specific foundational
facts. (People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 682-684) [overruled on other grounds
by People V. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 172].) The facts averred must provide a
“specific factual scenario” which supports a “plausible factual foundation” of the case. (
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 531); City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal
Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d at 85; City of San Jose
V. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1146 [no facts asserted to show how
evidence was mishandled, or how statements were coerced].)

In this case, Plaintiff Douglas has shown that the information sought is relevant and
material to the claims of preferential treatment of Beezley, failure to promote, and
retaliation for complaining of the relationship between Beezley and Maness.

The fact that plaintiffs do not have evidence of a sexual relationship is not dispositive.
The issue is whether the Deputy received preferential treatment, and whether Douglas
was retaliated against for complaining about it. The Declaration of Douglas contains
sufficient evidence to show the materiality of the documents sought.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule
3.1312 or further notice is required.

Item 4 2010-00091514-CU-OE

Annica Hagadorn vs. Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department

Nature of Proceeding: Annica Hagadorn’s Pitchess Motion Purs to Evidence Code Section

Filed By: Wong, Alice W. Plaintiff Annica Hagadorn’s Pitchess Motion is denied, without prejudice. Evidence
Code 1043 and 1045.

Plaintiffs allege claims for gender and race discrimination, contending that she has
been denied 41 positions to which she applied. She alleges that male Caucasians who
were less qualified than she was received the promotions. Plaintiff seeks documents
in personnel files of peace officers, yet her motion only attaches the discovery
requests without discussing in her points and authorities what documents she is
seeking and why they are relevant to any particular peace officers conduct that gives
rise to this action.

Evid Code § 1043 requires that the motion shall include: (1) Identification of the
proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is sought, the party seeking discovery or
disclosure, the peace or custodial officer whose records are sought, the governmental
agency which has custody and control of the records, and the time and place at which
the motion for discovery or disclosure shall be heard. (2) A description of the type of
records or information sought. (3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or
disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in
the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency
identified has the records or information from the records.

Here, plaintiff merely attaches her Request for Production of Documents, and,
although she has identified the categories sought, she has not established the
materiality of her claims in connection with the documents sought.

A party seeking discovery of a peace officer’s personnel records must establish that
the information sought is relevant and material to the claims in order to establish the
“good cause” for overcoming the privacy concerns in such records. (Evid. Code §
1043; see also City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 83.) The
moving party at all times has the burden of proof (Evid. Code § 500.) While averments
of counsel in the supporting declaration may be made on “information and belief,” such
averments must furnish specific foundational facts. (People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d
658, 682-684) [overruled on other grounds by People V. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal. 4th
172].) The facts averred must provide a “specific factual scenario” which supports a
“plausible factual foundation” of the case. (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.
3d 531); City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court , supra, 49 Cal.3d at 85; City of San
Jose V. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1146 [no facts asserted to show
how evidence was mishandled, or how statements were coerced].)

A showing of good cause must be based on a discovery request tailored to the specific
officer conduct alleged in the case. (California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000)
84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1120-1121.) In enacting the protections of Evidence Code
sections 1040, et seq., the Legislature’s aim “manifestly was to protect [peace officer]
records against ‘fishing expeditions.'” (San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal 4th 47,
54; Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at 538 (the information sought must be “requested with
adequate specificity to preclude the possibility that [moving party] is engaging in a
‘fishing expedition.'”) Thus, if a litigant fails to specifically tie the discovery request to
the specific conduct alleged, the request should be denied. (California Highway Patrol,
supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at 1120-1122.

Plaintiff has failed to offer any analysis in her points and authorities as to what the
documents are and how they are relevant to this case. The Court is staying the in
camera review ordered in the companion motions by co-plaintiffs to allow plaintiff to file
another motion to cure the defects.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or further notice is
required.

Item 5 2010-00091514-CU-OE

Annica Hagadorn vs. Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department

Nature of Proceeding: Tracie Keillor’s Pitchess Motion Purs to Evidence Code Section 1043 &

Filed By: Wong, Alice W.

Plaintiff Tracie Keillor’s Pitchess Motion is granted. Evidence Code sections 1043 and
1045.

Defendant is to produce the documents responsive to Requests for Production Nos. 1,
2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 13 for in camera review.

The Defendant shall obtain a date and time for the in camera hearing after meeting
and conferring with plaintiffs’ counsel. The date of the in camera hearing shall be
stayed for a period of at least 30 days to allow plaintiff Annica Hagadorn to file another
Pitchess motion curing the defects. It is preferable to have one in camera review for
this case rather than piecemeal in camera reviews.

At the time of the in camera review, the court will review the records in the presence of
a court reporter and the custodian of records must be present. The custodian shall be
prepared to identify and verify the completeness of the records. Neither counsel for
plaintiff nor counsel for defendant in this case may be present. The custodian of
records may be represented by his or her own counsel not from the same firm as
defendant’s counsel.

Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by the Sheriff’s Department for 17 years as a
deputy sergeant and is currently a sergeant in the Rancho Cordova Police
Department. She alleges that she was subject to gender discrimination and
harassment/hostile work environment and retaliation for complaining to defendant
about discrimination, including reporting about preferential treatment and an
inappropriate relationship between a Captain and another Deputy. Plaintiff made
numerous reports to her supervisor and co-plaintiff, Lieutenant Dawn Douglas, of the
inappropriate relationship. Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Scott Jones (then Captain) told
her to leave the Deputy alone because he had promised the Captain that he would
watch over the Deputy. Thereafter, the Captain was transferred to the main jail where
he allegedly began taking retaliatory actions against the plaintiffs.

The documents sought concern the personnel file of the Deputy who is alleged to have
been preferentially treated at the expense of plaintiff. The declaration of Wong and
the Declaration of Lieutenant Dawn Douglas establish the materiality of the information
requested.

A party seeking discovery of a peace officer’s personnel records must establish that
the information sought is relevant and material to the claims in order to establish the
“good cause” for overcoming the privacy concerns in such records. (Evid. Code § 1043; see also City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 83.) The
moving party at all times has the burden of proof (Evid. Code § 500.) While averments
of counsel in the supporting declaration may be made on “information and belief,” such
averments must furnish specific foundational
facts. (People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 682-684) [overruled on other grounds
by People V. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 172].) The facts averred must provide a
“specific factual scenario” which supports a “plausible factual foundation” of the case. (
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 531); City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal
Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d at 85; City of San Jose
V. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1146 [no facts asserted to show how
evidence was mishandled, or how statements were coerced].)

In this case, Plaintiff Keillor has shown that the information sought is relevant and
material to the claims of preferential treatment. Plaintiff contends County has told her
that all documents pertaining to the investigation of the alleged “inappropriate
relationship” were destroyed.

The fact that plaintiffs do not have evidence of a sexual relationship is not dispositive.
The issue is whether the Deputy received preferential treatment, and the Declaration
of Douglas contains facts from which preferential treatment can be inferred.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule
3.1312 or further notice is required.