PETRA CASTANEDA v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & Co., ET AL.
Case No.: 1-13-CV-256861
DATE: May 15, 2014
TIME: 9:00 a.m.
DEPT.: 8

The Request for Judicial Notice of the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) by Defendant Sears, Roebuck & Co. (“Sears”), while unnecessary and redundant as the Court already considers the face of the pleading under attack in ruling on a demurrer, is GRANTED pursuant to Evid. Code §452(d).

Sears demurrers to the FAC’s 1st and 2nd causes of action, Negligence and Negligent Hiring, Supervision and Retention respectively, on the ground that both fail to state sufficient facts because the Court has no jurisdiction over the claims due to the Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity Rule (Labor Code §§3600, 3602). See Notice of Demurrer at 2:2-15. This demurrer is SUSTAINED with 10 days’ leave to amend.

To determine if workers’ compensation exclusivity bars a claim, there is a two-step inquiry: (1) the court must determine whether the plaintiff is seeking relief for an injury sustained and arising out of the course of employment; (2) “if the injuries did arise out of and in the course of employment, the exclusive remedy provisions apply notwithstanding that the injury resulted from the intentional conduct of the employer, and even though the employer’s conduct might be characterized as egregious”, unless the employer stepped out of its proper role or engaged in conduct of questionable relationship to the employment. See Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 15-16.

Plaintiff alleges that the proximate cause of her injury was Defendants’ failure to “promptly summon” medical care. FAC at 50. However the FAC alleges that while Plaintiff felt ill before leaving home on Nov. 28, 2011 she voluntarily went to work and then only requested permission to leave because she did not feel well and/or felt sick. While there was a delay in granting Plaintiff’s request to leave until her supervisor arrived and gave permission, Plaintiff was allowed to leave work. See FAC at 15-28 generally. There is no allegation that Plaintiff was aware, much less communicated to Sears, that she was suffering the symptoms of a stroke. Plaintiffs’ worsening condition while at work is a personal injury sustained in and arising out of the course and scope of her employment. Even if the delay in granting Plaintiff the only relief she requested, permission to leave, were considered egregious that would not be enough by itself to escape the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. There are no allegations of any intentional wrongdoing by Sears or of any behavior/conduct that could reasonably be described as the employer stepping out of its proper role or outside the “compensation bargain.”

Once Plaintiff was given permission to leave work she was free to seek or call medical aid. She was under no obligation to heed the suggestion by her supervisor that she sit in her car rather than drive away and Sears was not exercising any control over her once she had been granted permission to leave. While Plaintiff’s opposition recites several of the exceptions to workers compensation exclusivity it fails to explain how any of them apply the facts alleged here or how their application is supported by allegations in the FAC.