2013-00146522-CU-BT

Image Int’l Manufacturing vs. Lira Cosmeceutical

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Quash Service of Summons

Filed By: Radcliffe, Scott E.

Cross-defendant Ronert’s motion to quash service of summons and cross-complaint
for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED, as follows.

Opposing counsel is admonished for failing to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(3)-(4).

Ronert, a Florida resident who was served with the summons and cross-complaint
there, seeks to quash service of summons on the ground she lacks the requisite
“minimum contacts” with the State of California such that there can be no general or
specific personal jurisdiction over her. More specifically, Ronert asserts there is no
general jurisdiction over her because she is not a California resident and cross-
complainants’ cannot make the requisite evidentiary showing needed to establish
specific jurisdiction over Ronert.

Cross-complainants’ oppose the motion. Although they concede there is no general
jurisdiction over Ronert, they argue the facts are sufficient to support specific
jurisdiction here because (1) the misconduct on which Ronert’s liability is based was
committed by her while in California and/or by correspondence which she directed at
cross-complainants who are residents of California and (2) the cross-complaint is
inextricably intertwined with the complaint such that the prosecution of the claims
against Ronert in this action will avoid a separate lawsuit and the potential for
inconsistent results. The opposition is supported by declarations from cross-
complainant Dalikas and her attorney, Mr. Levine.

Cross-defendant Ronert’s objection to the entirety of both the Dalikas and Levine
Declarations on the ground neither is signed under penalty of perjury in conformity with
Code of Civil Procedure §2015.5 is sustained.

Cross-defendant Ronert’s additional objections to select portions of the Dalikas
Declaration are sustained except for objection Nos. 6 and 9-13, each of which is
hereby overruled.

Cross-defendant Ronert’s additional objections to select portions of the Levine
Declaration are sustained except for objection No. 1, which is hereby overruled.

It is well established that cross-complainants, as the parties seeking to establish
personal jurisdiction over Ronert, bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that Ronert has the requisite “minimum contacts” with California. (School
Dist. Of Okaloosa County v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1131.) Cross-
complainants must “provide affidavits and other authenticated documents in order to
demonstrate competent evidence of jurisdictional facts. … Declarations cannot be
mere vague assertions of ultimate facts, but must offer specific evidentiary facts
permitting a court to form an independent conclusion on the issue of jurisdiction.” (
CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1118.)

However, as noted above, Ronert’s objection to the entirety of both declarations
submitted in opposition to this motion based on cross-complainants’ failure to comply
with Code of Civil Procedure §2015.5 has been sustained. Accordingly, none of the
evidence filed in opposition to this motion can be properly considered by this Court and
Ronert’s motion must therefore be granted since cross-complainants failed to carry
their burden of proof. Even if the Court were to overlook the fact that cross-complainants’ two declarations
were not signed under penalty of perjury as required by Code of Civil Procedure
§2015.5, the vast majority of cross-defendant Ronert’s other objections to specific
portions of both declarations was sustained and leave the Court with little admissible
evidence to consider in connection with this motion. Such evidence falls far short of
establishing by a “preponderance of the evidence” that Ronert has the requisite
“minimum contacts” with California to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
her.

In particular, the evidence in opposition fails to demonstrate that Ronert’s alleged
conduct outside of this state was expressly aimed and/or calculated to cause injury to
cross-defendants within the meaning of Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783, which
held that a reporter and editor based in Florida were subject to personal jurisdiction in
California as result of an allegedly defamatory article published in California about a
California resident. In reaching that result, the United States Supreme Court
distinguished the reporter and publisher’s intentional conduct which was directed at a
specific California resident who suffered harm from a scenario where a defendant can
merely “foresee” a possibility of an injury being caused in another jurisdiction. (Calder,
at 789 [discussing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286
and other precedent].)

In the case at bar, there is no admissible evidence which supports a finding that cross-
defendant Ronert more likely than not intended to cause any of the alleged harm in
California to cross-complainants or otherwise anticipated an injury in this state which
might create personal jurisdiction over Ronert. To be sure, even the two letters
attached to the Dalikas Declaration do not satisfy the standard for personal jurisdiction
established in Calder because both letters, on their face, were on behalf of a
corporation, not by Ronert as an individual. The Court also notes that the second of
the two letters was not even signed by Ronert.

For all these reasons, this Court holds that cross-complainants have failed to establish
Ronert possesses sufficient “minimum contacts” with California to justify the assertion
of personal jurisdiction over Ronert. The motion to quash must be and hereby is
granted.

This minute order is effective immediately. Counsel for prevailing party to prepare
formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312.