2013-00144475-CU-BC

Brian Lisec vs. Ford Motor Company

Nature of Proceeding:      Motion to Compel Deposition

Filed By:   Romano, Mark

Plaintiffs Brian and Catherine Lisec’s motion to compel deposition is granted.

The Court reluctantly considered Defendant Ford Motor Company’s late opposition
served only seven court days prior to the hearing.

In this lemon law matter involving a Ford F-350 truck with a 6.0 L engine, Plaintiffs
seek to compel Ford to produce its PMK for deposition pursuant to CCP § 2025.230.
In response to Plaintiffs’ PMK deposition notice, Ford interposed numerous boilerplate
objections to the deposition notice yet never responded to Plaintiffs’ attempts to meet
and confer regarding the objections and instead simply refused to produce a PMK.

Plaintiffs have demonstrated good cause for the deposition and the documents sought
in the deposition notice.  Here, the PMK deposition notice sought to have Ford
produce a PMK to provide testimony regarding, for example, the subject vehicle’s
repair history, the nature of any defects reported to Ford, corrective actions taken
regarding the subject vehicle, Ford’s policies for responding to customer complaints,
and Ford’s knowledge of defects with Plaintiffs’ vehicle.  (Romano Decl. ¶ 15; Exh. 7.)
These categories and related document requests easily meet the relevance standard
for discovery purposes.   Indeed, in the discovery context, information is relevant “if it
might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating
a settlement.  [citations omitted]  Admissibility is not the test and information, unless
privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.”  (Lipton
th
v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4   1599, 1611-1612 [court’s emphasis].)
Discovery related to Ford’s notice of the defects regarding Plaintiffs’ vehicle, the repair
history, etc. clearly meets this standard.

Ford’s opposition is unpersuasive here.  Indeed, Ford argues that the discovery is
geared towards a civil penalty yet Plaintiffs never contacted it prior to filing suit thereby
precluding recovery of such penalty.  This type of argument goes towards the ultimate
merits of the lawsuit, not whether information is discoverable in the first instance.  Ford
also incorrectly contends that the plaintiffs must prove that their truck was repaired four
or more times for the same problem, ignoring the section of the Act that requires a
manufacturer to conform a vehicle to its warranty within a reasonable number of
attempts. Civil Code section 1792.2(d)(2).  The phrase “a reasonable number of
attempts” means that a vehicle was subject to more than one repair attempt.  (Silvio v
Ford Motor Company (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1208.)  Moreover, Ford appears to
have cut and pasted its opposition from oppositions to other motions as it refers to
special interrogatories and discovery related to other vehicles.  However, the instant
motion does not involve interrogatories and the PMK notice is specifically geared
towards information related to Plaintiffs’ vehicle and, specifically, the 6.0L engine.
Further, to the extent the PMK deposition notice does involve other vehicles, it still
seeks information that meets the broad standard of discovery.  Indeed, discovery
related to Ford’s notice of defects in the 6.0L engine like the one in Plaintiffs’ vehicle,
or how Ford responds to lemon law complaints meets the relevance standard for
discovery purposes as “it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case,                                                                                                          th
preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement.”  (Lipton, supra, 48 Cal.App.4   at 1611-
1612.)  Ford has entirely failed to show that Plaintiffs are not entitled to take the
deposition of their PMK as to the issues set forth in the PMK deposition notice.  Ford
also refers to Civil Code section 3295, though Plaintiffs are not seeking information on
Ford’s profits and financial condition.  Further, Ford fails to even address the document
requests.

Ford seeks a protective order in its opposition.  Requests for orders seeking relief must
be made pursuant to a noticed motion.

The Court notes that Ford refers to a separate statement in opposition papers,
showing that it has agreed to produce witnesses as to certain categories, yet no
separate statement was filed with the Court.

The motion is granted. Ford shall designate and produce a PMK for the categories
identified in the PMK deposition notice and produce the documents requested in the
deposition notice.  Given the August 12, 2014 trial date, the deposition shall take place
no later than July 12, 2014.  Counsel shall meet and confer on the specific date and
time.

In addition, a mandatory monetary sanction of $1,700 ($425/hr x 4 hrs) is awarded to
Plaintiffs from Defendant pursuant to CCP § 2025.450(g)(1).  Here sanctions are
mandatory unless the Court finds that Ford “acted with substantial justification or that
other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”  (CCP § 2025.450(g)
(1).)  Here, Ford did not act with substantial justification and no circumstances render
imposition of sanctions unjust.  Sanctions are to be paid on or before June 29, 2014.  If
sanctions are not paid by that date, Plaintiffs may prepare a formal order granting
sanctions for the Court’s signature, and the order may be enforced as a separate
judgment.  ( Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615.)

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as
required by Local Rule 1.06(D).  Plaintiffs’ counsel is ordered to notify Defendant’s
counsel immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing,
in person or by telephone, in the event Defendant’s counsel appears without following
the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

The minute order is effective immediately.  No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule
3.1312 or other notice is required.