Case Number: BC534431 Hearing Date: June 04, 2014 Dept: 58

JUDGE ROLF M. TREU
DEPARTMENT 58
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Hearing Date: Wednesday, June 4, 2014
Calendar No: 5
Case Name: Quinlen, et al. v. Long, et al.
Case No.: BC534431
Motion: Special Motion to Strike
Moving Party: Defendant City of Alhambra
Responding Party: Plaintiffs John I. Quinlen and John I Quinlen, Jr.
Notice: OK

Tentative Ruling: Special motion to strike is granted.
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Background –
On 1/28/14, Plaintiffs John I. Quinlen (“John”) and John I. Quinlen, Jr. (“John Jr.”) filed this action against Defendants Veronica Long, Automobile Club of Southern California (“ACSC”), California Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), City of Alhambra, and City of Los Angeles arising out of the transfer of title of an automobile and the arrest of John Jr. for possession of a stolen vehicle.

Plaintiffs assert causes of action for (1) fraud – intentional misrepresentation, (2) conversion, (3) trespass to chattels, (4) defamation, (5) negligence against ACSC, (6) violation of Gov’t Code § 815.2 against DMV, (7) violation of Vehicle Code § 1653 against DMV, (8) violation of Gov’t Code § 815.2 against City of Alhambra, (9) violation of Gov’t Code § 815.2 against City of Los Angeles, (10) violation of Penal Code § 836(a) against City of Los Angeles, and (11) violation of Penal Code § 148.5. The 1st through 4th and 11th COAs are asserted against Long only.

On 4/29/14, the Court sustained City of Los Angeles’ demurrer to the 9th COA without leave to amend. On 4/11/14, the City of Alhambra filed a special motion to strike.

Factual Allegations of the Complaint –
John’s brother, Dennis W. Quinlen, owned a 2008 BMW and died on 2/25/12 with John being his only heir. ¶ 7. On 4/5/12, the BMW was transferred to John who authorized his son John Jr. to drive it. ¶¶ 8-9.

Long was a friend of Dennis and contacted ACSC to transfer title of the BMW to Long. ¶ 10. Long, through ACSC, caused the DMV to issue a certificate of title for the BMW to Long. ¶¶ 11-12. ACSC and DMV failed to verify the accuracy of Long’s information. ¶ 13. After Long obtained the certificate of title, she contacted the City of Alhambra’s police department and reported the BMW as stolen by or in the possession of John Jr. ¶ 14. The City of Alhambra designated the BMW as stolen and communicated this to the City of Los Angeles’ police department. ¶ 15. The City of Alhambra and the City of Los Angeles failed to verify the accuracy of the information (¶¶ 15-16), resulting in John Jr. being arrested for possession of a stolen vehicle (¶ 16) and the BMW being impounded and later released to Long (¶ 17).

Special Motion to Strike –
“An anti SLAPP motion requires the court to engage in a two step process. First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. If the court finds that such a showing has been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” Brenton v. Metabolife International Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 679, 684.

1. Hearing Date
Preliminarily, Plaintiffs oppose the special motion to strike on the ground that it was not heard within 30 days after service of the motion pursuant to CCP § 425.16(f). However, the calendaring of the hearing on this motion was dictated by the Court’s docket conditions (Aguayo Reply Decl. ¶¶ 2-3) which makes the motion timely heard. See CCP § 425.16(f); see also Hall v. Time Warner, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1348-49.

2. Protected Activity
“To prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion, the movant must first make ‘a threshold showing the challenged cause of action’ arises from an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue.” Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192. “The phrase ‘arising from’ means the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.” City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 67.

The 8th COA is the only claim asserted against the City of Alhambra. The gravamen of the 8th COA is City of Alhambra’s employees’ communication of Long’s unverified information to the police department of the City of Los Angeles. Complaint ¶¶ 68-70. City of Alhambra establishes that this is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute as communications among law enforcement personnel as a matter of public concern (Schaffer v. City and County of San Francisco (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 992, 1002-3 (citing Bradbury v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1114-17)) and in relating to an official proceeding (Hansen v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2008) 171 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1544).

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the 8th COA does not involve the exercise of free speech or an official proceeding. However, Plaintiffs wholly fail to address the authorities cited by City of Alhambra which concludes otherwise. City of Alhambra establishes that the 8th COA arises from protected activity.

3. Probability of Prevailing
Because City of Alhambra has established that this action is subject to the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to present admissible evidence that supports a prima facie case in his favor, much like the burden on a motion for summary judgment or directed verdict. CCP § 425.16(b)(1); Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 714. Plaintiffs wholly fail to submit any admissible evidence in opposition to the motion.

Additionally, the City of Alhambra establishes that its employees are immune for the alleged failure to investigate the information provided by Long (see Gov’t Code § 821.6; Amylou R. v. County of Riverside (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1209) which renders the City of Alhambra immune (Gov’t Code § 815.2(b)). See Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 4-8. The City of Alhambra correctly notes that Gov’t Code § 821.6 provides immunity for negligent investigation and institution of criminal proceedings. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 218, 229; Amylou R., 28 Cal.App.4th at 1209-11. In opposition, Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish these cases as involving the investigation of a crime as opposed to the negligent failure to verify Long’s information before issuing a stolen vehicle report. Opp’n p. 5:18-23. This is a distinction without a difference.

Therefore, Plaintiffs fail to carry their burden to establish a probability of prevailing.

4. Ruling
City of Alhambra’s special motion to strike is granted. As a prevailing party (see CCP §425.16(c)), City of Alhambra is entitled to seek attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to American Humane Ass’n v. Los Angeles Times Commc’n (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103.