Case Name: Margarito Paz v. Ford Motor Company, et al.

Case No.: 1-13-CV-241839

Demurrer by Defendant The Ford Store Morgan Hill, Inc. to the First Amended Complaint of Plaintiff Margarito Paz

This is an action for breach of warranty and related claims arising from Plaintiff’s purchase of a used 2008 Ford F-450 from defendant The Ford Store Morgan Hill on March 19, 2008. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ¶ 4.) Currently before the Court is the Ford Store’s demurrer to the FAC on the ground that the second, fourth, and sixth causes of action fail to state a claim because they are barred by the relevant statutes of limitations.

Request for Judicial Notice

The Ford Store requests judicial notice of Plaintiff’s original complaint in this action, which reflects admissions relevant to the pending motion. The request is unopposed, and is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [court may take judicial notice of court records].)

The Second and Fourth Causes of Action

The parties agree that Plaintiff’s claim for breach of implied warranty under the Song–Beverly Act is governed by the four-year limitations period established by California Uniform Commercial Code section 2725. (See Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1305-1306.) However, the Ford Store contends that Plaintiff’s claim accrued when his car was delivered, while Plaintiff argues that it accrued when he discovered or should have discovered the Ford Store’s breach of warranty.

Section 2725 provides that “[a] cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach,” and “[a] breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.” (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 2725, subd. (2).)

Plaintiff contends that the warranty at issue here is one extending to “future performance of the goods.” However, this portion of section 2725 on its face does not apply to implied warranties. (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 2725, subd. (2) [cause of action accrues when breach is or should have been discovered where warranty “explicitly” extends to future performance]; Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 116, 134 [“Because an implied warranty is one that arises by operation of law rather than by an express agreement of the parties, courts have consistently held it is not a warranty that ‘explicitly extends to future performance of the goods ….’”].)

On the other hand, the Ford Store’s argument that a claim for breach of implied warranty under the Song–Beverly Act necessarily accrues at the time of delivery is also incorrect. This is because the Song-Beverly Act, unlike the Uniform Commercial Code, contains a “duration provision” that provides that the duration of the implied warranty is the same as the duration of any reasonable express warranty that accompanies the product, but is in no event shorter than 60 days or longer than one year. (Civ. Code, § 1791.1, subd. (c); Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1310.) “[B]y giving the implied warranty a limited prospective existence beyond the time of delivery, the Legislature created the possibility that the implied warranty could be breached after delivery [, which] is a change from the Uniform Commercial Code, under which the implied warranty could be breached only at the time of delivery.” (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1309.)

Neither party addresses the issues of the duration of the implied warranty or the possibility that the warranty was breached after delivery of the vehicle at issue. However, even assuming the warranty extended to and was breached a year after Plaintiff’s car was delivered on March 19, 2008, the limitations period on Plaintiff’s claim would have begun to run on March 19, 2009 and would have expired on March 19, 2013. While Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed within the assumed limitations period on February 26, 2013, the original complaint did not name the Ford Store, and the FAC was filed outside this limitations period, on March 10, 2014. As urged by the Ford Store, the FAC does not relate back to the filling date of the original complaint as to it, given that the Ford Store was not named as a Doe defendant, but was instead added as an entirely new defendant. (See Ingram v. Super. Ct. (Slinkard) (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 483, 492 [“The straightforward rule is that amendment after the statute of limitations has run will not be permitted when the result is the addition of a party who, up to the time of the proposed amendment, was neither a named nor a fictitiously designated party to the proceeding.”].)

Thus, given that the FAC was filed after the expiration of the longest possible limitations period, the demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations.

An implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act is of the same duration as an implied warranty under the Song-Beverly Act and a claim for its breach is subject to the same statute of limitations. (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. of Texas (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 212, 229-231.) Consequently, the demurrer to the fourth cause of action is also SUSTAINED without leave to amend on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations.