Case Name: Montoya v. City of Mountain View, et al.

Case No.: 1-13-CV-258284

Defendants City of Mountain View (the “City”) and Fernando Maldonado (“Maldonado”) (collectively, “Defendants”) demur to the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) of plaintiff Joseph Montoya (“Plaintiff”). The City demurs to each cause of action. Maldonado demurs only to the fourth cause of action. The City also demurs to the prayer for punitive damages.

The City argues that the first, second, and third causes of action cannot be maintained against it because it is a governmental entity and Plaintiff has not alleged a statute that would subject the City to civil liability. A government entity is immune from liability except as otherwise specified by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815; In re Groundwater Cases (2007) 154 Cal. App. 4th 659, 688.) Further, statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity. (Susman v. Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal. App. 2d 803, 809; see also Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal. App. 3d 792, 802 [statute establishing government tort liability must be identified].) Plaintiff fails to allege a specific statute that provides for liability against the City. Accordingly, the City’s demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action is SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.

The fourth cause of action is for Violation of Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of the State of California. This cause of action is based on Civil Code section 52.1, which provides, in relevant part:

If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city attorney may bring a civil action . . . .

(Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (a).)

Plaintiff alleges that on December 7, 2012, he was asked to come to the Mountain View Police Department. (FAC, ¶ 7.) At the police station, Maldonado interrogated Plaintiff about an alleged forgery and wrongful repossession claim made by Plaintiff’s former girlfriend. (FAC, ¶ 7.) When Plaintiff tried to explain the circumstances of the repossession, Maldonado forcefully detained and arrested Plaintiff, and violently placed handcuffs on him, resulting in severe injury to Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶ 7.) Despite Plaintiff’s repeated requests to Maldonado to loosen the handcuffs, Maldonado refused to do so. (FAC, ¶ 8.) After approximately 2-3 hours, Maldonado told Plaintiff that, after finally checking with the Department of Motor Vehicles, Maldonado had concluded that Plaintiff had not done anything wrong. (FAC, ¶ 8.) Maldonado apologized to Plaintiff and released Plaintiff from physical restraint and custody. (FAC, ¶ 8.)

In Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, relied on by Defendants, the plaintiff was overdetained in the Los Angeles County jail by 16 days as a result of unintentional clerical error. The Shoyoye court noted that “[t]he statutory framework of section 52.1 indicates that the Legislature meant the statute to address interference with constitutional rights involving more egregious conduct than mere negligence.” (Id. at p. 958.) The court ultimately concluded that “where coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation alleged, i.e., an overdetention in County jail, the statutory requirement of “threats, intimidation, or coercion” is not met. The statute requires a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself.” (Id. at p. 959.) The Shoyoye court held that the plaintiff did not establish a violation of section 52.1 because there was no evidence of any coercion independent of that inherent in a wrongful detention itself. (Id. at pp. 961-962.)

Plaintiff contends that the instant case is distinguishable from Shoyoye and is more similar to Bender v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal. App. 4th 968. In Bender, the plaintiff was arrested without cause by a sheriff’s deputy in Los Angeles County. (Id. at p. 972.) Then several deputies beat the plaintiff and sprayed him in the face with pepper spray in addition to yelling obscenities at him. (Id. at pp. 972-973.) During the beating, the plaintiff’s glasses fell from his head and one of the deputies intentionally crushed them with the heel of his foot. (Id. at p. 973.) Based on the facts in the case, the Bender court found that when “an arrest is unlawful and excessive force is applied in making the arrest, there has been coercion ‘independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself.’” (Id. at p. 978, emphasis in original.) The court stated:

We emphasize this is not a case involving the use of excessive force during an otherwise lawful arrest based on probable cause. Nor is it a case involving an unlawful arrest or detention, but without any coercion beyond the coercion inherent in any arrest. [Citation.] Here, the Bane Act applies because there was a Fourth Amendment violation—an arrest without probable cause—accompanied by the beating and pepper spraying of an unresisting plaintiff, i.e., coercion that is in no way inherent in an arrest, either lawful or unlawful.

(Bender v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 217 Cal. App. 4th at p. 978.)

The Bender court distinguished its case from Shoyoye by stating:

Here, there clearly was a showing of coercion separate and apart from the inherent in an unlawful arrest. Deputy Sorrow wrongfully detained and arrested plaintiff, because he had no probable cause to believe plaintiff had committed any crime. But, in addition, Deputy Sorrow deliberately and unnecessarily beat and pepper sprayed the unresisting, already handcuffed plaintiff. That conduct was not the coercion that is inherent in a wrongful arrest.

(Bender v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 217 Cal. App. 4th at p. 979, emphasis in original.)

The alleged facts of the instant case are much more similar to those in Shoyoye. Plaintiff does not allege that he was arrested without any cause, but rather that there had been a wrongful repossession claim by his former girlfriend that led to the arrest. There are no allegations that Plaintiff was beaten or that there was any coercion other than that inherent in an arrest – i.e. the use of handcuffs. Consequently, Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a claim under Civil Code section 52.1. Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.

Plaintiff correctly points out that the prayer for punitive damages is not subject to demurrer; rather, a motion to strike would be the appropriate procedure because punitive damages are a remedy. (See Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal. App. 4th 365, 384-385.) Regardless, in light of the above ruling on the demurrer to each cause of action, the demurrer to the prayer for punitive damages is MOOT.