Case Name: Fox, et al. v. Stanford Hospital & Clinics, et al.
Case No.: 1-13-CV-257953

Defendant Stanford Hospital & Clinics (“SHC”) provided Plaintiff Caroline M. Fox (“Ms. Fox”) with reproductive medicine and cryogenic storage services. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), p. 2, ¶ 1, 3.) On or about July 20, 2010, 18 oocytes were extracted from Ms. Fox and frozen by SHC. (FAC, p. 2, ¶ 5.) Following the extraction, Ms. Fox was discharged from SHC’s care and the oocytes were put into cryogenic storage. (Id.) Ms. Fox legally married plaintiff Kiran Ramchandran (“Mr. Ramchandran”) on September 12, 2011. (FAC, p. 2, ¶ 4.) Ms. Fox and Mr. Ramchandran (collectively “Plaintiffs”) have been continuously married since that time. (Id.) On or about September 10, 2012, Ms. Fox informed SHC that she wanted to have her frozen oocytes transported to an in vitro fertilization facility closer to her home in southern California. (FAC, p. 2, ¶ 6.) Ms. Fox arranged for a shipping service to pick up the frozen oocytes at SHC and deliver them to the facility in southern California. (Id.)

The frozen oocytes were then removed from their storage facility by SHC staff, packaged and prepared for insertion in a cryogenic shipping container, turned over to the shipping service on September 25, 2012, and shipped for delivery to ART Reproductive Center on September 27, 2012. (FAC, pp. 2-3, ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs allege that upon opening the shipping container, the staff at ART Reproductive Center discovered that the apparatus used to package and hold the frozen oocytes had been improperly prepared by SHC, causing the containers of frozen oocytes to move without restraint in the shipping container and break while in transit. (FAC, p. 3, ¶ 8.) As a result, the frozen oocytes were damaged and unsuitable for in vitro fertilization, and Plaintiffs underwent additional rounds of treatment that were ultimately unsuccessful. (FAC, p. 3, ¶¶ 9-10.)

On December 18, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against SHC, alleging claims for general and medical negligence. Mr. Ramchandran also alleged a claim for loss of consortium. SHC demurred to the complaint, and on April 24, 2014, the Court issued an order: (1) sustaining the demurrer to Mr. Ramchandran’s claims with 10 days’ leave to amend; and (2) sustaining the demurrer to Ms. Fox’s claim for general negligence without leave to amend. On May 1, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint (“FAC”), alleging a claim against SHC for negligence. Mr. Ramchandran also alleges a claim for loss of consortium.

On June 2, 2014, SHC filed the instant demurrer to the FAC. SHC demurs to Mr. Ramchandran’s first cause of action for negligence on the grounds that it is uncertain and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against SHC. SHC argues that Mr. Ramchandran fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that it owes him a duty as he was not SHC’s patient or reasonably foreseeable. Similarly, SHC argues that Mr. Ramchandran’s negligence claim is uncertain because the FAC fails to set forth any facts establishing his relationship to SHC that would demonstrate that SHC owed him any duty.

SHC’s demurrer to the first cause of action on the ground of uncertainty is OVERRULED. SHC does not argue that the FAC is so unintelligible that it cannot reasonably respond, but that the FAC fails to set forth facts sufficient to establish that SHC owed Mr. Ramchandran a duty. (See Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 [a demurrer for uncertainty is disfavored and will be sustained only where the allegations of the pleading are so unintelligible that the defendant cannot reasonably respond to them].) As such, SHC’s argument regarding uncertainty duplicates its argument that the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The Court is not persuaded by SHC’s argument that it does not owe Mr. Ramchandran a duty because the action alleges only professional negligence and/or medical malpractice and Mr. Ramchandran was not its patient. A cause of action for “professional negligence” states a claim indistinguishable from any other form of negligence. The fundamental substance of the action remains the same as that for any negligence action–duty, standard of care, breach and causation. (See Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 992, 997-999.) An analysis of the factors outlined in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (“Rowland”), must be performed to determine whether a duty of care is owed in absence of a physician-patient relationship as an individual’s status as a non-patient alone is not a means of determining liability. (See Keene v. Wiggins (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 308, 313-314 [“[i]n California … the courts have not used status alone as a means of determining liability”]; Felton v. Schaeffer (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 229, 234-235; Rainer v. Grossman (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 539, 543-544 [while the duty of care in the usual case of medical malpractice springs from the physician-patient relationship, in the absence of such a relationship the determination as to whether the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of the factors outlined in Rowland]; Mero v. Sadoff (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 [“[t]o determine whether California should [. . .] adopt the principles set forth in Keene and Felton as dicta, that in the absence of a physician-patient relationship a physician still owes an examinee the duty …, the considerations set forth in [Rowland] provide guidance”].)

In the present case, under an analysis of the Rowland factors, SHC does not owe a duty of care to Mr. Ramchandran. (Rowland, supra, at p. 113 [the Rowland factors include: the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct; and the policy of preventing future harm; the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach.]; see also Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 650.)

No case law directly on point is found as to the forseeability factor, except for the analogous cases of Hegyes v. Unjian Enters. (“Hegyes”) (1991) 234 Cal. App. 3d 1103, 1124-1125 and Burger v. Pond (“Burger”) (1990) 224 Cal. App. 3d 597, 605-606. As in Hegyes and Burger, Mr. Ramchandran was not reasonably foreseeable as he was not the intended beneficiary of Ms. Fox’s relationship with SHC. (Hegyes, supra, at p. 1118.) There was no agreement to perform services that would directly benefit Mr. Ramchandran. Any affect on Mr. Ramchandran did not result from an intended objective or purpose of the services SHC was retained to perform, but rather from Mr. Ramchandran’s relationship with Ms. Fox. (Burger, supra, at p. 605.) Moreover, imposing liability for SHC’s alleged negligence in the absence of a physician-patient relationship would not serve the policy of preventing future harm as Ms. Fox has alleged a claim for negligence. Should she prove her claim, Ms. Fox will hold SHC accountable for its failure to package and prepare the oocytes with reasonable care. (Burger, supra, at pp. 603-604.) While the degree of certainty that Mr. Ramchandran suffered injury is high and moral blame attaches to SHC’s alleged conduct, “when faced with a novel cause of action sentiment should be put aside and the law must establish rules ascribing liability in a manner which avoids the drawing of artificial and arbitrary boundaries.” (Hegyes, supra at p. 1125 citing Albala v. City of New York, supra, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 273.) “While the temptation is always great to provide a form of relief to one who has suffered, it is well established that the law cannot provide a remedy for every injury incurred.” (Id. at p. 274.)

Accordingly, SHC’s demurrer to Mr. Ramchandran’s first cause of action for negligence is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

The Court will sign the proposed form of order.