2014-00158827-CU-NP

Junemarie Friedrich vs. Dmitriy Ormanzhi

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Strike (SLAPP)

Filed By: Griffin, Ryan D.

The hearing on Defendant Dmitriy Ormanzhi’s (“Defendant”) Special Motion to Strike
the First and Second Causes of Action of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure § 425.16 is DROPPED from the calendar.

The Court’s electronic Register of Actions reflects that Plaintiff Junemarie Friedrich
(“Plaintiff”) filed her complaint on February 14, 2014, alleging a cause of action for
malicious prosecution arising from a lawsuit in Sacramento Superior Court, which
allegedly culminated in a 2012 judgment adverse to Defendant. (Compl. at 1-2.)

The Court’s electronic Register of Actions also reflects that, according to a Proof of
Service filed on April 24, 2014, Defendant was personally served with the summons
and complaint on March 21, 2014.

The Court’s electronic Register of Actions also reflects that, on April 24, 2014, Plaintiff
requested that the Clerk enter the default of Defendant, and the Clerk did so on that same date.

Accordingly, Defendant is currently in default. Despite being in default beginning on
April 24, 2014, and continuing to the present, Defendant filed the pending Special
Motion to Strike on May 16, 2014.

On June 4, 2014, Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default, which is currently
set to be heard on June 27, 2014.

Given the entry of default against Defendant on April 24, 2014, and the fact that such
entry of default has not yet been set aside, Defendant’s pending motion is improper.
Defendant must first obtain relief from default.

“[T]he entry of the default terminates [the defaulting defendant’s] rights to take any
further affirmative steps in the litigation until either the default is set aside or a default
judgment is entered.” ( City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 670, 681
(citing Garcia v. Politis (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1479; Devlin v. Kearny Mesa
Amc/Jeep/Renault (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385).) “Upon the failure of the
defendant to answer the complaint within the time allowed by law, and upon the entry
of default, in the absence of fraud, the right of the defendant to participate in the
litigation is terminated, and the subsequent filing of an answer or demurrer on his part
is unauthorized and void, unless upon proceedings duly had, the default is first set
aside. . . .” (Forbes v. Cameron Petroleums, Inc. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 257, 262-63
(citing cases).) Where “defendants’ default had already been entered, they had no
standing to file any responsive pleading without first obtaining relief from the default.” (
Id.; accord Brown v. Ridgeway (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 732, 736 (where default had
been entered, defaulting party had “no standing to file the motion [to dismiss] without
first obtaining relief from the default”).) See also W. A. Rose Co. v. Municipal Court for
Oakland-Piedmont Judicial Dist. (1959) 176 Cal. App. 2d 67, 72.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rule
of Court 3.1312 or further notice is required.