Case Name:   Arthur James Sullivan, Jr. v. RMR Financial, LLC dba Princeton Capital

 

Case No.:       1-14-CV-263576

 

Demurrer by Defendant RMR Financial, LLC, dba Princeton Capital to the Complaint of Plaintiff Arthur James Sullivan, Jr.    

 

Request for Judicial Notice

 

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.  (See Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d); see also Oiye v. Fox (2012) 211 Cal.App.4^th 1036, 1055 [court may take judicial notice that pleadings were filed containing certain allegations and arguments, but may not take judicial notice of the truth of the facts alleged].)

 

Demurrer to the Complaint

 

Defendant’s demurrer to the complaint on the ground of uncertainty is OVERRULED.  In general, “a demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”  (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4^th 612, 616.)  Here, the moving papers are devoid of any legal arguments to support the demurrer for uncertainty.

 

With respect to the first cause of action, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege the essential statutory elements to support his claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

 

To sustain a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of fundamental public policy, the plaintiff must plead and prove that his dismissal violated a policy that is (1) fundamental, (2) beneficial for the public, and (3) embodied in a statute or constitutional provision.  (See Colores v. Board of Trustees (2003) 105 Cal.App.4^th 1293, 1307.)  Thus, “courts in wrongful discharge actions may not declare public policy without a basis in either constitutional or statutory provisions.”  (Parada v. City of Colton (1994) 24 Cal.App.4^th 356, 363.)

 

Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim is based on Business and Professions Code section 16600.  (See Complaint at ¶ 33.)  That section states that, with few exceptions, “every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.”  (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600.)  The statute “evinces a settled legislative policy in favor of open competition and employee mobility.”  (Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP (2008) 44 Cal.4^th 937, 946.)  For example, in VLS Systems, Inc. v. Unisen, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4^th 708, the public policy underlying section 16600 was used to void a contract in which two companies agreed not to hire each other’s employees after termination.

 

Here, as Defendant argues, Plaintiff fails to allege any agreement, express or implied, that prohibits him from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business.  In opposition, Plaintiff claims that it is not necessary to allege the existence of a contract and cites to Silguero v. Creteguard, Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4^th 60.  However, Silguero is not persuasive authority as that case involved discussion of a non-compete agreement.  Having failed to allege the essential elements of a fundamental public policy, Plaintiff has not stated a cause of action for wrongful termination.

 

Therefore, Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a claim.

 

With respect to the second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Defendant argues that the claim is barred by the California Workers’ Compensation Act.  (See Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 160.)  In opposition, Plaintiff correctly points out that the exclusive remedy of worker’s compensation does not apply to a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.  (See Gantt v. Sentry Ins. (1992) 1 Cal.4^th 1083, 1100 [overruled on other grounds in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4^th 66].)  However, as stated above, Plaintiff has not alleged a valid claim for wrongful termination to defeat the demurrer and support recovery of emotional distress damages.

 

Therefore, Defendant’s demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a claim.

 

For the reasons stated above with respect to the demurrer to the second cause of action, Defendant’s demurrer to the third cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress is also SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a claim.

 

With respect to the fourth cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and the fifth cause of action for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege any independently wrongful conduct to support his interference claims.

 

To state a claim for interference, a plaintiff must show that the defendant engaged in an independently wrongful act.  (See San Jose Construction, Inc. v. S.B.C.C., Inc. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4^th 1528, 1544.)  “An act is independently wrongful if it is unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard.”  (Id. at p. 1545.)  “An act must be wrongful by some legal measure, rather than merely a product of an improper, but lawful, purpose or motive.”  (Ibid.)

 

Here, Plaintiff’s opposition concedes that his interference claims are based on the public policy articulated in Business and Professions Code 16600.  (See OPP at p. 10.)  However, as stated above, Plaintiff has not alleged a valid cause of action for wrongful termination based on section 16600 to support his claims for interference.

 

Therefore, Defendant’s demurrer to the fourth and fifth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a claim.