Case Name:   James Wolfe v. Courtesy Chevrolet, et al.

Case No.:       1-14-CV-264327

Currently before the Court is the demurrer of defendant Courtesy Chevrolet (“Defendant”) to the complaint of plaintiff James Wolfe (“Wolfe”). Defendant demurs to each cause of action asserted in the complaint on the ground that Wolfe fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

Requests for Judicial Notice

Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of the following: (1) a CARFAX report run by Defendant in 2007 for the vehicle at issue in Plaintiff’s complaint, (2) a CARFAX report run by Defendant in 2014 for the vehicle, and (3) a webpage discussing the registration of salvaged vehicles purportedly created by the Department of Motor Vehicles. Defendant bases its request on Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (g) and (h).

With regard to the CARFAX vehicle history reports,[1] a CARFAX report provides information concerning the ownership and accident history of a particular vehicle based on “over 4 billion records from thousands of public and private sources ….” (Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A.) Given the specialized nature of the sources of information upon which a CARFAX report is based, the information contained in this document does not constitute a matter of common knowledge and cannot be easily verified by reference to sources readily accessible to the Court. Thus, the request for judicial notice as to the CARFAX vehicle history reports is DENIED.

With regard to the webpage discussing the registration of salvaged vehicles, a review of the information submitted to the Court indicates that the entity providing the information is not the California Department of Motor Vehicles. (See Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. C, p. 2 [“DMV.org is a privately owned website that is not owned or operated by any state government agency.”].) The contents of commercial web sites are “‘plainly subject to interpretation and for that reason not subject to judicial notice.’[Citation].” (Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 194.) Accordingly, the request for judicial notice as to this webpage is DENIED.

Wolfe asks the Court to take judicial notice of the complaint. Wolfe’s request is GRANTED given that the complaint is a court record relevant to the issues to be decided in this demurrer. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [only relevant matters subject to judicial notice].)

Statute of Limitations Defense

Defendant demurs to Wolfe’s complaint solely on the ground that each cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.

“When a ground for objection to a complaint, such as the statute of limitations, appears on its face or from matters of which the court may or must take judicial notice, a demurrer on that ground is proper.” (Hightower v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Sacramento (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 759, 765.)

Generally, the limitations period runs from the moment a claim accrues. (See Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191.) “The general rule for defining the accrual of a cause of action sets the date as the time ‘when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done,’ or the wrongful result occurs, and the consequent ‘liability arises.’” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397.) Nevertheless, pursuant to the discovery rule, the accrual of a cause of action is postponed until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. (Id.) In determining whether a plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action, courts look to whether the plaintiff has reason to at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing has injured him. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.)

Here, Wolfe alleges that he first learned that the vehicle was listed as a total loss in November 2013 when his friend ran a CARFAX vehicle history report. (See Complaint, ¶ 8.) The statutes of limitations for each of Plaintiff’s causes of action are as follows: (1) 3 years for his causes of action for fraud, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the CLRA (see Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subdivision (d) [fraud, intentional and negligent misrepresentation]; Civ. Code, § 1783 [CLRA]), (2) two years for his rescission of contract and breach of implied warranty causes of action (see Code Civ. Proc., § 339), and (3) four years for his unfair competition cause of action (see Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17208). Thus, absent a determination that he had reason to at least suspect that Defendant misrepresented his vehicle’s accident history prior to this time, his complaint was timely filed on April 25, 2014.

Defendant contends that each cause of action in the complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations because Wolfe should have been aware of his vehicle’s accident history at the time of its purchase in 2007. It reasons that, under Vehicle Code section 11515, when a vehicle is reported by an insurance company as a total loss, the title must be exchanged for a salvage certificate. Thus, Defendant argues that Wolfe knew or should have known of his vehicle’s accident history at the time he purchased his vehicle on or about May 11, 2007 because he presumably would have received a salvage certificate. As all of Wolfe’s causes of action have a statute of limitations no greater than four years and Wolfe did not file this action until 2014, Defendant concludes that the action is time-barred.

In opposition, Wolfe contends that he has properly alleged that he had no actual or constructive notice of the accident history of the vehicle until November 2013. He asserts that Defendant has put forward no judicially noticeable material indicating otherwise. Wolfe’s argument is persuasive.

While it is true that Vehicle Code section 11515 requires an owner of a total loss salvage vehicle to provide a salvage certificate to any purchaser of the vehicle, Defendant does not identify any allegations in the complaint or provide any judicially noticeable facts demonstrating that Wolfe actually received a salvage certificate. Thus, Defendant fails to demonstrate as a matter of law that Wolfe knew or should have known that it misrepresented the state of his vehicle’s accident history at the time of purchase in 2007. (See Roman v. County of Los Angeles (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 316, 324 [“The running of the statute [of limitations] must appear ‘clearly and affirmatively’ from the dates alleged. It is not sufficient that the complaint might be barred.”].) Accordingly, the demurrer to each cause of action in the complaint is OVERRULED