Case Name: Carmichael v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board
Case No.: 114CV261956
Plaintiff Carmichael moves the Court to overturn a decision by Defendant California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board that denied Plaintiff the federal extension in unemployment benefits. Defendant opposes on the ground that its decision is mandated by the federal Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008, Public Law 110-252, section 4001(d)(2)(A) and California Unemployment Insurance Code section 4552(e).
Plaintiff originally filed for unemployment benefits in December 2012 over the Internet. (Administrative Record (AR) 3-5.) However, Plaintiff made a mistake by filing the wrong base period because Plaintiff was confused about how the base period worked. (Administrative Record (AR) 27.) Plaintiff appealed to cancel the first claim and won the appeal. (AR 27.) After Plaintiff won the appeal, Mrs. Preciado, an employee in the Employment Development Department (EDD), called Plaintiff on March 22, 2013 stating that he could open a new claim. (AR 3-5.) Plaintiff did not know at the time nor did Mrs. Preciado tell him that Plaintiff would lose the federal extension benefits if he filed at that time. (AR 5.) Plaintiff appealed this to ALJ, and an administrative hearing was held on July 11, 2013. (AR 3-19.) Based on the facts presented, the ALJ ruled that Plaintiff did not meet the requirements of the Federal Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 because he did not earn sufficient wages during the base period. (AR 36-38.) Plaintiff appealed that decision to Defendant. (AR 42-50.) However, Defendant affirmed the decision on the grounds that Plaintiff had insufficient wages in the base period and was therefore ineligible for an extension. (AR 52.) The administrative record does not show what exactly Mrs. Preciado said to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff claims that he reasonably relied on Mrs. Preciado’s expertise and claims that she misled him. Plaintiff argues that if she called him about a week later, then he would have been automatically placed in the alternate base period. Plaintiff also argues that he was unprepared for the first hearing because he thought that it was going to be similar to the first appeal that he won. However, Plaintiff appealed the first hearing to the Defendant, and still lost.
Defendant argues that the weight of the evidence supports its determination that Plaintiff did not meet the requirements for extended unemployment insurance benefits. Defendant argues that Plaintiff was required to earn at least $18,000 during the base period, but only earned $16,164.00 in total wages and did not meet the requirement. (AR 37.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff does not appear to disagree that he did not meet the requirements, but rather that he would have qualified had he not requested that his claim be backdated. However, Defendant argues that it could not undo the backdating of his claim under applicable law, and that it correctly determined that Plaintiff did not meet the eligibility requirements for extended unemployment insurance benefits.
The Court interprets this motion as a writ of mandamus because Plaintiff seeks the Court to mandate the Defendant to overturn its ruling. (See Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5(a) (“Where the writ is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision…”).) “A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal […] to compel the performance of act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right […] to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal.” (Ibid. § 1085(a).) “The inquiry in such a[n administrative writ of mandate] case shall extend to questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Ibid. § 1094.5(b).) “Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supporting by the weight of the evidence. In all other cases, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record.” (Ibid. § 1094.5(c).) “Generally, mandamus is available to compel a public agency’s performance or to correct an agency’s abuse of discretion when the action being compelled or corrected is ministerial. [Citation.] A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to his [or her] own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists.” (AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, p. 700.)
Petitioner bears the burden of proof in establishing his entitlement to a writ of mandamus. (Campbell v. Bd. of Dental Examiners (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 872, pp. 875-876.) “The general rule is that a hearing on a writ of administrative mandamus is conducted solely on the record of the proceeding before the administrate agency.” (Pomona Valley Hosp. Medical Ctr. v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 93, p. 101.) “Augmentation of the administrative record is permitted only within the strict limits set forth in section 1094.5, subdivision (e) which provides as follows: ‘Where the court finds that there is relevant evidence which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been produced or which was improperly excluded at the hearing before respondent, it may enter judgment as provided in subdivision (f) remanding the case to be reconsidered in the light of that evidence; or, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, the court may admit the evidence at the hearing on the writ without remanding the case.’” (Ibid. (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5(e)).)
A claim for extended benefits is only valid if an individual had earnings from employment during the base period of the parent claim which “exceeded 40 times his or her most recent weekly benefit amount or 1.5 times the highest quarter, in the base period in which he or she exhausted all rights to regular compensation,” whichever is lower. (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 4552(e).) The applicant for unemployment insurance benefits has the burden of establishing eligibility. (McGuire v. Employment Development Dept. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1035, p. 1041.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s argument about being misled bears no weight on whether or not the Court should issue a writ of mandamus. Plaintiff argues that the Court should reverse the Defendant’s position because Mrs. Preciado misled him into not filing his claim later. However, these facts are not in the administrative record, which means that Defendant did not have an opportunity to consider this issue. In addition, there is no reason that these facts about Mrs. Preciado and her conversation could not have been introduced into the administrative record because the telephone conversation occurred in March 2013 and the administrative hearing occurred afterward. In addition, based on Plaintiff’s allegations, the Plaintiff has not adequately shown that Mrs. Preciado misled him. Plaintiff’s papers state that Mrs. Preciado told him that he could file a new claim. That statement is not misleading because Plaintiff had just won his appeal. Plaintiff does not cite any case law, nor has the Court found any, that the government has a ministerial duty imposed by legal authority to disclose to those seeking unemployment insurance the availability of benefits that they could receive. Therefore, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s argument about being misled as having weight to the writ of mandamus proceeding.
Based on the evidence, the Court finds that Defendant did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s claims. The Defendant was required to determine if Plaintiff had established that he was eligible for unemployment insurance benefits, and based on the facts presented to Defendant and presented to the Court, the Court finds that Defendant exercised its discretion correctly. Therefore, the motion to overturn Defendant’s decision is DENIED.