Case Number: BC505083    Hearing Date: August 08, 2014    Dept: 92

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

LEVON LEVONYAN,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.

RONALD HEATON, ET AL.,

Defendant(s).

CASE NO: BC505083

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

Dept. 92
1:30 p.m. — #27
August 8, 2014

Cases BC505083 and BC505084 are deemed related, with BC505083 designated the lead case. All hearings in BC505084 D-91 are advanced and vacated to today’s date. Plaintiff, Levon Levonyan’s Motion to Consolidate is Granted. All future filings and hearings to be in BC505083, D-92.

1. BC505083
Plaintiff, Levon Levonyan filed BC505083 against Defendant, Ronald Heaton for damages arising out of an automobile accident. The accident occurred on 4/14/11, and Plaintiff filed the complaint on 4/05/13.

2. BC505084
Plaintiff, Levon Levonyan filed BC505084 against Defendant, Thomas Jayamaha for damages arising out of a subsequent automobile accident. The second accident occurred on 6/21/11; Plaintiff filed the complaint on the same date as the first complaint, 4/05/13.

3. Motion to Consolidate
a. Law Governing Consolidation
CCP ¿1048 grants discretion to the trial courts to consolidate actions involving common questions of law or fact. The trial court’s decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. A consolidation of actions does not affect the rights of the parties. The purpose of consolidation is to avoid unnecessary costs or delay, avoid duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to both action, and avoid inconsistent results by hearing and deciding common issues together. (See Estate of Baker (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 471, 485.) The granting or denial of a motion to consolidate rests in the trial court’s sound discretion, and will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. (Feliner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 509, 511.) Each case presents its own facts and circumstances, but the court generally considers the following: (1) timeliness of the motion: i.e., whether granting consolidation would delay the trial of any of the cases involved; (2) complexity: i.e., whether joining the actions involved would make the trial too confusing or complex for a jury; and (3) prejudice: i.e, whether consolidation would adversely affect the rights of any party. (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 428, 430–431.)

In deciding whether to grant a motion to consolidate, the court should weigh whether the common issues predominate over the individual issues and whether any risks of jury confusion or prejudice to the parties outweighs the reduction in time and expense that would result from consolidation. (Todd-Stenberg v. Shield (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 978.)

Consolidation is a procedure for uniting separate lawsuits for trial, where they involve common questions of law or fact and are pending in the same court. (See CCP § 1048.) The purpose is to enhance trial court efficiency (i.e., to avoid unnecessary duplication of evidence and procedures); and to avoid the substantial danger of inconsistent adjudications (i.e., different results because tried before different juries, or a judge and jury, etc.). (See Todd-Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 978–979.) There are two types of consolidation under ¿ 1048: (1) a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate, and (2) a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, where the two actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment. (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147.) The trial court’s decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.

A consolidation of actions does not affect the rights of the parties. The purpose of consolidation is merely to promote trial convenience and economy by avoiding duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to both actions. (See Estate of Baker (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 471, 485.) In deciding whether to grant a motion to consolidate, the court should weigh whether the common issues predominate over the individual issues and whether any risks of jury confusion or prejudice to the parties outweighs the reduction in time and expense that would result from consolidation. (Todd-Stenberg v. Shield (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 978.)

At this time, Plaintiff moves to consolidate the two actions, contending both accidents caused or contributed to his back pain and also to damage to Plaintiff’s vehicle, and consolidation is necessary to avoid conflicting rulings, avoid cumulative testimony, prevent unreasonable financial burden, and ensure proper use of judicial resources.

The Court has reviewed Henry v. Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 440 in connection with the issue of whether consolidation is appropriate in cases involving multiple accidents that allegedly contribute to the same injuries. In Henry, the plaintiffs sued the defendant homeowners for premises liability. The plaintiffs sought to recover damages not only for the injury sustained as a result of the incident, but also for the negligent medical treatment they received from Kaiser thereafter. The court of appeals made a number of important holdings. First, it noted that the homeowner defendants were solely liable for any of the plaintiff’s damages that were caused by the incident itself, but were jointly and severally liable with Kaiser for any damages due to the ultimate negligent medical care. The court noted, “traditional California tort law holds a tortfeasor liable not only for the victim’s original personal injuries but also for any aggravation caused by subsequent negligent medical treatment, provided the injured party exercised reasonable care in obtaining the medical treatment. The subsequent tortfeasor, in turn, is also liable to the injured party for the enhanced injuries he or she has caused.” Id. at 445.

The court went on to hold that the homeowner defendants would be entitled to indemnification from Kaiser for the amount of fault that the jury apportioned to Kaiser, and that the homeowners could pursue this by way of a cross-complaint against Kaiser or by way of a future action for indemnification. Id. at 449. The court then discussed the application of Prop 51 to such a situation, ultimately holding that the jury must apportion fault for the plaintiff’s non-economic (pain and suffering) damages, and that the homeowner defendants would only be liable for their own proportionate share of the non-economic damages.

In the case at bar, Plaintiff has two actions against two different sets of defendants for damages arising out of two separate automobile accidents; the actions, however, allegedly caused or contributed to the same injury. Plaintiff alleges that his back was injured in the first accident, and the injury was exacerbated in the second accident. If the two actions are not consolidated, very complicated results could ensue. These highly complicated and potentially contrary results can be avoided by having both actions heard together. The jury can consider whether either/both defendant(s) is/are negligent, whether their negligence caused and/or contributed to Plaintiff’s claimed damages, and can ultimately apportion the damages between the two sets of defendants. The Court notes that both defendants were properly served with the moving papers, and neither defendant has filed opposition to this motion. The Court therefore finds consolidation is in the interest of justice, and the motion to consolidate is granted.

Dated this 8th day of August, 2014

Hon. Elia Weinbach
Judge of the Superior Court