Case Name:   Institute of Med. Ed., Inc. v. Western Assn. of Schools and Colleges, et al.

Case No.:       1-13-CV-253698

 

After full consideration of the evidence, the separate statements submitted and the authorities submitted by each party, the court makes the following rulings:

 

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication.

 

Plaintiff Institute of Medical Education, Inc.’s (“IME” or “Plaintiff”) request for judicial notice of the March 21, 2014 order is GRANTED.  (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d).)  The request for judicial notice of the reply brief, the memorandum of points and authorities, the docket and the joint case management conference statement is GRANTED as to the documents’ existence.  (See Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4^th 875, 882 (stating that “[w]hile the Court is free to take judicial notice of the existence of a document in a court file, the Court may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files… [and c]ourts may not take judicial notice of allegations in affidavits, declarations and probation reports in court records because such matters are reasonably subject to dispute and therefore require formal proof”).)  The request for judicial notice of the BPPE/DCA decision is GRANTED.  (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (c).)  The request for judicial notice of the responses to requests for production of documents is DENIED as the document is not a proper subject for judicial notice.

 

Plaintiffs, who bear the burden of proof at trial by preponderance of evidence,  “must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying material fact more likely than not—otherwise he would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but would have to present his evidence to a trier of fact.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4^th 826, 851.)  To prevail on its motion for summary judgment, or summary adjudication on any of its claims, Plaintiff must demonstrate the amount of damages sustained as a result of the breach of contract.  (See Acoustics, Inc. v. Trepte Construction Co. (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 887, 913 (stating that resulting damages is an element for a breach of contract claim); see also Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guarantee Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4^th 26, 55 (stating that resulting damages is an element for an intentional interference with contractual relations cause of action); see also Venhaus v. Shultz (2007) 155 Cal.App.4^th 1072, 1078 (stating that resulting damages is an element for a negligent interference with prospective economic advantage cause of action).)

 

Plaintiff’s memorandum of points and authorities contains very little argument or analysis whatsoever.  Rather, Plaintiff’s sole argument and analysis of the issue of damages is:

 

Defendants withdrawal of UDSOE status, and failure to timely notify of the withdraw, caused Plaintiff to:  lose Title IV funding, lose accredit of courses, lose teachers, lose students, become unable to pay rent, become unable to pay for equipment and services provided in the sum of $21,275,000 (Sunil Decl., Exhibit 8).

 

(Pl.’s memorandum of points and authorities in support of motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, for summary adjudication (“Pl.’s memo”), p.24:16-22; id. at p.26:27-28 (stating that “Plaintiffs incorporates by reference the evidence and arguments from elements 4 & 5 from the Breach of Contract discussion”); id. at p.29:24-25 (in discussion regarding promissory estoppel claim, stating that “IME suffered substantial detriment as a result of the false representations (see elements 4 & 5 under the Breach of Contract”).)

 

Likewise, the separate statement’s undisputed material fact in support of its damages states the identical language.  (See UMF 17, issue one; UMF 17, issue two; UMF 7, issue three; UMF 5, issue four; UMF 7, issue five.)

 

Plaintiff’s lone evidence in support of its motion provides two different means for determining damages with two different amounts, and Plaintiff’s motion is seeking the higher of the two figures.  At a minimum, Plaintiff’s own evidence has created a triable issue of material fact.  (See Sunil Vethody decl. in support of motion for summary judgment, exh. 8 (“Keyes report”).)  Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment and motion for summary adjudication of each cause of action cannot be granted.

 

Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s evidence also fails to demonstrate that it is entitled to a judgment on the entire $21,275,000 claimed.  Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to meet its initial burden and the motion for summary judgment and alternate motion for summary adjudication of each cause of action is DENIED.

 

Defendants’ request for judicial notice is not the basis for this Court’s order and is DENIED.

 

Defendants’ objections to Plaintiff’s evidence were also not the basis for the Court’s order and are OVERRULED.

 

The Court will prepare the order.