Case Name:   Faylor v. Palm, et al.

Case No.:       1-12-CV-219770

After full consideration of the evidence, the separate statements submitted by each party, and the authorities submitted by each party, the court makes the following rulings:

Defendants Richard Palm, Jr. (“Richard”) and Hannah Palm (“Hannah”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move for summary adjudication of plaintiff Joshua Faylor’s (“Faylor”) punitive damages claim against Hannah.  (See Code Civ. Proc. [“CCP”], § 437c, subd. (f).)

This action is consolidated with an action filed by plaintiffs Chuck Kin Kwan and Emily Yan Kwan (collectively, “the Kwans”); however, the Kwans do not seek punitive damages.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that this motion for summary adjudication of Faylor’s punitive damages claims in any way affects the Kwans’ claims.  Moreover, Faylor’s assertion that the motion is somehow procedurally defective and should be denied because it was filed under the case number associated with the Kwans’ case is without merit, as the stipulation and order to consolidate cases (“Consolidation Order”) instructs the parties to file all documents in the Kwans’ action, and “no further papers or documents of any kind need to be filed in said later filed action[s],” as consistent with standard practice in consolidation orders.  (Consolidation Order, p. 2:6-11.)

Turning to the merits of the motion, a party may move for summary adjudication to completely dispose of a claim for punitive damages on the ground that the claim has no merit.   (CCP, § 437c, subd (f)(1).)  Summary adjudication involves “a three step process” where the court (1) identifies the issues as framed by the pleadings; (2) determines whether the moving party has established facts negating the opposing party’s claims and justifying judgment in the movant’s favor; and (3) determines whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable issue of material fact.  (Lease & Rental Management Corp. v. Arrowhead Central Credit Union (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1057-1058.)

Faylor asserts two causes of action against Defendants for negligence, and seeks punitive damages against Hannah for acting with malice by allegedly deliberately allowing her car to drift across the median as she drove southbound on interstate-505 and causing her vehicle to collide with Faylor’s vehicle as he traveled northbound.  A plaintiff may recover punitive damages “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)  “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)  “A person acts with knowing disregard when he or she is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and deliberately fails to avoid those consequences.”  (CACI, No.3940; Dawes v. Super. Ct. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88.)

Defendants contend that Faylor’s punitive damages claim fails as a matter of law because he cannot establish that Hannah’s conduct was intentional.  However, malice is defined in Civil Code section 3294 as conduct that is intended to cause harm or, alternatively, conduct that is “despicable” and carried on “with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  (See Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, § 5; see also Mock, supra, at p. 331.)  Moreover, when nondeliberate injury is alleged, the definition of malice should be interpreted as conscious disregard for the safety of others.  (G.D. Searle & Co. v. Super. Ct. (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 32.)  Defendants’ assertion that Faylor must establish that Hannah intended to injure him is therefore unavailing.  In Defendants’ supporting separate statement of undisputed material facts, they proffer Hannah’s deposition testimony as evidence that she was praying while driving, she is unsure whether her vehicle drifted, and she became startled either because her vehicle drifted or because another vehicle passed her on her right, causing her to lose control of her vehicle.  This evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that Hannah’s conduct was not intended to harm others or despicable and carried out with a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others.  Therefore, Defendants have met their initial burden.

In opposition, Faylor argues that Hannah deliberately chose to let her vehicle drift off the roadway, despite knowing the high likelihood that she would lose control of her vehicle and collide with another vehicle, and the high likelihood that a collision at highway speeds commonly result in serious or fatal injuries.  Faylor proffers evidence from expert witnesses and the responding officer that the northbound and southbound lanes of interstate-505 are 75 feet apart and separated by two paved shoulders, two gravel strips, and a 58-foot grass median; there is no evidence that Hannah hit her brakes or moved her vehicle side-to-side on the southbound roadway; it would have been obvious to Hannah that she had driven off the pavement; and Hannah would have had ample time to avoid colliding with Faylor’s vehicle in the northbound lane.  Faylor also presents evidence that immediately after the collision, Hannah told the responding officer that she was “feeling upset” and “began to pray and let her vehicle drift into the center divider”; she told Richard that she was “too tired and upset to drive safely.”  Faylor also proffers evidence from expert witnesses demonstrating that Hannah would have known that crossing the median would create a high likelihood of a collision with oncoming traffic and such a collision would be likely to injure or kill others.  Faylor’s evidence demonstrates a triable issue of material fact as to whether Hannah’s conduct was intentional or despicable and carried out in conscious disregard of the safety of others.  Moreover, if accepted by a reasonable trier-of-fact, this evidence could meet the clear and convincing evidence standard.  (See Reader’s Digest Ass’n. v. Super Ct. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 252; see also Basich v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1118-1121.)  Accordingly, Faylor has met his burden to demonstrate triable issues of material fact.

In light of the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of Faylor’s punitive damages claim is DENIED.

The parties asserted objections in their separate statements; however, their objections do not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354.  Thus, Defendants’ evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.  Faylor’s evidentiary objections are likewise OVERRULED.