Defendant and Cross-Complainant Shapell Industries, Inc. (“Shapell”) brings this Motion to Contest the Application for Determination of Good Faith Settlement submitted by Defendant Padilla Construction (“Padilla”).  In their moving papers, Shapell argues that the Application is premature because the underlying global settlement is contingent upon the Plaintiff collecting all settlement proceeds, securing all the signatures of all parties, and providing Shapell with a settlement agreement signed by all parties.  Shapell further argues that since they have not yet received a fully executed agreement or assurance that the subcontractors have accepted the terms of the settlement, there has not been a “meeting of the minds” and accordingly, Padilla’s Application is premature.  Finally, Shapell argues that the Application should be further denied as it seeks relief beyond what is provided in CCP 877.6(c) and does not set forth the terms of the settlement or indicate why the settlement is within the “ballpark” of what is considered good faith.

In opposition, Padilla submits the Declaration of Adrian Paul Finneran which states that Padilla settled directly with Plaintiffs after Shapell assigned all of its rights against Padilla to Plaintiffs.  The Declaration attaches an unsigned copy of the purported settlement agreement together with some email correspondence between counsel and the Special Master.

California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 provides that a party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors may seek a determination that a settlement was made in good faith.  “A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor…from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor…for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).)  “The purpose of this statute is to bar claims against a settling tortfeasor and thereby promote settlement.”  (Cal-Jones Properties v. Evans Pacific Corp. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 324, 327.)

In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Cycle & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, the Supreme Court set forth the following factors for consideration of a proposed settlement:

a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settler’s proportionate liability;
the amount paid in settlement;
the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs;
discount for settlement before trial;
the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and
the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of non-settling defendants.

(Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 499.)

In determining whether a proposed settlement is made in good faith, the court may consider affidavits and counteraffidavits.  In its discretion, the Court may receive other evidence at the hearing on the motion.  (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (b).)  “The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.”  (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).)  Bad faith may be established by “demonstrat[ing] that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these [Tech-Bilt] factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.”  (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499-500.)

“Where there are multiple defendants, each having potential liability for different areas of damage, an allocation of the settlement amount must be made.”  (L.C. Rudd & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 742, 750.)  The failure to allocate the settlement “may preclude a ‘good faith’ determination because there is no way to determine the appropriate setoff pursuant to section 877 against the nonsettling defendant.  (Id.)  As a result, “[i]t is the burden of the settling parties to explain to the court and to all other parties the evidentiary basis for any allocations and valuations made sufficient to demonstrate that a reasonable allocation was made.”  (Id.)  “[W]here the settling parties have failed to allocate, the trial court must allocate in the manner which is most advantageous to the nonsettling party.”  (Dillingham Construction N.A., Inc. v. Nadel Partnership (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 264, 287.)

However, “the inquiry at the good faith settlement stage is not the same as the inquiry at trial, where complete precision of allocation could presumably be achieved.  Since we are dealing with a pretrial settlement, in which the factual findings or determinations made on contested issues of liability or damages are tentative, and made solely for purposes of evaluating the good faith of a settlement as of the date of the valuation [citation], we must necessarily apply a broader and more permissive standard for evaluating good faith of a settlement as to such allocation. . . . [W]hat should be required of the settling parties is that they furnish to the court and to all parties an evidentiary showing of a rational basis for the allocations made and the credits proposed.  They must also show that they reached these allocations and credit proposals in an atmosphere of appropriate adverseness so that the presumption may be applied that a reasonable valuation was reached. [Citation.]”  (Regan Roofing v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1685, 1704.)

In the immediate case, the Court finds that the party seeking a good faith settlement determination has not provided sufficient information for the Court to make a good faith settlement determination.  Other than the amount of the settlement, there is no information provided for the Court to conduct an analysis as to whether there is, in fact, a settlement and the specific terms and conditions of that settlement and how the settlement would be allocated to issues involving non-settling parties.  Based upon the information provided, it is not clear that a settlement agreement has even been reached or that an assignment of claims was made.  According, the Motion to Contest Good Faith Settlement is GRANTED and the Application for Good Faith Settlement Determination by Padilla is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.