Case Number: 19. EC059503    Hearing Date: August 22, 2014    Dept: B

19. EC059503
ROBERT DANELEN v FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al
Motion for Summary Judgment

The Plaintiff alleges he suffered damages as a result of a fire caused by a defective component inside a 2000 Ford F250 that was parked inside the Plaintiff’s commercial building. The owners of the motor vehicle, Ricardo Turcios, and Maria Castro, are liable because they did not keep the motor vehicle maintained and because they did not have the amount of insurance required under the lease.

The causes of action in the Complaint are: 1) Negligence; 2) Product Liability and
3) Breach of Contract

This hearing concerns the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against the Defendants, Ricardo Turcios and Maria Castro.
Under CCP section 437c, a plaintiff may move for summary judgment on a complaint and has the burden of proof to offer evidence establishing each element of the causes of action in the complaint. A review of the Plaintiff’s complaint reveals that it contains two causes of action directed at these Defendants: the first cause of action for negligence and the third cause of action for breach of contract.
The Plaintiff’s motion does not address the first cause of action and does not offer any evidence to demonstrate that the Plaintiff can establish each element. Since the Plaintiff did not meet his burden on the first cause of action, the Plaintiff has not met his burden of proof because he has not demonstrated that he is entitled to summary judgment on the entire Complaint.

In the alternative, the Plaintiff seeks summary adjudication of the third cause of action, the first through twelfth affirmative defenses in the Defendants’ answer, the Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees, and the Plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest.
Under CCP section 437c(f), a party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. California law interprets a “claim for damages” in CCP section 437c(f)(1) to be limited to a claim for punitive damages. Decastro W. Chodorow & Burns v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 410, 421. The Legislative intent of CCP section 437c(f) was to stop the practice of adjudication of facts or adjudication of issues that do not completely dispose of a cause of action or a defense. Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal. App. 4th 1848, 1854.

1. Summary Adjudication of Third Cause of Action for Breach of Contract
The third cause of action is based on the lease agreement and includes the following essential elements:

1) the contract,
2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance,
3) defendant’s breach, and
4) the resulting damages to plaintiff.
Reichert v. General Ins. Co. (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 822, 830.

The Plaintiff provided the following evidence to establish each of these elements in the causes of action:

1) the parties entered into a lease agreement (see separate statement of facts 4 to 7, 17);
2) the Plaintiff performed all obligations under the agreement (see separate statement of facts, number 26); and
3) the Defendants breached the agreement by failing to obtain and maintain the required insurance (see separate statement of facts 18).

However, the Plaintiff does not meet his burden of proof with the element of damages. Contract damages are generally limited to those within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was entered into or at least reasonably foreseeable by them at that time; consequential damages beyond the expectations of the parties are not recoverable. Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 503, 515. The Plaintiff offers a list of fees and costs; however, he does not offer facts that these fees and costs are the result of the breach.
For example, the Plaintiff claims $26,550 for “owner time” involved in the reconstruction of the building (separate statement of facts 57). This is based on the Plaintiff claiming that he spent 15 hours per week at $30 per hour for 59 weeks. There are no supporting facts for the $30 per hour amount he charges or any facts identifying the tasks for which he is seeking to recover $26,550 for his “owner time” during the 59 weeks. This is insufficient to demonstrate that the entire amount of $26,550 claim for “owner time” is the result of the failure to obtain insurance.
In addition, there are questions of fact regarding the amounts sought by the Plaintiff. For example, the Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to $52,586.11 for tile flooring that the Defendants installed in the building.
Under Article 7, part B, of the lease trade fixtures do not become part of the property. The Defendants provide evidence that their business is a flooring and marble business and that the tile flooring was a trade fixture, which they used to demonstrate their craft (Turcios decl., paragraph 9). In addition, the Defendants state that they considered the flooring a removable alternative and that they intended to remove the flooring upon termination of the lease (Turcios decl., paragraphs 8 and 9). Further, the Defendants state that they installed the flooring using their own tile and that the Plaintiff’s valuation is based on a retail value and not the correct wholesale value of the tiles (Turcios decl., paragraph 8). This demonstrates that there is a question of fact whether $52,586.11 amount can be recovered as damages under the breach of contract claim.

Therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to summary adjudication on the third cause of action because there are questions of fact regarding the element of damages.

2. Summary Adjudication of Twelve Affirmative Defenses
The Plaintiff sought summary adjudication of the first through twelfth affirmative defenses. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants have failed to provide facts supporting any of their defenses.
Under California law, a party may meet its burden of proof under CCP section 437c by demonstrating that the opposing party’s discovery responses lack any facts. Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal. App. 4th 573, 590 (holding that a moving defendant may rely on factually devoid discovery responses to shift the burden of proof pursuant to CCP section 437c).
The Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof. The Plaintiff did not proceed through each affirmative defense and identify the factually devoid discovery responses that meet his burden of proof. Instead, the Plaintiff merely copied the same 77 facts for each affirmative defense. None of the separate statements refer to a specific item of discovery to which the Defendants provided a factually devoid response.
For example, the Plaintiff argues that the third affirmative defense of unclean hands does not apply because the Defendants have no facts that demonstrate that the Plaintiff violated conscience, good faith, or other equitable principles. The Plaintiff cites to separate statements of facts, numbers 1 to 77. A review of facts 1 to 77 reveals that none of these facts cite to a factually devoid response to discovery seeking to discover the facts supporting the affirmative defense of unclean hands. This is insufficient to meet the burden of proof.
The Plaintiff does not cite to any factually devoid discovery responses in his separate statement supporting his request for summary adjudication of the twelve affirmative defenses. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has not met his burden of proof because he has not directed the Court to factually devoid discovery responses relevant to each of the twelve affirmative defenses.

3. Summary Adjudication of Request for Attorney’s Fees and Request for Prejudgment Interest
The Plaintiff also sought summary adjudication of two claims for damages: 1) his request for attorney’s fees and 2) his request for prejudgment interest. As noted above, California law interprets a “claim for damages” in CCP section 437c(f)(1) to be limited to a claim for punitive damages. Decastro W. Chodorow & Burns v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 410, 421. Since the claims for attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest are not claims for punitive damages, the Plaintiff cannot seek summary adjudication of these claims for damages.
Accordingly, there are no grounds to grant summary adjudication to the claims for attorney’s fees or prejudgment interest.
The motion for Summary Judgment is denied. The Motion for Summary Adjudication is denied.