Case Name:   Roy Abraham, et al. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al.

Case No.:       1-14-CV-266067

 

Currently before the Court is the demurrer of defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) and California Reconveyance Company (“CRC”) (collectively, “Defendants”) to the complaint of plaintiffs Roy Abraham and Danilo Suva (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Defendants demur to each cause of action in the complaint on the grounds of failure to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action and uncertainty. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (f).)

 

Requests for Judicial Notice

 

In support of their demurrer, Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of a number of court records, recorded real property records, and the purchase and assumption agreement between the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Chase. The request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d); Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264-265; Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 753-754.)

 

In opposition to the demurrer, Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of several court records. The request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

 

Uncertainty

 

Defendants demur to each cause of action on the ground of uncertainty. In particular, they contend that Plaintiffs’ allegations are disjointed, incoherent, and lack specificity.

 

Here, the pleading is not so incomprehensible that Defendants cannot reasonably respond. (See Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135 [demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where pleading is so incomprehensible that opposing party cannot reasonably respond].) In this regard, Defendants’ demurrer fully addresses the merits of each of the causes of action in the complaint. Accordingly, the demurrer on the ground of uncertainty is OVERRULED.

 

Failure to Allege Sufficient Facts

 

Defendants demur to each cause of action on the ground that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. They contend that the doctrine of res judicata bars each cause of action, and Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts supporting the elements of each cause of action.

 

Res Judicata

 

Defendants argue that each cause of action in the instant complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Plaintiffs could have litigated these claims in Roy Abraham, et al. v. Washington Mutual Bank, FA, et al., case number 112CV218677, originally filed on June 26, 2012.

 

Defendants assert that: (1) Plaintiffs were parties in both this suit and the original action, (2) both actions concern the same issues, and (3) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits, as the court issued an order sustaining Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that they did not have the opportunity to litigate the issues raised in the instant complaint in the prior action and the judgment in the prior action was not a final judgment on the merits. It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs were parties to the prior action.

 

First, the alleged invasion of a primary right suffered in both the 2012 action and the present action is the same. (See Burdette v. Carrier Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1668, 1674-1675 [“California adheres to a ‘primary rights’ theory in determining whether the claims or causes of action are the same. [Citation.] The significant factor is whether the claim or cause of action is for the invasion of a single primary right.”].) In both actions, Plaintiffs alleged that they were harmed by: (1) the foreclosure of their property by Defendants, who lacked the authority to foreclose, (2) the recordation of fraudulent documents, and (3) the refusal to respond to a qualified written request in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”). Accordingly, the claims alleged in the present action are the same as those alleged in the prior action.

 

Second, the judgment in the prior action constituted a final judgment on the merits. A review of the Court’s January 3, 2014 order sustaining the demurrer to the third amended complaint (see Defendants’ Request for judicial notice, Ex. 15) indicates that the demurrer to each cause of action was sustained on the ground that Plaintiffs failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. A demurrer which is sustained for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is considered a final judgment on the merits. (See Kanarek v. Bugliosi (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 327, 334.) Therefore, the Court’s January 3, 2014 order sustaining the demurrer to each cause of action in the third amended complaint constitutes a final judgment on the merits.

 

In sum, the claims raised in the present action are the same as the claims litigated in the prior proceeding, the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits, and Plaintiffs were parties to the prior proceeding. Thus, each cause of action in the complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

 

Elements of the First Cause of Action for “Broken Chain of Title”

 

Defendants contend that the first cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the assignment of a deed of trust and CRC, as the trustee of the subject deed of trust, was authorized to foreclose on the property. This argument is persuasive.

 

Here, it is undisputed that CRC was at all times the trustee of the deed of trust. (Compl., ¶ 28 [stating that CRC was the trustee of the deed of trust].) Thus, CRC had the requisite authority to initiate the foreclosure. (See Civ. Code, § 2924, subd. (a); Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 433, 440.) As such, Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action for lack of authority to foreclose.

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Elements of the Second Cause of Action for False Representation

 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to plead the elements of a cause of action for fraud. In particular, they indicate that Plaintiffs do not allege the specific substance of the misrepresentation, that the individual making the representation had knowledge of its falsity, or that Plaintiffs relied on the purported misrepresentation to their detriment.

 

Here, Plaintiffs do not allege the nature of the misrepresentation, that the individual making the representation had knowledge of its falsity, or that Plaintiffs relied on the purported misrepresentation to their detriment. (Compl., ¶¶ 28-32.) Thus, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for false representation. (See Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170, 184.)

 

Elements of the Third Cause of Action for Violation of RESPA

 

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action for violation of RESPA because they do not allege either actual damages or a pattern or practice of RESPA noncompliance.

 

With regard to actual damages, Plaintiffs do not allege any specific, concrete harm caused by the qualified written request itself. (See Compl., ¶ 36.) In regards to Defendants’ alleged pattern or practice of noncompliance, Plaintiffs only allege one failure to respond to a qualified written request. (See Compl., ¶ 34.) Thus, Plaintiffs do not allege any facts indicating that Defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of noncompliance. (See Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 533.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege that they were either actually damaged by Defendants’ failure to respond to a qualified written request or are entitled to damages for Defendants’ alleged pattern or practice of noncompliance. As such, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for a violation of RESPA.

 

Elements of the Fourth Cause of Action for “Violation of Security Trust”

 

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs, as unrelated third parties to the securitization agreement, cannot challenge the securitization process. Defendants’ argument is persuasive. An unrelated party to the alleged securitization lacks standing to enforce any such agreements, including an investment trust’s pooling and servicing agreement related to such transactions. (See Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp 514-515.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs may not challenge the securitization process and, therefore, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action.

 

Based on the foregoing, the demurrer to each cause of action in the complaint is SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND on the ground of failure to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action.

 

The currently-scheduled date for case management conference (9-30-14 at 3:45 p.m.) is CONTINUED to November 4, 2014 at 10:00 a.m. in Department 5.