Case Name:   Chandramohan Ammini, et al. v. Dana Ichinotsubo, et al.

Case No.:       1-10-CV-167069

 

After full consideration of the evidence, arguments, authorities, and papers submitted by each party, the Court makes the following rulings:

 

Currently before the Court is the motion of defendant Daniel Lee (“Mr. Lee”) to quash service of summons on the ground that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1).  Plaintiffs[1] oppose the motion and argue that Mr. Lee is subject to specific jurisdiction because he has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state.

 

As a preliminary matter, Mr. Lee’s objections to exhibits A-F attached to the declaration of James De Los Reyes are OVERRULED. (See O’Laskey v. Sortino (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 241, 273 [stating that a writing must be authenticated by evidence establishing that the writing is what it purports to be]; see also Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 523 [explaining that ordinarily in law and motion matters, a writing is authenticated by declarations establishing how the documents were obtained, who identified them, and their status as “true and correct” copies of the original]; see also Evid. Code, §§ 1220 [party admission] 1280 [public records].)

 

Mr. Lee’s request for judicial notice of the printouts from the Hawaii Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs’ online business registry (RJN, Exs. A and B) is GRANTED, but only as to the existence of the records and not as to the truth of factual matters which might be deduced therefrom.  (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); see also Aquila, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 569 [a court may take judicial notice of official acts and public records that are relevant to pending issues, but this does not in and of itself require acceptance of the truth of factual matters which might be deduced therefrom]; see also Pedus Building Services, Inc. v. Allen (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 152, 156, fn. 2; see also Gigax v. Ralston Purina Co. (1982) 136 Cal. App. 3d 591, 602 [courts may properly take judicial notice of corporate filings].)

 

Specific jurisdiction requires a showing of: (1) purposeful availment—i.e., the out-of state defendant purposefully established contacts with the forum state; (2) arising out of—i.e., the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or is related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state; and (3) reasonableness —i.e., the forum’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in the particular case comports with fair play and substantial justice.  (Weil & Brown, supra, at § 3:225; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 477-478.)

 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established that Mr. Lee is subject to specific jurisdiction.

 

First, Plaintiffs have not shown that Mr. Lee purposefully availed himself of the benefits of the forum state.  (See Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 969, 978-979 [“[p]urposeful availment occurs where a nonresident defendant purposefully directs its activities at residents of the forum, purposefully derives benefit from its activities in the forum, creates a substantial connection with the forum, deliberately has engaged in significant activities within the forum, or has created continuing obligations between itself and residents of the forum”]; see also Pavlovich v. Super. Ct. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 272 [the effects test is a means to establish purposeful availment when the defendant’s intentionally out-of-state act causes an effect in the forum state].)

 

With respect to Mr. Lee’s purported involvement with defendants Eurus Corporation and Eurus Genomics, Inc., the mere act of serving as an agent for service of process for an out-of-state corporation is not a contact with California and Plaintiffs do not offer any evidence that Mr. Lee took any action as an agent for service of process for those companies that was purposefully directed toward California.

 

With respect to Mr. Lee’s involvement with defendant Asian Pacific Research Foundation, merely being an officer or director of a company, without evidence of the individual actively participating in the wrongful conduct alleged, is insufficient to subject an individual to specific jurisdiction.  (See Seagate Technology v. A. J. Kogyo Co. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 696, 701; see also Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp. (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 103, 114; see also Mihlon v. Super. Ct. (1985) 169 Cal. App. 3d 703, 712.)  Furthermore, there is no indication that Mr. Lee’s preparation of the company’s articles of incorporation was in anyway related to the wrongful conduct alleged in the TAC.  Moreover, Mr. Lee’s passive receipt of payments from defendant Asian Pacific Research Foundation, absent evidence that Mr. Lee knew that the funds used to pay him were misappropriated from Antara, is inadequate to show that Mr. Lee intentionally caused an effect in California sufficient to constitute purposeful availment. (See Quattrone v. Super. Ct. (1975) 44 Cal. App. 3d 296, 306 [“it is reasonable to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant intentionally causing “effects in the state by an omission or act done elsewhere’”] [emphasis added]; see also In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 110 [the jurisdictional facts shown must pertain to each separate nonresident defendant, even in a case alleging a conspiracy, and allegations in an unverified complaint are insufficient to satisfy this burden of proof].)

 

Additionally, the fact that Mr. Lee was a shareholder of Antara, entered into a “Representation Agreement” with Antara from March 17, 2009 to August 5, 2009, and hired a Hawaii attorney to investigate Antara as pursuant to the “Representation Agreement” does not constitute purposeful availment.  (See Goehring v. Super. Ct. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894, 904-905 [passive investment alone is not enough alone to establish personal jurisdiction]; see also Sacramento Suncreek Apartments, LLC v. Cambridge Advantaged Properties II, L.P. (2010) 187 Cal. App. 4th 1, 15; see also Seagate Technology v. A. J. Kogyo Co. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 696, 701; see also Edmunds v. Super. Ct. (1994) 24 Cal. App. 4th 221, 234-236 [the court found that the out-of-state attorney representing a California client did not purposefully avail himself of the benefits of the forum state].)  Notably, there is no evidence that Mr. Lee traveled to California, sent correspondence to California, advised Antara as to any matter, received payment from Antara, or had any other contact with California during his limited representation of Antara.

 

Second, the controversy is not related to and does not arise out of Mr. Lee’s contacts with California.  (See Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC v. Super. Ct., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 979 [“[a] controversy is related to or arises out of the defendant’s forum contacts, so as to satisfy the second requirement for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, if there is a substantial connection between the forum contacts and the plaintiff’s claim”].)  As articulated above, Plaintiffs submitted evidence that Mr. Lee had contacts with California because he was a shareholder of Antara and worked as Antara’s legal counsel for several months in 2009.  However, the TAC alleges that Mr. Lee participated in a conspiracy to defraud Antara by working with Mr. Ichinotsubo to “facilitate[e] various transactions involving [defendants] Asian Pacific Research Foundation, Eurus Genomics, Inc., and Eurus Corporation,” and does not allege that Mr. Lee’s work as legal counsel for Antara—during which he hired a Hawaii attorney to investigate Antara—is connected to the alleged wrongdoing.  (TAC, ¶ 20.)

 

Third, it would be unreasonable to exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Lee’s person.  As Mr. Lee has not purposefully availed himself of the benefits of the forum state and the controversy arises out of his contacts with California, it would be a burden on him as a Hawaii resident to litigate the matter in the forum state.  (See Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC v. Sup. Ct., supra, 165 Cal.App.4^th at pp. 979-980.)

 

Plaintiffs request a 60-day continuance to conduct jurisdictional discovery should the Court be inclined to grant the motion.  As Plaintiffs have adequately articulated the jurisdictional facts that they seek on discovery the request is GRANTED.  (See Goehring v. Super. Ct. (1998) 62 Cal. App. 4th 894, 911 citing Mihlon v. Super. Ct. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 703, 711 [“[a] plaintiff is generally entitled to conduct discovery with regard to a jurisdictional issue before a court rules on a motion to quash.”].)

 

The Court will prepare the order.

 

[1] Chandramohan Ammini, Sarah Brashears, Gregory Bogdan, Kilian Dill, Luz Maria Garcia, Robert Gordon, George Jokhadze, Mark Kozlowski, Peter Lobban, Bich Nguyen, Michael Norris, Joelle Ogi, Bradley Scherer, Mark Trulson, and LaVonne Young.