| Raymond and Michelle Plata v. City of San Jose | CASE NO. 114CV258879 | |
| DATE: 5 September 2014 | TIME: 9:00 | LINE NUMBER: 17 |
This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.882.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 4 September 2014. Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.
On 5 September 2014, the motion of plaintiffs Raymond and Michelle Plata (collectively “Plaintiffs”) to compel further responses to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production of documents, and for an award of monetary sanctions, was argued and submitted. Defendant the City of San Jose (“Defendant”) filed a formal opposition to the motion.
Statement of Facts
On 10 January 2014, Plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit against Defendant alleging that it has regularly used its water company, San Jose Municipal Water System (“Muni Water”), to generate profit in violation of the California Constitution.
In their complaint, Plaintiffs explain that Muni Water imposes fees and charges on the users of the water utility on a monthly basis. In 1996, California voters approved Proposition 218, which added articles XIII C and XIII D to the California Constitution. Articles XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution provide that revenues derived from fees or charges imposed by Muni Water shall not be used for any purpose other than maintaining or improving Muni Water. Defendant is also prohibited from imposing fees or charges on water use to the extent that the revenue generated by the same exceeds the funds required to provide water service.
Plaintiffs allege that from January 1997 to the present, Defendant has illegally transferred approximately $30,000,000.00 from Muni Water to the general fund as “rate of return” transfers, “in-lieu fees,” “late fees,” and other transfers that are not related to the maintenance or improvement of Muni Water. Plaintiffs further allege that San Jose Municipal Code section 4.80.630, subdivision (a) purports to authorize unconstitutional “rate of return” transfers and, pursuant to this provision, Defendant has transferred to the general fund several millions of dollars as an illegal return on investment. Plaintiffs assert that the water utility fees and charges are imposed by Muni Water for general revenue purposes and exceed the reasonable and actual cost of providing the services. They further assert that, on an annual basis, the revenues have consistently exceeded projected amounts, while expenditures have consistently fallen short of projected amounts.
By their complaint, Plaintiffs seek a refund for any amount paid in fees or charges in excess of the cost of providing water service. Plaintiffs also seek a declaration of legal rights and duties, including a declaration that San Jose Municipal Code section 4.80.630 violates Article XIII D of the California Constitution and a declaration that the “rate of return” transfers and other transfers that are not related to the maintenance or improvement of Muni Water are in violation of Article XIII D of the California Constitution. Plaintiffs further seek a permanent injunction directing Defendant to refund Plaintiffs the amounts paid in excess of the cost of providing Muni Water services and enjoining Defendant from continuing to impose water charges that exceed the cost of providing those services, transferring funds from the water utility fund to the general fund and city hall debt service fund, and enforcing San Jose Municipal Code section 4.80.630.
Discovery Dispute
On 31 January 2014, Plaintiffs served Defendant with form interrogatories, set one (“FI”), special interrogatories, set one (“SI”), requests for admission, set one (“RFA”), and requests for production of documents, set one (“RPD”). On 25 February 2014, Plaintiffs granted Defendant’s request for an extension of time to respond to the discovery requests until 4 April 2014. Defendant’s counsel and Plaintiffs’ counsel then met and conferred at length regarding the scope of the discovery sought, but no resolution was reached.
Consequently, Defendant filed a motion for a protective order on 11 April 2014, requesting an order providing that it did not have to respond to the majority of the SI, RFA, and RPD propounded by Plaintiffs. Defendant asserted numerous grounds as the basis for its request for a protective order, including that the form of the discovery requests was improper, the requests were overbroad as to time and scope, the requests sought irrelevant information and information that was equally available to Plaintiffs, and the requests were oppressive and unduly burdensome. In its 6 June 2014 order on Defendant’s motion for protective order, the Court found that many of the grounds asserted by Defendant as a basis for the protective order were without merit and the motion was granted in part and denied in part. The Court granted the motion with respect to Defendant’s request for an order stating that it need not provide a response to RPD Nos. 82-85, 87-88, and 98. The Court also found that Defendant was entitled to an order providing that it need only respond to SI Nos. 72-74 and 81-87, and RPD Nos. 5-11, 97-100, 103, 106, and 108 to the extent that the requests ask for information and documents from 1997 to the present. In all other respects, the Court denied Defendant’s motion for a protective order.
On 10 June 2014, Plaintiffs granted Defendant an extension of time to provide discovery responses to the FI, SI, RFA, and RPD to 7 July 2014. (See Atkinson Dec., ¶ 23.) Defendant then requested an additional 30-day extension of time to 7 August 2014, to provide discovery responses. (See Tolentino Dec., ¶ 10.) On 16 June 2014, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent Defendant’s counsel a letter advising that he received Defendant’s request for an extension of time to provide responses to the discovery requests and stating: “[W]e agree to the requested extension with the understanding that the additional time is needed to provide substantive responses. Please let me know as soon as possible if the City does not intend to respond substantively to the requests.” (See Atkinson Dec., ¶ 24, Ex. J.)
The parties attended a case management conference in this case on 24 June 2014, at which time Defendant’s counsel advised the court (Hon. Joseph Huber) that Defendant was considering filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a writ. (See Zoglin Dec., ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs’ counsel sent a letter to Defendant’s counsel on the same day, stating that based upon Defendant’s counsel’s statements at the case management conference “[t]he City apparently has no intention of providing substantive responses to the requests – on August 7, 2014, or at any other time.” (See Atkinson Dec., ¶ 26, Ex. K.) Plaintiffs’ counsel further stated that “[b]ecause the requested additional time will not be used to provide substantive responses, we do not agree to further extend the deadline to respond beyond July 7, 2014,” and requested that Defendant provided substantive responses by that date. (See id.)
Defendant’s counsel sent Plaintiffs’ counsel a letter on 2 July 2014, requesting that Defendant’s counsel reconsider his position and extend Defendant’s deadline to provide responses to the discovery requests to 7 August 2014. (See Tolentino Dec., ¶ 12, Ex. C.) Plaintiffs’ counsel replied to the letter on 7 July 2014, refusing to provide any additional extension and advising that Defendant’s deadline to provide responses to the requests remained 7 July 2014. (See Atkinson Dec., ¶ 29, Ex. M.)
On 7 July 2014, Defendant served Plaintiffs with its responses to the FI, SI, RFA, and RPD, which consisted primarily of objections. (See Atkinson Dec., Exs. R, T, U, and V.)
Plaintiffs’ counsel sent Defendant’s counsel a meet and confer letter on 8 July 2014, arguing in general terms that all of Defendant’s objections to the requests were without merit because Defendant raised the same arguments as grounds for its motion for protective order and that motion was denied. (See Atkinson Dec., ¶ 30, Ex. N.) Plaintiffs’ counsel stated that unless Plaintiffs received complete, code-compliant responses by 11 July 2014, Plaintiffs would “appear on Monday, July 14, 2014 at 8:15 a.m., at the Downtown Superior Courthouse, for an order shortening time on a motion to compel further responses.” (See id.)
Defendant’s counsel sent Plaintiffs’ counsel a letter on 11 July 2014, indicating that Defendant was “working on providing supplemental responses to the discovery requests” regarding specific fiscal years, but would not be able to provide the supplemental responses by 11 July 2014. (See Zoglin Dec., ¶ 14, Ex. D.)
On 14 July 2014, Plaintiffs sought an ex parte order shortening the notice time for their motion to compel and the court (Hon. Carol Overton) ordered the motion to compel further responses set for hearing on 5 September 2014.
Plaintiffs’ counsel then sent Defendant’s counsel a meet and confer letter on 18 July 2014. Plaintiffs’ counsel stated that Plaintiffs did not need to provide more “specific disapproval” of Defendant’s responses to the discovery requests because Defendant’s “relevancy, ambiguity and burden objections have been litigated—and overruled.” Nonetheless, Plaintiffs’ counsel then identified purported deficiencies in Defendant’s responses to FI No. 17.1 (as to RFA Nos. 18-93) and provided analysis as to why Plaintiff’s relevancy, vague and ambiguous, overbroad, burdensome, attorney-client privilege, and work product doctrine objections were without merit. In addition, Plaintiffs’ counsel generally asserted that Defendant’s substantive responses were incomplete and evasive. (See Atkinson Dec., ¶ 32, Ex. P.)
Defendant’s counsel sent a reply letter on 1 August 2014, indicating that the Court’s 6 June 2014 order did not “require the City to waive its objections” to the discovery requests. (See Tolentino Dec., ¶ 15, Ex. F.) Defendant’s counsel advised that the City was preparing supplemental responses to the SI, RPD and RFA that would be served by the end of the following week (i.e., 8 August 2014). (See id.)
On August 7, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to compel further responses to FI No. 17.1 (as to RFA Nos. 18-93), SI Nos. 1-45, 52-80, 82-116, 118, 120-150, 152, 154-178, 189-190, 225-226, 254, 256, 258, and 260-262, RFA Nos. 18-93, and RPD Nos. 1-81, 86, 89-97, and 99-109.
On the same day, Defendant served Plaintiffs with further responses to SI Nos. 3-45, 52-82, 84-178, 189-226, and 261-262, RFA Nos. 21, 27-82, 85, 90, and 93, and RPD Nos. 1-81, 86, and 89-109. (See Zoglin Dec., ¶ 17, Exs. G, H, and I.) In the cover letter accompanying Defendant’s further responses, Defendant’s counsel advised that the City would also supplement its response to FI No. 17.1 and provide a privilege log within two weeks. (See Atkinson Reply Dec., Ex. Y.) Thereafter, on 15 August 2014, Defendant served Plaintiffs with a further response to FI No. 17.1 (as to RFA Nos. 18, 21-45, and 47-93) and a privilege log. (See Tolentino Dec., Ex. H.)
Defendant filed papers in opposition to the instant motion on 19 August 2014. Plaintiffs filed a reply on 26 August 2014.
Discussion
Plaintiffs move for an order compelling further responses to FI No. 17.1 (as to RFA Nos. 18-93), SI Nos. 1-45, 52-80, 82-116, 118, 120-150, 152, 154-178, 189-190, 225-226, 254, 256, 258, and 260-262, RFA Nos. 18-93, and RPD Nos. 1-81, 86, 89-97, and 99-109.[1] Defendant opposes the motion and argues that the motion was unnecessary given the service of further responses, Plaintiffs failed to adequately meet and confer prior to moving ex parte for an shortening the notice period on their motion, its objections are appropriate, and its substantive responses are complete.
- Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiffs request that the Court take judicial notice of its 6 June 2014 order on Defendant’s motion for a protective order.
A court may take judicial notice of court records that are relevant to a pending issue. (See Evid. Code, §452, subd. (d); see also People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [only relevant matters subject to judicial notice].)
Here, the 6 June 2014 is a court record that is relevant to the pending motion. Accordingly, Defendant’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.
II. Legal Standard
If a party demanding a response to an interrogatory or request for admission deems an answer to a particular interrogatory or request for admission as incomplete or evasive, or an objection to be without merit or too general, that party may move for an order compelling further response. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, 2033.290.) The objecting party bears the burden of explaining and justifying any objection. (See Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (2000) 22 Cal 4th 245, 255, citing Coy v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal. 2d. 210, 220-221.)
Similarly, if a party demanding a response to an inspection demand deems that a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or an objection in the response is without merit or too general, that party may move for an order compelling further response. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).) On a motion to compel further responses to requests for production, it is the moving party’s burden to demonstrate good cause for the discovery sought. (See Kirkland v. Super. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) This requires demonstrating both relevance to the subject matter and specific facts justifying discovery. (Id.) Once good cause has been shown, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify any objections or failure to provide a code-compliant response. (See id. at 98.)
III. Meet and Confer
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs failed to adequately meet and confer prior to bringing the instant motion.
A motion to compel further responses to interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and requests for admission shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration “showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2030.300, subd. (b), 2031.310, subd. (b)(2), and 2033.290, subd. (b).) A reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution requires that the parties present the merits of their respective positions with candor, specificity, and support. (See Townsend v. Super. Ct. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, 1439.) Additionally, the “reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with opposing counsel; rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.” (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.) A determination as to whether attempts at informal resolution were adequate depends upon the particular circumstances presented. (See Obregon v. Super. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal. App. 4th 424, 431.)
Here, Defendant’s counsel and Plaintiffs’ counsel engaged in extensive meet and confer efforts regarding the discovery requests at issue. The discovery requests were the subject of a prior motion for protective order and Defendant’s objections to the requests had been discussed in detail. Defendant’s 7 July 2014 responses to the requests consisted primarily of objections. While it would have been preferable for Plaintiffs to wait until the previously agreed upon deadline of 7 August 2014, to determine whether Defendant would in fact provide substantive responses, it was not wholly unreasonable for Plaintiffs to believe that a motion to compel further responses would be necessary given the circumstances.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ meet and confer efforts were adequate.
IV. Mootness
As articulated above, Defendant advises in its opposition papers that it served Plaintiffs via U.S. mail with further responses to SI Nos. 3-45, 52-82, 84-178, 189-226, and 261-262, RFA Nos. 21, 27-82, 85, 90, and 93, and RPD Nos. 1-81, 86, and 89-109 on 7 August 2014. In addition, Defendant served Plaintiffs with a further response to FI No. 17.1 (as to RFA Nos. 18, 21-45, and 47-93) and a privilege log on 15 August 2014.
When discovery responses are served after a motion to compel is filed, the court has substantial discretion in deciding how to rule in light of the particular circumstances presented. (See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 408-409 (“Sinaiko”).) Through this discretion, the court might deny the motion to compel as moot and just impose sanctions, or examine the responses to determine if they are code-compliant. (See id., at p. 409.)
In their reply, Plaintiffs indicate that they believe that Defendant’s amended responses to the discovery requests are deficient. Given the sheer number of requests to which further responses were provided, the Court declines to evaluate the sufficiency of the amended responses at this juncture and Plaintiffs should meet and confer with Defendant regarding the purported deficiencies in the further responses in an effort to avoid the need for any further court intervention. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion as to FI No. 17.1 (as to RFA Nos. 18, 21-45, and 47-93), SI Nos. 3-45, 52-82, 84-178, 189-226, and 261-262, RFA Nos. 21, 27-82, 85, 90, and 93, and RPD Nos. 1-81, 86, and 89-109 as MOOT.
V. Remaining Discovery Requests at Issue
The discovery requests that remain at issue are RFA Nos. 18-20, 22-26, 83-84, 86-89, and 91-92, FI No. 17.1 (as to RFA Nos. 19-20 and 46), and SI Nos. 1-2, 83, 254, 256, 258, and 260.
A. 6 June 2014 Court Order
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs argue throughout their papers that Defendant’s responses to the discovery requests defied the Court’s 6 June 2014 order because the Court previously overruled the objections that Defendant raised in response to the requests.
The Court’s 6 June 2014 addressed Defendant’s motion for a protective order and the merits of the grounds for the same. At the time of the Court’s 6 June 2014 order, Defendant had not served its responses to the discovery requests at issue and, thus, the Court did not rule on the merits of any objections raised in those responses. While many of the objections raised in Defendant’s responses to the discovery requests are based upon the same grounds as Defendant’s motion for a protective order, the Court’s 6 June 2014 order granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s motion for a protective order did not prohibit Defendant from raising any objections to the discovery requests in its responses to the same. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ argument is not well-taken.
B. RFA Nos. 18-20, 22-26, 83-84, 86-89, and 91-92
1. RFA Nos. 18, 83-84, and 86-89
RFA No. 18 asks Defendant to admit that Muni Water is the exclusive water provider for all of the residents that it serves. RFA Nos. 83-84 and 86-89 ask Defendant to admit that specific transfers of funds from the Water Utility Fund to other government funds during certain fiscal years were used for purposes other than providing or maintaining Muni Water services.
In response to RFA Nos. 18, 83-84, and 86-89, Defendant asserted numerous objections. Subject to those objections, Defendant provided identical substantive responses stating “deny as stated based on information and belief.” (See e.g., Opp’n. RFA Sep. Stmt., p. 2:9-10.)
Plaintiffs assert that all of Defendant’s objections to the requests are without merit. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant may not avoid providing an unequivocal denial simply because it lacks the requisite personal knowledge if the information necessary to admit or deny the matter is reasonably available. Furthermore, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant improperly qualifies its denials because the substantive responses are made “subject to” Defendant’s numerous objections. Plaintiffs also argue that the requests are impermissibly qualified because they are made on information and belief.
Conversely, Defendant argues that its responses are complete as it answered the requests to the best of its ability. Defendant asserts that denials to a request “as framed” and denials made upon information and belief are appropriate. Defendant also states that it has a right to preserve its objections, but Defendant does not attempt to justify any of the objections that it raised in its responses to the requests.
Since Defendant does not attempt to defend its objections made to RFA Nos. 18, 83-84, and 86-89, the Court finds that the undefended objections are without merit. (See Coy v. Super. Ct., supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 220-221.)
With respect to Defendant’s substantive responses, a denial of all or a portion of a request must be unequivocal. (See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern Calif. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 268.) However, reasonable qualifications of a denial (i.e., explaining the reason for the denial) are not improper. (See St. Mary v. Super. Ct. (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 762, 780.) Moreover, a response stating “as framed, denied” is a code-compliant denial. (See Smith v. Circle P Ranch Co. (1978) 87 Cal. App. 3d 267, 275.) In addition, denials may be made on information and belief. (See Chodos v. Super. Ct. (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 318, 322-323.)
Here, Defendant’s responses are code-complaint because, despite the numerous objections, they unequivocally deny the requests, as framed, upon information and belief. (See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist., supra, 126 Cal. App. 4th at p. 268.)
Accordingly, further responses to RFA Nos. 18, 83-84, and 86-89 are not warranted.
2. RFA Nos. 19-20
RFA No. 19 asks Defendant to admit that the entity called Muni Water was purchased in 1961 using loans from the City’s General Fund. RFA No. 20 asks Defendant to admit that the loans from the General Fund that were used to purchase Muni Water have been fully repaid with interest since 1971.
In response to RFA Nos. 19-20, Defendant asserted numerous objections. Subject to those objections, Defendant provided identical substantive responses stating “admit based on information and belief.” (See e.g., Plaintiffs’ Sep. Stmt., v. 2, p. 491:17.)
In their respective moving and opposition papers, Plaintiffs and Defendant proffer the same arguments with respect to RFA Nos. 19-20 that they made regarding RFA Nos. 18, 83-84, and 86-89.
Since Defendant does not attempt to defend its objections to RFA Nos. 19-20, the Court finds that the undefended objections are without merit. (See Coy v. Super. Ct., supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 220-221.)
Here, Defendant’s responses are code-complaint because, despite the numerous objections, they clearly admit the matters stated in the requests upon information and belief. (See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist., supra, 126 Cal. App. 4th at p. 268; see also Chodos v. Super. Ct. (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 318, 322-323 [admissions may be made on information and belief].)
Accordingly, further responses to RFA Nos. 19-20 are not warranted.
3. RFA Nos. 22-26
RFA Nos. 22-23 ask Defendant to admit that the water service provided to Muni Water customers are property related services and Muni Water fees and charges are imposed upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership. RFA Nos. 24-26 ask Defendant to admit that under Proposition 218 and the California Constitution Muni Water fees and charges may not exceed the funds required to provide water services, be used for any purpose other than that for which the fee was imposed, and be imposed for general governmental services.
In response to RFA Nos. 22-26, Defendant asserted numerous objections. Subject to those objections, Defendant provided identical substantive responses stating “deny.” (See e.g., Plaintiffs’ Sep. Stmt., v. 2, p. 504:18.)
Plaintiffs assert that all of Defendant’s objections to the requests are without merit. Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant improperly qualifies its denials because the substantive responses are made “subject to” Defendant’s numerous objections.
Conversely, Defendant argues that its responses are complete as it denied the requests.
Since Defendant does not attempt to defend its objections to RFA Nos. 22-26, the Court finds that the undefended objections are without merit. (See Coy v. Super. Ct., supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 220-221.)
The Court finds that Defendant’s responses to RFA Nos. 22-26 are code-compliant because Defendant unequivocally denied the requests, notwithstanding its objections. (See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water Dist., supra, 126 Cal. App. 4th at p. 268.)
Accordingly, further responses to RFA Nos. 22-26 are not warranted.
4. RFA Nos. 91-92
RFA Nos. 91-92 ask Defendant to admit that specific monetary transfers from the Water Utility Fund to other governmental funds for the fiscal year 2013-2014 will be used for purposes other than providing or maintaining Muni Water services.
In response to RFA Nos. 91-92, Defendant asserted numerous objections, including speculation. Subject to those objects, Defendant provided identical substantive responses stating that “a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in this request has been made and the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable Defendant to admit, deny, or respond to the request as stated.” (See e.g., Plaintiffs’ Sep. Stmt., v. 3, p. 643:2-4.)
Plaintiffs generally argue that all of Defendant’s objections to the requests lack merit. Plaintiffs further argue that Defendant’s responses are incomplete because it should “at minimum deny as much of the matter as in [sic] untrue.” (See e.g., Plaintiffs’ Sep. Stmt., v. 3, p. 643:14-15.)
Conversely, Defendant asserts that it has provided a complete, code-compliant response to the requests because it conducted a good faith inquiry into the matter and has not been able to identify any current employees who have sufficient personal knowledge to respond. Defendant also states that it has a right to preserve its objections. However, Defendant only attempts to justify its objection based on speculation, arguing that the requests are improper because they require it to speculate given that the 2013-2014 fiscal year has not closed.
As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that any undefended objections to RFA Nos. 91-92 are without merit. (See Coy v. Super. Ct., supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 220-221.)
With respect to Defendant’s objection based on speculation, the Court finds that the objection lacks merit as Defendant’s fiscal year ended on 30 June 2014[2], such that Defendant need not speculate as to how specific funds will be used for the 2013-2014 fiscal year.
With respect to Defendant’s substantive response, the Court finds that the response is evasive. While a party may give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for a failure to admitall or part of a request, Defendant’s response is evasive because Defendant also states that the information that is known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable it to “respond to the request as stated.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (c).)
Accordingly, further responses to RFA Nos. 91-92 are warranted.
C. FI Nos. 17.1 as to RFA Nos. 19-20 and 46
FI No. 17.1 asks for: (a) the identification of all responses to the RFA that are not unqualified admissions; (b) all facts on which an identified response is based; (c) all persons with knowledge of those facts; and (d) all documents that support an identified response.
In response to FI No. 17.1, Defendant asserted numerous objections and did not provide any information with respect to RFA Nos. 19-20 and 46. As indicated above, in response to RFA Nos. 19-20, Defendant asserted numerous objections. Subject to those objections, Defendant provided identical substantive responses stating “admit based on information and belief.” (See e.g., Plaintiffs’ Sep. Stmt., v. 2, p. 491:17.) Defendant provided an objection-only initial response to RFA No. 46. In its further responses served on 7 August 2014, Defendant again asserted numerous objections to RFA No. 46 and, subject to those objections, provided a substantive response stating “deny.”
Plaintiffs do not specifically address Defendant’s response to FI No. 17.1 as it pertains to RFA Nos. 19-20 and 46 in their papers, but generally argue that Defendant’s objections to FI No. 17.1 are without merit.
Defendant asserts in its papers that Plaintiff failed to provide a separate statement with respect to FI No. 17.1 and on that basis the motion should be denied. Defendant does not otherwise attempt to justify its response to FI No. 17.1.
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs did in fact provide a separate statement with respect to FI No. 17.1 though it is not surprising that Defendant overlooked the same given that Plaintiff’s separate statement is over 800 pages long and the portion addressing FI No. 17.1 is only a few pages long and tucked in between the portions of the separate statement discussing the RFA and RPD.
As Defendant does not attempt to defend its objections to FI No. 17.1 as to RFA Nos. 19-20 and 46, the Court finds that the undefended objections are without merit. (See Coy v. Super. Ct., supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 220-221.)
Since Defendant’s further response to RFA No. 46 denies the matters stated in the RFA, and Defendant’s response to FI No. 17.1 does not provide any information with respect to RFA No. 46, a further response to FI No. 17.1 as to RFA No. 46 is warranted.
In contrast, since Defendant admitted RFA Nos. 19-20, it was not required to provide a response to FI No. 17.1 for those requests as FI No. 17.1 only asks for information about responses to the RFA that are not unqualified admissions. Accordingly, a further response to FI No. 17.1 as to RFA Nos. 19-20 is not warranted.
D. SI Nos. 1-2, 83, 254, 256, 258, and 260
1. SI Nos. 1-2
SI Nos. 1-2 ask Defendant to identify each individual who was an agent, employee, or representative of Muni Water for the fiscal years 1997-1998 and 1998-1999. The parties both acknowledge that the requests were amended on 10 March 2014, so they request only the number of Muni Water employees for the fiscal years 1997-1998 and 1998-1999.
In response to the requests, Defendant asserted numerous objections, including objections based on relevance, over breadth, undue burden, and harassment. Subject to those objections, Defendant provided identical substantive responses stating that “after a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information, Defendant is unable to respond to the amended Interrogatory at this time.” (See e.g., Plaintiffs’ Sep. Stmt., v. 1, p. 3:25-27.)
In their opposition, Defendant attempts to justify its relevance and over breadth objections, arguing that “[a]s each imposition of the fees challenged by Plaintiffs constitutes its own potential cause of action, information about the imposition of fees prior to the statutory period is irrelevant and overbroad.” (See e.g., Opp’n. SI Sep. Stmt., p. 3:23-26.) Defendant also attempts to justify its undue burden and harassment objections, stating that “[i]n light of the City’s pending motion for judgment on the pleadings, through which it seeks a judicial determination of the applicable statute of limitations, Plaintiffs’ insistence on obtaining immediate information from years before any actionable event is burdensome, harassing, and appears to serve no purpose other than to waste City Time and resources.” (See e.g., Opp’n. SI Sep. Stmt., pp. 3:26-28, 4:1-2.)
Furthermore, Defendant asserts that its substantive response is adequate because it has made a reasonable and good faith inquiry, but is unable to respond to the request because it has been unable to locate responsive information going back to fiscal years 1997-1998 and 1998-1999.
Plaintiffs argue that the information is clearly relevant as they allege that Defendant has committed wrongful acts dating back to 1997. Plaintiffs further argue that even if some of their claims were barred by the statute of limitations, information about how Defendant calculated Muni Water fees and charges beginning in 1997 could lead to relevant information about witnesses or how fees are presently calculated. Plaintiffs also assert that Defendant’s undue burden and harassment objections are without merit because Defendant has not shown how the requests create an unreasonable burden. Plaintiffs further assert that Defendant’s substantive response is incomplete and evasive because it does not state that Defendant lacks the requisite personal knowledge to respond.
As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that any undefended objections to SI Nos. 1-2 are without merit. (See Coy v. Super. Ct., supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 220-221.)
In addition, the Court finds that Defendant’s over breadth and relevance objections are not well-taken. As indicated in the Court’s 6 June 2014, the issue of whether some of Plaintiffs claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations is an issue that is dispute by the parties. Whether some of Plaintiffs claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations is an issue that is properly argued on law and motion. Here, the complaint clearly asserts claims for wrongful conducting dating back to 1997. Since information from that time period could lead to witnesses or evidence about how Defendant calculates Muni Water fees and charges, Plaintiffs are entitled to conduct discovery regarding those allegations. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; see also Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790 [any doubt as to relevance is generally resolved in favor of discovery; see also Gonzalez v. Super. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) Accordingly, these objections are overruled.
Furthermore, the Court finds that Defendant’s undue burden and harassment objections are without merit. First, Plaintiffs cite no authority supporting the proposition that Defendant’s should be prohibited from conducting discovery as to some of their claims because Plaintiffs have filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (See Budget Finance Plan v. Super. Ct. (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 794, 797 [discovery is not dependent upon the status of the pleadings]; Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1436.) Second, some burden is inherent in all demands for discovery and Defendant has not made a particularized showing of facts demonstrating hardship e.g., specific facts as to how much work, time, and expense would be required to respond and/or produce responsive documents. (See West Pico Furniture Co. v. Super. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417-418; see also Contra, Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Super. Ct. (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 313, 318.) Accordingly, these objections are overruled.
Finally, Plaintiffs persuasively argue that Defendant’s substantive responses to SI Nos. 1-2 are not code-complaint. Defendant’s responses do not state that Defendant lacks the requisite personal knowledge sufficient to respond to the requests, but merely states that it is unable to respond to SI Nos. 1-2 at this time. (See Code Civ. Proc., §2030.220, subds. (a) and (c) [“[e]ach answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party … [i]f the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state”].)
Accordingly, further responses to SI Nos. 1-2 are warranted.
2. SI No. 83
SI No. 83 asks Defendant to define “Human Resources/Payroll System Upgrade” as used in the statement of source and use of funds for the Water Utility Fund in its annual operating budgets.
In its objection-only response to the request, Defendant asserted numerous objections, including objections based on relevance, over breadth, undue burden, and harassment.
In its opposition, Defendant states that it intends to amend its response to this request. Defendant also attempts to justify its objections based on relevance, over breadth, undue burden, and harassment, proffering the same arguments that it made to support those objections in response to SI Nos. 1-2.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s objections are without merit, offering the same reasoning that they provided in connections with their discussion of those objections with respect to SI Nos. 1-2.
As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that any undefended objections to SI No. 83 are without merit. (See Coy v. Super. Ct., supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 220-221.) Furthermore, for the reasons articulated above, Defendant’s relevance, over breadth, undue burden, and harassment objections are overruled.
Accordingly, a further response to SI No. 83 is warranted.
3. SI Nos. 254, 256, 258, and 260
SI Nos. 245, 256, 258, and 260 ask Defendant to describe the method it used for calculating the late fees for Muni Water for fiscal years 2010-2011, 2011-2012, 2012-2013, and 2013-2014.
In response to the requests, Defendant asserted numerous objections, including objections based on relevance, over breadth, undue burden, and harassment. Subject to those objections, Defendant provided identical substantive responses stating that Plaintiffs should “refer to San Jose Municipal Code section 15.08.320 and Resolution No. 75442 [page 47 at Section 85], which will be produced. (See C.C.P. §2030.230.)” (See e.g., Plaintiffs’ Sep. Stmt., v. 2, p. 479:23-25.)
Defendant attempts to justify its objections based on relevance, over breadth, undue burden, and harassment, proffering the same arguments that it made to support those objections in response to SI Nos. 1-2. Defendant also argues that its substantive responses to the requests are complete.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s objections are without merit, offering the same reasoning that they provided in connection with their discussion of those objections with respect to SI Nos. 1-2.
As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that any undefended objections to SI Nos. 245, 256, 258, and 260 are without merit. (See Coy v. Super. Ct., supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 220-221.) Furthermore, for the reasons articulated above, Defendant’s relevance, over breadth, undue burden, and harassment objections are overruled.
Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 provides that it is a sufficient answer to an interrogatory to refer to that section and to specify documents from which the answer to the interrogatory may be obtained, if the answer would necessitate the preparation of a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary and the burden of preparing one would be substantially the same for the propounding as the responding party. The specification of documents “shall be in sufficient detail to permit the propounding party to locate and to identify, as readily as the responding party can, the documents from which the answer may be ascertained.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.230.) The responding party shall afford the propounding party a reasonable opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect the documents and to prepare the compilation, abstract, audit, or summary. (See id.)
Here, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the responses to SI Nos. 245, 256, 258, and 260 would require preparation of a compilation, abstract, or summary. In its responses, Defendant specifies in detail the document from which the answers to the requests may be ascertained and indicates that it will produce the subject document to Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Defendant’s responses to the requests comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 and, thus, further responses to SI Nos. 245, 256, 258, and 260 are not warranted.
VI. Request for Discovery Referee
In their opposition papers, Defendant suggests that the Court appoint a discovery referee given the scope and number of discovery requests at issue.
When the parties do not stipulate to the appointment of a referee, however, the Court is authorized to appoint one only if it is “necessary…to hear and determine any and all discovery motions and disputes relevant to the discovery in the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 639.) Discovery referees are not granted lightly. (See e.g. Taggares v. Super. Ct. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 94, 105.) “Unless both parties have agreed to a referee, the court should not make blanket orders directing all discovery motions to a discovery referee except in the unusual case where a majority of factors favoring reference are present.” (Id.) “These include: (1) there are multiple issues to be resolved; (2) there are multiple motions to be heard simultaneously; (3) the present motion is only one in a continuum of many; (4) the number of documents to be reviewed (especially in issues based on assertions of privilege) make the inquiry inordinately time-consuming.” (Id.)
Defendant does not address the factors relevant to the Court’s determination of whether a discovery referee is warranted or demonstrate that this is an exceptional case where a discovery referee is necessary. Accordingly, Defendant’s request for a discovery referee is DENIED.
VII. Plaintiffs’ Request for Monetary Sanctions
Plaintiffs request monetary sanctions in the amount of $11,975 against Defendant under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.010, 2023.030, 2030.300, 2031.310, and 2033.290.
First, with respect to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.010 and 2023.030, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should impose a monetary sanction against Defendant for making unmeritorious objections and disobeying a prior court order. Plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010 because that statute defines acts that constitute misuses of the discovery process, and does not itself set forth any provisions regarding the issuance of a monetary sanction. Furthermore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 as that statute provides that sanctions may be imposed for misuses of the discovery process “[t]o the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title” and does not provide an independent basis for an award of sanctions.
Second, Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, 2031.310, and 2033.290 provide for the imposition of monetary sanctions in connection with a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories, requests for production of documents, or requests for admission against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes such a motion, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.
Here, Plaintiffs were only partially successful on their motion and Defendant was justified in opposing the motion as several of its responses were code-compliant. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.
Conclusion and Order
Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to FI No. 17.1 as to RFA No. 46 and SI Nos. 1-2, 83, and 91-92. The motion is DENIED as moot as to FI No. 17.1 as to RFA Nos. 18, 21-45, and 47-93, SI Nos. 3-45, 52-82, 84-178, 189-226, and 261-262, RFA Nos. 21, 27-82, 85, 90, and 93, and RPD Nos. 1-81, 86, and 89-109. The motion is DENIED on the merits as to RFA Nos. 18-20, 22-26, 83-84, and 86-89 FI No. 17.1 as to RFA Nos. 19-20, and SI Nos. 245, 256, 258, and 260. Accordingly, within 20 days of the date of the filing of this Order, Defendant shall provide Plaintiffs with verified, code-compliant further responses to FI No. 17.1 as to RFA No. 46 and SI Nos. 1-2, 83, and 91-92, without objection.
Defendant’s request for a discovery referee is DENIED.
Plaintiffs’ request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.
| ____________________________
DATED: |
_________________________________________________
HON. SOCRATES PETER MANOUKIAN Judge of the Superior Court County of Santa Clara |
[1] The Court notes that Plaintiffs assert in their reply papers that Defendant has only served them with 77 documents in response to the RPD, none of which pre-date 2008. Plaintiffs appear to contend that Defendant should have provided them with additional documents in response to the RPD. To the extent that Plaintiffs believe that Defendant has not produced certain documents in compliance with its responses to the RPD, Plaintiffs’ remedy is to file a motion to compel compliance with the responses. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.320, subd. (a).)
[2] According to the “Frequently Asked Questions” page on Defendant’s website “[t]he City’s fiscal year begins July 1 and ends June 30.” (See City of San Jose website, http://www.sanjoseca.gov/FAQ.aspx.)
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