Case Name:   Sarat Chandra Rayapati thru his Guardian Ad Litem Ushasri Ganala, et al. v. St. Louise Regional Medical Center, et al.

 

Case No.:       1-13-CV-251146

 

Demurrer by Defendants Regional Medical Center of San Jose and Regional Medical Center of San Jose Emergency Department to the First Amended Complaint; Demurrer by Defendants St. Louise Regional Medical Center and Leigh-Ann Periard to the First Amended Complaint; Demurrer by Defendant Casey Buitenhuys, M.D. to the First Amended Complaint; and Demurrer by Defendant California Emergency Physicians Medical Group to the First Amended Complaint

 

            This action arises out of the alleged negligent care and treatment received by plaintiff Sarat Chandra Rayapati (“Mr. Rayapati”) in connection with an injury to his left hand.  Currently before the Court are the demurrers by defendants Regional Medical Center of San Jose and Regional Medical Center of San Jose Emergency Department (collectively “Regional Medical Center of San Jose”), defendants St. Louise Regional Medical Center (“St. Louise”) and Leigh Ann Periard (“Ms. Periard”), defendant Casey Buitenhuys, M.D. (“Dr. Buitenhuys”), and defendant California Emergency Physicians Medical Group (“CEPMG”) to the first amended complaint (“FAC”) of plaintiffs Sarat Chandra Rayapati thru his guardian ad litem Ushasri Ganla, Ushasri Ganla as an individual (“Ms. Ganla”), and Conservatorship of Person and Estate of Sarat Chandra Rayapati thru his conservator Ushasri Ganla (collectively “Plaintiffs”).

 

“In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurer, we are guided by long settled rules.  ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’”  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  “A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading.  It admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint; the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.”  (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213–214.)

 

Demurrer by Regional Medical Center of San Jose

 

The demurrer by Regional Medical Center of San Jose is MOOT.  On August 28, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal of the case, with prejudice, as to Regional Medical Center of San Jose and Regional Medical Center of San Jose Emergency Department and the dismissal was entered as requested on the same date.

 

 

 

 

Demurrer by St. Louise and Ms. Periard

 

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED.  (See Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d) [a court may take judicial notice of court records that are relevant to a pending issue]; see also People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2.)

 

The demurrer by St. Louise and Ms. Periard is OVERRULED.  Based on the allegations in the FAC, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to establish delayed discovery for pleading purposes.  (See Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808 [“In order to rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, a plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.  In assessing the sufficiency of the allegations of delayed discovery, the court places the burden on the plaintiff to show diligence; conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer.”] [internal citation and quotation marks omitted].)  The FAC specifically pleads facts showing the time and manner of discovery Ms. Ganla’s discovery of the negligent cause of Mr. Rayapati’s injury because it alleges that Ms. Ganla first learned that the injury was not due to Mr. Rayapati’s left hand injury, as she was told by the medical staff, but to the administration of unsafe opiate levels from Mr. Hartman on or about May 29, 2013.  (FAC, 7:21-27, 8:1-6.)  Additionally, the FAC specifically pleads facts showing Plaintiffs’ inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence because it states that: Ms. Ganla believed the medical personnel when they told her that Mr. Rayapati’s cardiac arrest was due to his hand injury; Ms. Ganla was subsequently preoccupied for caring for her family and their needs; and once Ms. Ganla was informed by her probate counsel that she should discuss Mr. Rayapati’s current treatment with a medical malpractice attorney, she promptly investigated the matter further by seeking Mr. Hartman’s counsel.  (FAC, p. 6, ¶ 5.)  Whether the delay in discovery was reasonable is a question of fact that is not properly addressed on demurrer given that the allegations of the FAC, which bear on whether Plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of the allegedly undiscovered facts about the administration of unsafe levels of opiates, are not susceptible to only one legitimate inference.  (See Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 300.)

 

Demurrer by Dr. Buitenhuys

 

The demurrer by Dr. Buitenhuys is MOOT.  On August 28, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal of the case, with prejudice, as to Dr. Buitenhuys and the dismissal was entered as requested on the same date.

 

Demurrer by CEPMG

 

As a preliminary matter, CEPMG’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.  The request is GRANTED as to the August 13, 2013 complaint.  (See Evid. Code § 452, sudb. (d) [a court may take judicial notice of court records that are relevant to a pending issue]; see also People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2.)  The request is DENIED as to the April 4, 2014 letter from CEPMG’s counsel and the April 14, 2014 handwritten response from Plaintiffs’ counsel.  (See Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal. App. 4th 343, 364 [“The hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable. Judicial notice of matters upon demurrer will be dispositive only in those instances where there is not or cannot be a factual dispute concerning that which is sought to be judicially noticed.”]; see also Hubbart v. Super. Ct. (1999) 19 Cal. 4th 1138, 1178, fn. 37 [finding that the content of a letter was not a proper subject of judicial notice].)

 

In addition, Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED.  (See Evid. Code § 452, sudb. (d); see also People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co., supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 422, fn. 2.)

The demurrer by CEPMG is OVERRULED.  While CEPMG is correct that the failure to rename a defendant in an amended pleading results in the voluntary dismissal of that defendant without prejudice (see Kuperman v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co. (“Kuperman”) (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 943, 947) and an amendment does not relate back to the original complaint if the plaintiff attempts to rename a dismissed defendant after the statute of limitations has run (see Troche v. Daley (“Troche”) (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 403, 412), CEPMG was not named as a defendant in the original complaint filed on August 13, 2013.[1]  (See Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. 1.)  Thus, CEPMG was not “voluntarily dismissed” from the case when Plaintiffs did not name it as a defendant in the FAC.  Since Plaintiffs first named CEPMG as a defendant (i.e., “Doe 1”) in their June 19, 2014 amendment to the FAC, the amendment relates back and is deemed filed as of the date the original complaint was filed, August 13, 2013.  (See Woo v. Super. Ct. (Zarabi) (“Woo”) (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 169, 176.)  Notably, CEPMG argues that the statute of limitations ran on May 29, 2014, and does assert any argument with respect to the validity of Plaintiffs delayed discovery allegations.  Since the amendment relates back to August 13, 2013, and CEMPG contends that the statute of limitations ran on May 29, 2014, Plaintiffs’ claim against CEMPG is not barred by the statute of limitations.

 

The Court will prepare the order.

 

[1] CEPMG contends that it was served with the complaint before the FAC was filed and, since there is an notation at the bottom of the summons indicating that the complaint was served on the individual defendants on behalf of CEPMG, CEPMG was named as a defendant in the complaint.  The fact that the proof of service section at the bottom of the summons indicates that the named defendants were served as individual defendants on behalf of CEPMG does not alter the analysis in any way because CEPMG was not named as a defendant in the complaint itself.