Case Name:   Nazzisi, et al. v. Pineda

Case No.:       1-14-CV-263563

Defendants Guillermo Pineda Galvan (“Pineda”) and Guillermo Pineda, Sr. (collectively, “Defendants”) move to strike all references to punitive damages in the Amended Complaint (“FAC”) of plaintiffs Carl Nazzisi (“Nazzisi”) and Maryben Stover (“Stover”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).

Plaintiffs allege that on October 23, 2013, Nazzisi was driving a truck owned by Stover.  (FAC, ¶ 8.)  As Nazzisi was driving, his vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by Pineda.  (FAC, ¶ 8.)  Pineda was intoxicated while driving with a blood alcohol level of .22%.  (“FAC, ¶ 11.)

Defendants argue that the allegation regarding blood alcohol level is insufficient by itself to warrant punitive damages and that Plaintiffs have failed to set forth factual allegations showing the level of willfulness or disregard of the rights and safety of others required by Civil Code section 3294.

Punitive damages are generally authorized “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”  (Civ Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)  Plaintiffs seek punitive damages based on the alleged malice of Pineda.  (See FAC, ¶ 17.)  “Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)

In Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 890, 892, cited by Plaintiffs, the Court “consider[ed] whether punitive damages are recoverable in a personal injury action brought against an intoxicated driver.”  (Citation omitted.)  The Court ultimately “concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under section 3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.  (Ibid.)

Defendants assert that at the time Taylor was decided “despicable conduct” was not a requirement for punitive damages.  Defendants cite to Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal. App. 4th 1188 in support of this proposition.  As stated by Defendants, the Lackner court found that “[t]he statute’s reference to “despicable conduct” represents “a new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.”  (Id. at p. 1211.)  However, the Lackner case did not involve intoxication; rather, it concerned a collision between a snowboarder and a skier.  While Lackner provided an explanation of the requirements for punitive damages following amendment of Civil Code section 3294, it did not overrule Taylor.

As stated in Taylor,

[o]ne who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving incidents.

(Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, supra, 24 Cal. 3d at p. 897.)

Plaintiffs allege that Pineda had a blood alcohol level almost three times the legal limit and then chose to drive a motor vehicle.  (FAC, ¶¶ 11, 17.)  Consequently, a jury could find that Pineda acted with malice.  Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED.