JASON LIN v. ESTATE OF ALINA LYNN WONG, ET AL.

Case No.:  1-11-CV-203796

DATE:  October 2, 2014

TIME:  9:00 a.m.

DEPT.: 3

 

As an initial matter the Court notes that Plaintiff expressly does not oppose summary adjudication of the SAC’s 7^th and 8^th causes of action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty.  Accordingly, summary adjudication of those two claims is GRANTED.

 

The Court also notes that Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Separate Statement do not comply with Rule of Court 3.1350(b), stating in pertinent part, “If summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.”  Given this failure to comply with Rule of Court 3.1350(b) the remainder of the motion is treated as one for summary judgment only.

 

Defendant’s request for judicial notice of 15 documents (Exhibits A-O) is GRANTED as follows.

 

Notice of Exhibits A, E, K, L, M, N and O is granted pursuant to Evid. Code §452(d).  Only exhibits E and O are noticed as to their contents; the remaining court documents are noticed only as to their existence and filing dates.  Transcripts and declarations cannot be noticed as to the truth of their contents. See Bach v. McNelis (1989) 207 Cal App 3d 852, 865 (court may not notice the truth of declarations or affidavits filed in court proceedings); Garcia v. Sterling (1985) 176 Cal App 3d 17, 22 (“Although the existence of statements contained in a deposition transcript filed as part of the court record can be judicially noticed, their truth is not subject to judicial notice.”)

 

Notice of Exhibits B-D and F-J is granted pursuant to Evid. Code §452(c) which states that the Court may take judicial notice of “any official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States.”  This has been interpreted to include documents recorded by a government department.  “The court may take judicial notice of recorded deeds.”  Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4^th 540, 549.  But See Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal App 4^th 1106, 1117 (“However, the fact a court may take judicial notice of a recorded deed, or similar document, does not mean it may take judicial notice of factual matters stated therein.”)

 

Contrary to Defendant’s argument, the fact that a document is certified as a correct copy by some authority does not establish the truth of the contents of such documents or require the Court to take judicial notice of the contents of such documents.  This would presuppose that individuals never file or record documents containing false or inaccurate statements.

 

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of four documents is GRANTED pursuant to Evid. Code §452(d) for exhibits 1, 3 and 4 and §452(c) as to exhibit 2.  Only Ex. 1 is noticed as to the truth of its contents.  It is irrelevant for purposes of judicial notice that the copies provided are not certified.

 

The pleadings serve as the “outer measure of materiality” in a summary judgment motion, and the motion may not be granted or denied on issues not raised by the pleadings.  See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 79 Cal App 4^th 95, 98; Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal App 4^th 1242, 1258; Nieto v. Blue Shield of Calif. Life & Health Ins. (2010) 181 Cal App 4^th 60, 73 (“the pleadings determine the scope of relevant issues on a summary judgment motion.”).  The Court notes that no cause of action for Constructive Trust is pled in the operative Second Amended Complaint.  See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 79 Cal App 4^th 95, 98 fn. 4 (“A defendant moving for summary judgment need address only the issues raised by the complaint; the plaintiff cannot bring up new, unpleaded issues in his or her opposing papers.”)

 

The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.  Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4^th 826, 850.  The moving party’s declarations and evidence will be strictly construed in determining whether they negate or disprove an essential element of a plaintiff’s claim “in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s (or opposing party’s) favor.”  Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal 4^th 56, 64, parentheses added.  While the same standards of admissibility govern both, the opposition declarations are liberally construed while the moving party’s evidence is strictly scrutinized.  Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal 4^th 763, 768.

 

“A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.  …  The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show there is a triable issue of material fact on that issue.”  Alex R. Thomas & Co. v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4^th 66, 72; internal citations omitted.

 

Treated solely as a motion for summary judgment Defendant’s motion must be DENIED for failure to meet its burden to establish an absence of triable issues of material fact as to all causes of action.

 

The parties direct most of their arguments toward Plaintiff’s first four causes of action for cancellation of instruments.  Triable issues remain as to these four claims.  Defendant has failed to meet its burden to establish the affirmative defense of unclean hands.  See Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4^th 970, 979.  It is also clear given Decedent’s undisputed preparation of the relevant documents that triable issues remain as to whether she and Plaintiff were equally culpable in any improper or unethical conduct, such that her Estate may not raise the defense against Plaintiff.

 

Defendant has also failed to meet its burden to show that Plaintiff’s 2013 discovery responses show that he lacks evidence to support these claims.  A party moving for summary judgment on the ground that discovery responses show a lack of evidence does not satisfy its burden of proof by producing discovery responses that do not exclude the possibility that opposing parties may possesses or may reasonably obtain evidence sufficient to establish their claim.  See Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Const. Co. (1999) 69 Cal App 4^th 64, 80-81; Gulf Ins. Co. v. Berger, Kahn, Shaffton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone (2000) 79 Cal App 4^th 114, 134-136; Weber v. John Crane, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal App 4^th 1433, 1441-1442 (“A motion for summary judgment is not a mechanism for rewarding limited discovery; it is a mechanism allowing the early disposition of cases where there is no reason to believe that a party will be able to prove its case.”)  If the moving party’s evidence is only factually devoid discovery responses, the Court may not shift the burden to the opposing party unless stringent review of the direct, circumstantial and inferential evidence confirms the absence of an essential element of a claim or defense.  See Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal App 4^th 96, 101, 103.  Furthermore, it is not enough for the moving party to show merely that the opposing party “has no evidence” on a key element of a claim or defense.  The moving party must also produce evidence showing the opposing party cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support that claim or defense.  Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal App 4^th 884, 891; Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal App 4^th 799, 808.

 

Finally triable issues remain as to whether Plaintiff has standing to bring his first four claims.  While the February 28, 1996 Grant Deed of full title to the Bianchi Way property to Hui Lin, Plaintiff’s brother, is sufficient to meet Defendant’s initial burden on this issue and Plaintiff may not now raise the unpled issue of a constructive trust, when the burden shifts Plaintiff is able to raise triable issues of material fact.  Plaintiff in his opposing declaration states that he has no recollection of the January 13, 2000 Grant Deed prepared by Decedent after her marriage to Plaintiff whereby Decedent (for no apparent consideration) acquired a tenancy in common interest in the Bianchi Way property from Hui Lin (pursuant to a power of attorney also prepared by Decedent) and Plaintiff submits a Quitclaim Deed from Hui Lin transferring whatever title and interest he has (if any) in the Bianchi Way property to Plaintiff.  This also raises triable issues as to the 9^th cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.