Case Name:   Johnny Trieu v. Rommel Macatangay

Case No.:       1-14-CV-261793

After full consideration of the arguments, authorities, and papers submitted by each party, the Court makes the following rulings:

On March 10, 2012, defendant Rommel Macatangay (“Defendant”) was driving northbound on Highway 880 while intoxicated and plaintiff Johnny Trieu (“Plaintiff”) was riding in the right-rear passenger seat of Defendant’s vehicle.  (See Complaint, pp. 5-6.)  Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knowingly and willing became intoxicated, was aware that he was physically unfit to operate a motor vehicle, and knowingly drove in a negligent and reckless manner by making an unsafe lane change, veering off course, and crashing into a cement divider wall.  (See Complaint, p. 6.)

Currently before the Court is Defendant’s motion to strike all references to punitive damages in the complaint.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

Defendant’s motion to strike all references to punitive damages in the complaint is DENIED because the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to establish malice for pleading purposes.  (See Complaint, pp. 5-6; see also Perkins v. Super. Ct. (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7 [the complaint should be read as a whole so even conclusory allegations may suffice when read in context with facts alleged as to defendant’s wrongful conduct]; see also Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1) [defining malice].)  A reasonable trier of fact might very well conclude that consciously driving a motor vehicle while under the influence is base, contemptible and/or vile behavior, and an act of such extreme indifference to public safety that it constitutes malice for which punitive damages should be awarded.   (See Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1287 citing BAJI No. 14.72.1 (2003) [defining despicable conduct]; see generally Ross v. Sweeters (1932) 119 Cal App 716 [noting that malice is always question of fact for the court or jury to determine]; See also Roberts v. Permanente Corp. (1961) 188 Cal App 2d 526 [stating that generally a question of exemplary damages is for the trier of fact].)  Plaintiff need not allege any aggravating circumstances in order to adequately plead malice. (See Taylor v. Super. Ct. (“Taylor”) (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 896 [“while a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident, we do not deem these aggravating factors essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases”].)

Defendant’s reliance on Gombos and Dawes is misplaced to the extent that those decisions indicate that additional aggravating circumstances must be pled to establish malice because the California Supreme Court in Taylorexpressly disapproved that view. (See Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d. at p. 900 [“To the extent that [Gombos], is inconsistent with the views herein expressed, it is disapproved.].)

The Court will prepare the order.