Case Name: Nasher Shohabi v. Chaloy J. Hardwick, et al.
Case No.: 1-15-CV-276273
Date: August 6, 2015
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: 21

Plaintiff Nasher Shohabi (“Plaintiff”) brings this personal injury action against defendant Chaloy J. Hardwick (“Hardwick”), who allegedly injured Plaintiff while driving under the influence of alcohol and fleeing from law enforcement at a speed of approximately 120 miles per hour. (See First Amended Complaint, p. 5.)

Currently at issue is Hardwick’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 435-436), which is DENIED.

Driving while intoxicated may constitute an act of malice under Civil Code section 3294. (Taylor v. Superior Court (Stille) (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 897-98 (“Taylor”) [“[o]ne who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others”].) As urged by Hardwick, the Legislature amended the definition of “malice” after the decision in Taylor to require “despicable” and “willful” conduct in addition to conscious disregard of others’ safety. (See Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1211.) However, that amendment was intended to incorporate the definition of malice stated in Taylor. (Ibid.) Consequently, it did not alter Taylor’s precedential effect.

As discussed in Taylor, “while a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the probability and foresee ability of an accident, … these aggravating factors [are not] essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 896.) Even if aggravated conduct were required, Plaintiff has alleged it here by indicating that Hardwick was not only intoxicated, but was fleeing law enforcement at 120 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Such conduct is clearly “despicable” and “willful,” and supports a claim for punitive damages. (See also Dawes v. Superior Court (Mardian) (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 89 [“intoxicated driver’s decision to zigzag in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area” supported a claim for punitive damages].)