On 28 March 2014, the motion of defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. to compel further responses to requests for production of documents was argued and submitted. Plaintiff A. Salem, D.D.S., Inc. filed a formal opposition to the motion.

All parties are reminded that all papers must comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(f).

Statement of Facts

A. Salem, D.D.S., Inc. (“Plaintiff”) brings this negligence action against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Defendant” or “Wells Fargo”). Plaintiff operates a dental office in Los Altos owned by Ardeshir Salem, D.D.S. (“Dr. Salem”). Jinnie Chao (“Ms. Chao”) began working for Plaintiff in 2006. From January 2010 until she was terminated in January 2012, Ms. Chao worked as an office manager for Plaintiff. According to the allegations of the complaint, on or around 9 February 2011, Wells Fargo allowed a bank account in the name of Plaintiff to be improperly opened by Ms. Chao without Plaintiff’s authorization. Through the account, Ms. Chao embezzled in excess of $250,000 from Plaintiff’s dental practice. According to Plaintiff, Wells Fargo was negligent in failing to obtain, verify, and record information that identified each person opening an account on behalf of Plaintiff and otherwise allowing Ms. Chao to open the account.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff instituted this action against Wells Fargo on 18 September 2012, raising claims for negligence, breach of contract, false advertising, unfair business practices, and violations of the consumer legal remedies act. The Court subsequently sustained Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend, and on 30 January 2013, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint raising a single claim for negligence.

Discovery Dispute

Defendant served Plaintiff with its first set of requests for production of documents (“RPD”) seeking 27 categories of documents. The parties’ papers and supporting materials do not indicate the date on which Defendant served Plaintiff with the RPD. The requests seek documents related to, among other things, Plaintiff’s financial operations, e.g., revenue, expenses, profits, losses, and bank deposits.

In September 2013, Plaintiff served Defendant with unverified initial responses to Defendant’s RPD. Plaintiff objected and refused to produce documents to 23 of the 27 requests. Plaintiff did, however, produce 96 pages of documents and a privilege log identifying 13 emails between Ms. Chao and Dr. Salem that were withheld on the basis of privacy.

Counsel for Defendant wrote to counsel for Plaintiff on 24 September 2013, identifying perceived deficiencies with Plaintiff’s responses. (Amended Decl. of Margaret Schneck in Support of Def.’s Mot. to Compel Further Responses (“Amended Decl. of Schneck”), Ex. A.)

Counsel for Plaintiff responded to defense counsel’s letter on 8 October 2013. (Amended Decl. of Schneck, Ex. B.)

Following counsels’ meet and confer efforts, Plaintiff provided further responses to some of the requests and produced additional documents. Defense counsel informed Plaintiff’s counsel that she believed the responses remained inadequate and that Plaintiff had yet to verify any of the responses. When counsel for the parties could not resolve their dispute, they agreed to extend the deadline for Defendant to file a motion to compel to 14 January 2014.

On 14 January 2014, Defendant filed a motion to compel further responses to the RPD served on Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion on 17 March 2014. Defendant did not file a reply.

Discussion

Defendant seeks further responses to RPD Nos. 1-12, 16, 17, and 25-27. The requests fall into the following four categories: (1) financial documents, e.g., documents concerning Plaintiff’s revenue, expenses, profits, loses, and bank deposits made during the relevant time period (RPD Nos. 1-11 and 25); (2) communications between Ms. Chao and Dr. Salem (RPD No. 12); (3) documents identifying persons who worked for Plaintiff during the relevant time period (RPD Nos. 16 and 17); and (4) documents concerning Ms. Chao’s authorization (or lack thereof) to open the bank account at issue (RPD Nos. 26 and 27). Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s production of documents responsive to these requests is incomplete and that its objections lack merit.

A. Legal Standard

Upon receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, including requests for the production of documents, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply:

(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.
(2)
(3) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.
(4)
(5) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.
(6)
(Code Civ. Proc. [“CCP”], § 2031.310, subd. (a)(1) – (3).) The motion for order compelling further responses “shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand.” (CCP, § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1); Kirkland v. Sup. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) To establish “good cause,” the burden is on the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter (e.g., how the information in the documents would tend to prove or disprove some issue in the case) and specific facts justifying discovery (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). (Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.4th 1113, 1117.) Where the moving party establishes “good cause,” the burden shifts to the responding party to justify its objections. (Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.)

B. Verification

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to verify its responses to the RPD in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.250. That section provides that “[t]he party to whom the demand for inspection . . . is directed shall sign the response under oath unless the response contains only objections.” (CCP, § 2031.250, subd. (a).)

Plaintiff responded to the majority of Defendant’s document requests with nothing but objections. Those responses did not require a verification. Two of the responses, however, are hybrid in nature—containing objections and substantive responses. Plaintiff was required to provide a verification for the substantive portions of those responses and its failure to do so renders its two hybrid responses technically out of compliance with section 2031.250. (See Food 4 Less Supermarkets, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651, 657.)

Plaintiff does not dispute that it failed to verify its responses or that verification was required for the substantive responses to Defendant’s requests. Indeed, Plaintiff states in its opposition that it will provide Defendant with a verification.

Based on the above discussion, Plaintiff will be required to provide Defendant with a verification for its substantive responses. Additionally, to the extent this order requires Plaintiff to provide further responses, those responses shall be verified.

C. RPD Nos. 1-11

RPD Nos. 1-11 seek financial records from Plaintiff, including documents related to: revenue and “monthly case flow” (RPD No. 1-3); bank deposits (RPD Nos. 4 and 5); profits (RPD Nos. 6 and 7); expenses (RPD Nos. 8 and 9); and losses (RPD Nos. 10 and 11).

In its responses, Plaintiff objected to RPD Nos. 1-11 as follows:

Plaintiff objects to this request as follows: request is extremely overly broad, unduly burdensome and oppressive; request as phrased seeks documentations [sic] that is privileged, private and protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege, attorney work product doctrine, constitutional right of privacy, the physician-patient privilege, HIPAA, Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, other privacy laws, and the tax payer-privilege; request is improperly compound; and request seeks documentation that is not relevant and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

(Def.’s Separate Statement, pp. 2-9.)

1. Good Cause

Concerning good cause, Defendant asserts that “[t]his information is necessary to inform various issues in the case including whether the allegedly embezzled funds were actually spent for the benefit of the company; whether [and to what extent] Dr. Salem knew about company finances; the volume of company revenue and expenses which bears on defenses including but not limited to contributory negligence.” (Def.’s Mem. of Ps & As, (no page numbers) Sec. III.B.1 of memorandum.) Along the same lines, in its separate statement, Defendant identifies additional supporting facts justifying the discovery. For instance, Defendant indicates that it is informed and believes that Plaintiff has accounting software such as Quickbooks which, according to Defendant, would make response to these requests straightforward.

The Court agrees that the financial documents are relevant. If the documents show that the funds were used for business expenses—as opposed to the allegation that they were embezzled—it may not effect the determination of whether Defendant negligently opened the bank account, but it would diminish Plaintiff’s damages. Similarly, for the reasons articulated by Defendant, the documents are relevant in determining what Dr. Salem knew about the finances of his dental practice and the issue of contributory negligence.

Plaintiff asserts that the failure to set forth the specific facts justifying the discovery in a declaration (as opposed to the motion itself or in the separate statement) is fatal to Defendant’s motion. (Pl.’s Opp., p. 10, citing Calcor Space Facility v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224 [stating that facts can only be submitted to the court through declarations].) The Court disagrees. Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 provides that “[t]he motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (CCP, § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) The subdivision goes on to provide that the motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (Id., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) Read together, these provisions indicate that the Legislature knew how to differentiate between motions and declarations. While the statute requires the moving party to set forth “specific facts” as part of the good cause showing, it does not require those facts to be included in a declaration. If the Legislature intended for the “specific facts” requirement to be included in a declaration it could have so indicated—as it did with the meet and confer requirement.

This interpretation is further supported by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345, which requires the moving party to file a separate statement that includes “[a] statement of the factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses, answers, or production as to each matter in dispute.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c)(3).) In sum, the statutory provisions do not expressly require factual assertions to be included in a declaration and the applicable Rule of Court mandates that factual support be included within the separate statement. Given the language of the statute and rule 3.1345, the fact that Defendant did not set forth the facts justifying its motion in a declaration is not fatal to the motion.

Based on the above discussion, the Court finds that Defendant has demonstrated the relevance of the documents and set forth specific facts justifying the discovery. The Court therefore finds that Defendant has established good cause for the discovery sought, thereby shifting the burden to Plaintiff to justify its objections. (Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.)

2. Objections

It its initial responses, Plaintiff objected to RPD Nos. 1-11 on the grounds of overbreadth, undue burden, relevance, the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, privacy, the physician-client privilege, HIPAA, the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, and the tax payer-privilege.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the requests are overly broad and will sustain Plaintiff’s objections on that ground.

RPD Nos. 1-11 seek all documents relating to Plaintiff’s revenue and profits, bank deposits, cash flow and expenses, and losses. For example, RPD No. 3 seeks “ALL WRITINGS related to or reflecting monthly cash flow for Los Altos Dental Care or A. Salem, D.D.S., Inc. for January 2011 through January 2012.” (Def.’s Separate Statement, p. 3.) The other requests in this category are substantially similar.

Plaintiff asserts that these requests require the production of an expansive range of documents, including but not limited to the following documents: “dental patient invoices, bulling, payments, receipts and ledgers; dental insurance invoices, billing, payments, receipts and ledgers; employee wage and payment documentation; vendor invoices, billing, payments and ledgers; corporate tax returns and tax-related documents; corporate banking records and credit account records; general accounting records; litigation and settlement documents; and communications between [Plaintiff] and its dental patients, insurance companies, vendors, banks, attorneys, [and] accountants.” (Pl.’s Opp., p. 5.)

Plaintiff asserts that the requests necessarily require the production of private medical treatment information that, in turn, raises issues concerning the physician-patient privilege, HIPAA, Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, and other privacy laws. Defendant asserts that it is not seeking and has no interest in obtaining documents containing medical treatment information. The fact that Defendant is not seeking that information, however, does not change the wording of its requests.

The requests seek “all writings” and “all communications” related to revenue, monthly cash flow, and profits. Plaintiff operates a dental office and derives its revenue from patients. If the patients pay Plaintiff for the dental treatment they receive, documents relating to the payments (including the identity of the patients and possibly the treatment they received) would have to be produced under Defendant’s requests. Information concerning Dr. Salem’s patients is irrelevant to Wells Fargo’s defense in this case. The requests are therefore overly broad.

Based on the above discussion, Plaintiff’s objections to RPD Nos. 1-11 on the basis of overbreadth are sustained. Consequently, Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to RPD Nos. 1-11 is DENIED.

D. RPD No. 12

RPD No. 12 seeks “ALL WRITINGS related to, reflecting or comprising communications between Ardeshir Salem and Jinnie Chao from January 1, 2010 to the present.” (Def.’s Separate Statement, p. 9.)

In its initial response, Plaintiff objected to RPD No. 12 on the same grounds as RPD Nos. 1-11 (overbreadth, undue burden, relevance, the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, privacy, the physician-client privilege, HIPAA, the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, and the tax payer-privilege). Without waiving its objections, Plaintiff also provided a substantive response, indicating that it would produce all non-privileged, non-private documents responsive to the requests, and further indicated that it would provide a privilege log for the documents not produced.

The privilege log identifies 13 emails between Ms. Chao and Dr. Salem that will not be produced. The privilege log lists various grounds for non-production, including Dr. Salem’s right to financial privacy, third party privacy rights, HIPAA, and the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act. The privilege log does not indicate that any of the documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine.

In its supplemental responses, Plaintiff acknowledges that the parties have entered into a confidentiality agreement and indicated that it would concurrently produce the previously withheld 13 emails.

Defendant does not dispute that the previously withheld emails have been produced or that Plaintiff has failed to otherwise produce all documents in its possession responsive to the request. Because it appears that Plaintiff has produced all documents responsive to the request, Defendant’s motion to compel a further response to RPD No. 12 is DENIED, subject to requirement that Plaintiff provide Defendant with a verification for the response.

E. RPD Nos. 16 and 17

RPD Nos. 16 and 17 both seek “ALL WRITINGS” which identify names, titles and job descriptions of any employees and other persons who regularly worked for Plaintiff between 2010 and 2012.

Plaintiff objected to both of the requests as follows:

Plaintiff objects to this request as follows: request is extremely overly broad, unduly burdensome and oppressive; request seeks documents that are not relevant to the case and/or not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; request seeks documentation that is private and protected from disclosure by the constitutional right of privacy, HIPAA and/or other privacy laws. (Def.’s Separate Statement, p. 12.)

1. Good Cause

Concerning good cause, Defendant points out that Plaintiff has alleged that Ms. Chao was a volunteer rather than an employee and that, “[s]ince the office manager was apparently endowed with authority to deal with company finances, the identities and rolls of actual employees is important and relevant to the defense.” (Def.’s Separate Statement, p. 12.) Defendant further asserts that it indented the requests to exclude confidential employee information.

The Court agrees that there is good cause justifying the discovery sought. As Defendant points out, the individuals who regularly worked at Plaintiff’s office are witnesses to the companies’ operations and may have information concerning the issue of whether Ms. Chao had the authority to conduct the financial affairs of Plaintiff’s operations. The Court therefore finds that RPD Nos. 16 and 17 seek relevant information and that Defendant has established good cause, thereby shifting the burden to Plaintiff to justify its objections.

2. Objections

Plaintiff objects to RPD Nos. 16 and 17 on the grounds of relevance, overbreadth, undue burden, and privacy. As discussed in the preceding section, the requests seek relevant information. Plaintiff’s relevance objections are therefore overruled. However, for the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees that the requests are overly broad.

Objections based on overbreadth require a showing the request is not tailored in a way to limit the information requested to matters relevant to the subject matter of the litigation or that the category of documents sought is not reasonably particularized. (See CCP, § 2020.410.) Plaintiff asserts that RPD Nos. 16 and 17 are overly broad because they require the production of documents related to a variety of workers, including those who worked on building maintenance, computer issues, telephone repair, janitorial services, and/or security. (Pl.’s Opp., p. 6.) Plaintiff’s assertion is not well taken. The fact that the requests seek documents concerning various types of work does not alter the relevance analysis—persons who regularly worked at Plaintiff’s dental office may have information concerning Ms. Chao’s authority to conduct the financial affairs of Plaintiff’s business. In relevance jargon, the witnesses may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Moreover, the requests are limited in time to a two year period.

However, Plaintiff also argues that RPD Nos. 16 and 17 would require the production of employment records, which, according to Plaintiff, are irrelevant and protected by the right to privacy.

In response to Plaintiff’s objection to the production of employment records, Defendant asserts that it is not seeking such records. Rather, Defendant simply wants the names, job titles, and job duties of the persons who worked for Plaintiff during the relevant time period. However, as the Court stated with regard to RPD Nos. 1-11, the fact that Defendant is not seeking certain information, does not change the wording of its requests. The requests, which seek “all writings” identifying names, job titles, and job descriptions of persons who worked for Plaintiff necessarily encompass employment records, which would include such information. Defendant does not contend that employment records are relevant. The Court therefore finds that, as written, RPD Nos. 16 and 17 are overly broad. Plaintiff’s objections on that ground are therefore sustained and Defendant’s motion to compel further responses to RPD Nos. 16 and 17 is DENIED.

F. RPD No. 25

RPD No. 25 seeks “All Heritage Bank records reflecting deposit of funds which originated from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., or payment of funds to account(s) at Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.” (Def.’s Separate Statement, p. 13.)

Plaintiff objected to the request as follows:

[The] request is improperly compound; request is overly broad in scope and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery admissible evidence; request is oppressive and burdensome; request seeks documents that contain information that is already in the possession or control of the requesting party; request seeks documents that are private and protected from disclosure by the constitutional right of privacy. (Def.’s Separate Statement, p. 13.)

Concerning good cause, Defendant states that “[t]his information is necessary to inform various issues in the case including whether the allegedly embezzled funds were actually spent for the benefit of the company; whether [and to what extent] Dr. Salem knew about company finances; the volume of company revenue and expenses which bears on defenses including but not limited to contributory negligence.” (Def.’s Mem. of Ps & As, (no page numbers) Sec. III.B.1 of memorandum.) For the same reasons the Court found good cause for RPD Nos. 1-11, the Court finds good cause justifying the discovery sought through RPD No. 25. The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to justify its objections. (Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.)

In its opposition, Plaintiff only attempts to justify its privacy objection with regard to RPD No. 25. Plaintiff’s remaining unjustified objections to RPD No. 25 are therefore overruled.

Plaintiff argues that the bank records sought by RPD No. 25 concern Plaintiff’s confidential financial affairs and are therefore protected by the right to privacy under Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution.

The right of privacy established by the California Constitution protects an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” (Pioneer Electronics, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370.) There is a legally recognized privacy interest in a person’s financial affairs. (See Fortunato v. Sup. Ct. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480; see also Valley Bank of Nevada v. Sup. Ct. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656-657 (“Valley Bank”).) The right to privacy, however, is not absolute, and where privacy rights are implicated, the court must “carefully balance” the right of privacy and the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts. (Valley Bank, supra, 15 Cal.3d at 657.)

To obtain private information, the party seeking discovery must show that the discovery sought is directly relevant to a particular cause of action or defense. (Britt v. Sup. Ct. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859-862.) “Direct relevance” is a higher standard than the “relevancy to the subject matter” standard generally applicable to discovery requests. (Id., at p. 859.) According to the California Supreme Court, direct relevance means that the discovery sought is essential to the fair resolution of a matter in dispute. (Id.)

Neither party focuses on whether the documents sought by RPD No. 25 (or for any of the requests for that matter) are directly relevant for the purposes of the privacy analysis. Plaintiff generally asserts with regard to the financial documents requests in general that the financial information requested cannot be separated from Plaintiff’s dental patient’s private information. While that argument may hold true for RPD Nos. 1-11, it does not hold true for RPD No. 25, which simply seeks bank account information concerning the transfer monies from one bank to another.

According to Defendant, “[d]ocuments related to the path of the subject funds will show what, if any of the funds were used for the benefit of plaintiff and/or plaintiff’s employees or business functions.” (Def.’s Separate Statement, p. 13.) In other words, the information is relevant to the issue of damages. The Court finds that such information is essential to the fair resolution of matter in dispute and therefore directly relevant.

The Court must next balance the right of privacy, on the one hand, and the right of civil litigants to discover relevant facts, on the other. (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Sup. Ct. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 657.) The existence of a protective order limiting access to the information claimed to be private is an important factor in balancing the need for discovery with privacy rights. (See Alch v. Sup. Ct. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th1412, 1435.)

Here, the parties have executed a confidentiality agreement and Plaintiff has already produced documents pursuant to that agreement. The Court finds that the parties’ confidentiality agreement will sufficiently protect Plaintiff’s interest in keeping its financial affairs private. Plaintiff’s objection to RPD No. 25 on the basis of privacy is therefore overruled and Defendant’s motion to compel a further response to the request is GRANTED.

G. RPD Nos. 26 and 27

RPD Nos. 26 and 27 seek documents concerning the authorized responsibilities of Ms. Chao. More specifically, RPD No. 26 seeks “ALL WRITINGS related to whether or not Jinnie Chao was authorized to conduct bank transactions on behalf of A. Salem, D.D.S., Inc. or Los Altos Dental Care.” (Def.’s Separate Statement, p. 13.) RPD No. 27 seeks “ALL WRITINGS related to the authorized responsibilities of Jinnie Chao on behalf of A. Salem, D.D.S., Inc. or Los Altos Dental Care.” (Id., p. 15.)

Plaintiff objected to RPD No. 26 on the grounds of relevance, overbreadth, vagueness and ambiguity, attorney-client privilege, attorney work product, and privacy. Plaintiff also provided the following substantive response:

To the extent this request concerns bank transactions on behalf of A. Salem, DDS, Inc. from an account at Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Plaintiff states that it is unable to comply with this request after a reasonable and diligent search because Jinnie Chao was not authorized to conduct bank transactions on behalf of Plaintiff for any account opened at Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Def.’s Separate Statement, pp. 13-14.)

Plaintiff objected to RPD No. 27 on similar grounds, with additional objections on the basis of the physician-patient privilege and HIPAA. Plaintiff did not provide a substantive response to RPD No. 27.

Concerning good cause, Defendant asserts that the central issue in this action is whether Ms. Chao was authorized to open the account at Wells Fargo. According to Defendant, documents reflecting the authorized job duties and responsibilities of the alleged embezzler will reveal whether Ms. Chao was in fact authorized to open the account. The Court agrees and finds that the information sought through RPD Nos. 26 and 27 is directly relevant to Wells Fargo’s defense in this action, i.e., whether Ms. Chao was authorized to open the bank account.

Plaintiff does not attempt to justify its objections to RPD No. 26. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that, with the exception of its failure to provide a verification, its response to RPD No. 26 is code-compliant. This argument is not well-taken. As an initial matter, since Plaintiff failed to justify its objections, those objections are overruled with the exception of the objections based on the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, which are preserved. (See Coy v. Sup. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221; see also Best Products, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2204) 119 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1188-1189.)

Moreover, the response is not code-complaint. Ignoring the fact that Plaintiff did not verify the response, the response remains deficient. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230, a representation of an inability to comply with a document request must “specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party.” Plaintiff’s representation of an inability to comply does not state whether the requested documents ever existed and is therefore not code-compliant.

Because Defendant has set forth good cause justifying the discovery sought by RPD No. 26, Plaintiff failed to justify its objections, and failed to provide a code-compliant response, Defendant’s motion to compel a further response to the request is GRANTED.

Concerning RPD No. 27, Plaintiff only attempts to justify its overbreadth and undue burden objections. Plaintiff’s remaining objections are therefore overruled with the exception of the objections based on the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, which are preserved. (See Coy, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 220-221.)

As to overbreadth and undue burden, Plaintiff argues that RPD No. 27 would require the production of every document drafted, reviewed, touched, handled, maintained, and/or prepared by Ms. Chao and would require Plaintiff to review every document associated with its business for approximately a 6-year period.

This argument is not well taken. The Court has already found that the request seeks information directly relevant to the central issue in this case and rejects Plaintiff’s assertion that the request is overly broad. As to the argument that the request will require Plaintiff to do a lot of work, that assertion in itself is not a basis to object to a request. A party claiming that requested discovery is unduly burdensome must make a particularized showing of facts demonstrating hardship. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417-418.) Standing alone, the fact that a response to a particular discovery request requires a lot of work to answer does not justify an undue burden objection. (Id.)

Plaintiff has not made a particularized showing or otherwise explained why the production of documents disclosing Ms. Chao’s authorized responsibilities would create a hardship. Plaintiff’s objections on the bases of overbreadth and undue burden as to RPD No. 27 are therefore overruled and Defendant’s motion to compel a further response to the request is GRANTED.

Conclusion and Order

Defendant’s motion to compel further responses is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is DENIED as to RPD Nos. 1-12, 16, and 17. The motion is GRANTED as to RPD Nos. 25-27. Accordingly, Plaintiff shall serve verified, code-compliant further responses, without objection (except for attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine, which have been preserved) to RPD Nos. 25-27, and documents in conformity with those responses, within 20 calendar days of the filing of this Order. To the extent any additional documents are withheld based upon attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work product, Plaintiff shall also provide a privilege log identifying all documents withheld and providing a factual basis for the privilege claimed.

If Plaintiff has not already done so by the date of the filing of this Order, Plaintiff shall serve Defendant with a verification attendant to Plaintiff’s initial responses within 20 calendar days of the filing of this Order.