Abby Butterfield vs Kyle Sanchez et al
Defendants move to transfer venue out of Santa Clara County; plaintiffs oppose the motion.
Here are the Court’s tentative rulings:
1. The Court DENIES each side’s sanctions request, as the legal issues were not clear-cut. In other words, there is substantial justification for the arguments on both sides.
2. The Court GRANTS defendants’ request for judicial notice in its entirety. As for plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice, the Court GRANTS the request for Exhibits 1 and 4, as they are court records, but DENIES it for Exhibit 2 (it is not a “government enactment” within the meaning of Evidence Code section 452, subd. (b)) and Exhibit 4 (a corporate website is not necessarily of indisputable accuracy).
3. Ericsson Inc. (“Ericsson”) is a foreign corporate defendant, as its principal place of business is in Texas and it is not incorporated in California. Ericsson confirmed in its California Secretary of State statement of information form that its “principal executive office” is in Plano, Texas. (See Ex. D to Defs. Venue Transfer Motion.) But for some reason, Ericsson did not fill in the blank on this form for “its principal business office in California ….”
A leading civil procedure treatise states that “if the [foreign] corporate defendant has not filed such statement [the Secretary of State’s statement of information form] designating a principal place of business in California, venue is proper in any county in the State.” (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial: The Rutter Group 2019), ¶ 3.525, at p. 3-150 [italics in original] (Weil & Brown).) The Court agrees with that analysis. Here, Ericsson is a foreign corporate defendant, and did not designate a principal place of business in California. Therefore, if plaintiffs had sued Ericsson only, then venue in Santa Clara County certainly would be proper.
4. But plaintiffs did not sue only Ericsson—they also sued an individual (Kyle Salvador Sanchez). Generally, “[w]here an action is brought against both corporate and individual defendants, venue is proper either where any individual defendant resides or where the corporation has its principal office (its ‘residence’ for venue purposes).” (Weil & Brown, supra, ¶ 3.528, at p. 3-150 to p. 3-151; accord Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. American President Lines, Ltd. (1950) 35 Cal.2d 858, 860.) If a foreign corporation has no California residence for venue purposes, then the individual defendant is entitled to “move the place of trial of the action to the county of [his] residence.” (Warren v. Ritter (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 403, 406.)
Sanchez lives in Tulare County, and has requested transfer of the case to Tulare County. But plaintiffs have alleged, and provided evidence, that Ericsson’s California residence is in Santa Clara County. (First Amended Complaint, ¶ 9.) If true, then the case would need to remain in Santa Clara County, Sanchez’s Tulare County residence notwithstanding. Ericsson, as one of the moving defendants, has the burden to show its California residence is not in Santa Clara County. (See Fontaine v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 830, 836 [burden is on moving defendant to justify transfer].)
5. Ericsson first argues that its principal place of business is in Texas, citing the statement of information form. But that doesn’t answer the question of where Ericsson’s “principal business office in California” is. Ericsson left that portion of the form blank. That fact alone significantly distinguishes this case from Rosas v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 671, a case on which Ericsson heavily relies. And it is certainly plausible that a foreign corporation would have its main headquarters outside California, but also have a principal office in California.
Second, Ericsson tries to claim plaintiffs have not proven that its principal business office in California is in Santa Clara County. But the burden is on Ericsson, not plaintiffs, as discussed above. Ericsson submitted no declarations or affidavits from knowledgeable Ericsson personnel that it does not have a principal business office in California that is in Santa Clara County. Moreover, the evidence submitted by Plaintiff shows that Ericsson has stated that it employs thousands of employees at its Santa Clara campus and has characterized this campus as “the regional hub for the [U.S.] westcoast.” (Wu Decl., Ex. B.) Ericsson claims these statements are hearsay, but these are party admissions by knowledgeable Ericsson employees on the subject. The Court OVERRULES Ericsson’s objections.
The Court accordingly finds that Ericsson has not carried its burden to show it does not reside in Santa Clara County.
6. Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (a) states that wrongful death cases can be venued in the county where the death occurred (here, Lassen County) or where a defendant resides (Tulare County for Sanchez, and Santa Clara County for Ericsson, as found above). Plaintiff is entitled to pick any of these counties, and has chosen Santa Clara County. As discussed above, defendants have not proven her choice is contrary to law.
For all of these reasons, the Court DENIES the motion to transfer venue.