Heimlich v. Shivji CASE NO. 112CV231939
DATE: 23 May 2014 TIME: 9:00 LINE NUMBER: 8
This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 22 May 2014. Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.

On 23 May 2014, the motion of Alan Heimlich (“Plaintiff”) for evidence sanctions and monetary sanctions was argued and submitted. Shiraz Shivji (“Defendant”) filed a formal opposition to the motion in which he also requests monetary sanctions.

All parties are reminded that all papers must comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(f).

Statement of Facts

This case arises out of an attorney fee dispute. Plaintiff is a patent attorney retained by Defendant in 2003. According to the allegations of the complaint, Defendant signed an agreement whereby he agreed to pay Plaintiff in exchange for legal services. Defendant allegedly accumulated an outstanding account balance of over $125,000 in legal fees owed to Plaintiff, but refused to pay the fees. Based on these allegations, on 10 September 2012, Plaintiff instituted this action against Defendant for breach of contract.

According to Defendant, the legal services provided by Plaintiff were for the benefit of Giotti, Inc. (“Giotti”)—a company formed by Defendant—and not for Defendant personally. In support of this contention, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff billed Giotti for his services and Plaintiff accepted payments from Giotti. Based upon these assertions, and the fact that Giotti acquired defunct corporate status in 2008, Defendant argues that he cannot be held personally liable for the legal services rendered for the benefit of Giotti. Giotti is not named as a defendant in this action.

Discovery Dispute

On 4 October 2013, Plaintiff served Giotti with a business records subpoena. Responsive documents were to be produced under the subpoena on 24 October 2013.

On 17 October 2013, Defendant, acting in his personal capacity, served Plaintiff with various documents and a flash drive containing electronically stored information (“ESI”) purportedly in response to the records subpoena to Giotti. The affidavit accompanying the production makes clear that Defendant is not in possession of all documents responsive to the subpoena and that, through Defendant’s production, Giotti was not certifying the authenticity of the documents and ESI produced. The affidavit further indicates that Giotti had not authorized him to respond to the records subpoena on its behalf. Giotti never responded or produced documents responsive to the subpoena.

On 14 October 2013, Plaintiff served Giotti with a subpoena for deposition testimony of Giotti’s person most qualified (“PMQ”). The deposition was noticed for 28 October 2013.

On 24 October 2013, Defendant, in his individual capacity, served written objections to the subpoena for PMQ testimony served on Giotti. No one from Giotti appeared for the deposition on 28 October 2013.

On 7 November 2013, Plaintiff deposed Defendant in his personal capacity. When asked questions about Giotti, Defendant refused to substantively respond on the ground that he was not authorized to answer on the company’s behalf and advised Plaintiff that he no longer represented Giotti because Giotti was a defunct corporation.

On 26 November 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Giotti to comply with both subpoenas, or alternatively, for evidence sanctions.

In response to Plaintiff’s motion, Defendant argued that Giotti is unable to designate a PMQ because to do so would expose the PMQ to criminal liability under Revenue and Taxation Code section 19719, which provides that “[a]ny person . . . who transacts or attempts to transact intrastate business in this state on behalf of a foreign corporation, the rights and privileges of which have been forfeited pursuant to this section, is punishable by a fie of not less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) and not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both fine and imprisonment.” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19719, subd. (a).)

In an order dated 20 December 2013, the Court rejected Defendant’s argument, finding that “[r]esponding to discovery demands by designating [] PMQs and causing them to appear for depositions is not an intrastate business transaction, and therefore, the Revenue and Taxation Code does not impose criminal penalties against persons who testify as PMQs for forefeited foreign corporations.” (Order dated 20 Dec. 2013, p. 6.) Based upon this finding, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion in part and ordered Giotti to produce documents responsive to the business records subpoena (even if they were duplicative of what Defendant had already produced) and designate a PMQ to appear for a deposition within 20 days of the entry of the order.

The Court denied Plaintiff’s request for evidence sanctions. However, with regard to its denial of evidence sanctions, the Court stated the following:

Here, Defendant was one of Giotti’s founders, officers, [and] employees. He also opposes this motion to compel Giotti to comply with the subpoenas, is currently registered with the secretary of state as the designated agent for Giotti’s service of process, and has represented himself as the custodian of Giotti’s records. In light of the foregoing, Giotti is affiliated with Defendant. As such, if Giotti fails to comply with this Order, the Court is authorized to impose evidence sanctions against Defendant.” (Order dated 20 Dec. 2013, p. 8.)

On 27 December 2013, counsel for Plaintiff sent Defendant (as the representative of Giotti) and Defendant’s counsel a letter offering three dates (1/08/2014, 1/13/2014, and 1/15/2014) for the PMQ deposition. (Decl. of Heimlich in Support of Mot. for Sanctions, Ex. A.) The letter is in the form of an email, but Plaintiff represents that the email was printed and sent via U.S. mail.

According to Defendant, during “[t]he week of January 6, 2014, Mr. Ellahie [counsel for Defendant] attempted multiple times to contact Mr. Heimlich [counsel for Plaintiff] by phone to see about potential deposition dates, in an effort to help coordinate efforts with Giotti, who was attempting to contact former board members over the holidays and obtain counsel.” (Def.’s Opp., p. 3.) The phone calls went unanswered. (Id.)

On 10 January 2013, the former board members of Giotti met and appointed Defendant as custodian of records and the PMQ, and agreed that Defendant would act as Giotti’s representative with respect to the subpoena responses. (Id.)

On 13 January 2014, counsel for Defendant emailed Plaintiff’s counsel, stating the following:

Nick: I still haven’t heard from you regarding setting up depos for Giotti. For the record Giotti has asked me to advise you that [Defendant] has been designated as the [PMQ] and the person who can respond to your Giotti Questions. (Decl. of Heimlich in Support of Mot. for Sanctions, Ex. B.)

The same day, Plaintiff’s counsel responded to defense counsel’s email, asking defense counsel to have the person who authorized Defendant to act as Giotti’s representative contact him. (Id.)

On 15 January 2014, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed defense counsel, stating that he had not heard from Giotti, that defense counsel had previously made clear that he does not represent Giotti, and that the deadline for Giotti to comply with the Court’s 20 December 2013 order had expired. (Id.)

Defense counsel responded the same day, stating:

Nick: Stop playing games. I have advised you that Giotti has asked me to co-ordinate this. You need to give me a date so we can set up a time. I have also asked you to give me a date to set up a telephone call to clear the calendars and yet you have thought it appropriate to ignore that under the pretext that Giotti hasn’t called you. Call me and let us move on with getting you what you need. (Id.)

On 31 January 2014, Defendant (as representative of Giotti) sent an email to Plaintiff’s counsel, stating: “I understand that Mr. Ellahie has contacted you several times to set up a schedule for the deposition and provide you with documents for Giotti but you have instead insisted that Giotti contact you directly.” (Def.’s Opp., p. 4.) Defendant also indicated that he had been nominated as the PMQ and stated that, “[i]n order to move this forward, I am sending this email, on behalf of Giotti, and ask you to schedule through Mr. Ellahie who has kindly agreed to facility[ate] this but is only acting as an intermediary.” (Id.)

On 6 March 2014, Plaintiff’s counsel sent an email to defense counsel, stating his intention to move for evidentiary sanctions for Giotti’s failure to comply with the Court’s 20 December 2013 order. (Id.)

Defense counsel responded the same day, stating the following:

Nick: this is absurd. I contacted you several times and left you messages to co-ordinate the logistic[s] regarding providing the documents and scheduling a deposition. I understand that [Defendant] did the same but you failed to return calls or respond. It would be best if you respond so delivery of the documents and depositions can be scheduled. (Id.)

On 13 March 2014, Plaintiff filed the motion presently before the Court, seeking evidentiary and monetary sanctions against Defendant for Giotti’s failure to comply with the Court’s 20 December 2013 order. Defendant filed an opposition to the motion on 12 May 2014, and Plaintiff filed a reply on 15 May 2014.

Discussion

I. Plaintiff’s Motion for Evidence Sanctions

Plaintiff asks the Court to impose evidence sanctions against Defendant for Giotti’s failure to comply with the Court’s 20 December 2013 order. Specifically, Plaintiff requests that Defendant be prohibited from introducing any corporate records of Giotti for the purpose of attempting to demonstrate that Plaintiff entered into an oral, written or implied contract with Giiotti for legal services, or otherwise agreed to a novation in which Giotti became Plaintiff’s client in lieu of Defendant. Plaintiff further requests that Defendant be prohibited from offering oral testimony at trial to support the theory of the case that Plaintiff provided legal services on behalf of Giotti and not Defendant personally.

A. Preliminary Matter

Defendant asks the Court to revisit its ruling concerning the Revenue and Taxation Code. Specifically, Defendant seeks clarification on the issue of whether the appointment and appearance of a PMQ at a deposition will violate the first part of Revenue and Taxation Code section 19719, which provides that “[a]ny person who attempts or purports to exercise the powers, rights, and privileges of a corporation that has been suspended pursuant to Section 2330” may also be subject to fines and criminal liability. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 19719, subd. (a).)

Defendant claims that, in the 20 December 2013 order, the Court did not address the above quoted language. Contrary to this assertion, the Court believes that it has fully addressed the issue. In the 20 December 2013 order, after a detailed discussion of the statutory language, the Court expressly stated that “there is no legal authority that supports Defendant’s contention that responding to discovery requests as Giotti’s authorized agent would be unlawful.” (Order dated 20 Dec. 2013, p. 6.)

Once again Defendant has expressed the fear that complying with the Court’s order will subject him to criminal sanctions. He has not, however, cited any authority indicating that the Court erred in its ruling that responding to discovery would violate section 19719 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. While the Court maintains the inherent authority to revisit interim rulings, (see Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1107), the Court is not required to find the legal authorities substantiating and unsupported legal argument. (See Quantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Assocs., Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 927, 934 [indicating that court may deny motion that does not set forth the legal basis for the relief requested].)

Defendant’s request for the Court to revisit the 20 December 2013 order is DENIED.

B. Legal Standard

Plaintiff moves for evidence sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, subdivision (h). The section provides that, “[i]f a party or party-affiliated deponent [] fails to obey an order compelling attendance, testimony, and production, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction . . . against that party deponent or against the party with whom the deponent is affiliated.” (Code Civ. Proc. [“CCP”], § 2025.450, subd. (h).) The section further provides that, “[i]n lieu of, or in addition to, this sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanctions. . . against that deponent or against the party with whom that party deponent is affiliated . . . .” (Id.)

Additionally, section 2023.030 authorizes a range of penalties for conduct amounting to the “misuses of the discovery process.” Pursuant to section 2023.010, “[d]isobeying a court order to provide discovery” constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (CCP, § 2023.010, subd. (g).) Concerning evidence sanctions, the remedy Plaintiff seeks in relation to the present matter, section 2023.030 provides that “[t]he court may impose an evidence sanction by an order prohibiting any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process from introducing designated matters in evidence.” (CCP, § 2023.030, subd. (b).)

Two facts are prerequisite to the imposition of non-monetary sanctions: (1) there must be a failure to comply with a court order; and (2) the failure must be willful. (Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL Administrators, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1102.) Even where these facts are present, however, the trial court has broad discretion in imposing discovery sanctions. (See Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1293.) In exercising this discretion, the court of appeal has indicated that the trial court should consider both the conduct being sanctioned and its effect on the party seeking discovery. (See Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992.) Additionally, the trial court should “attempt to tailor the sanction to the harm caused by the withheld discovery” (id.) and the court’s discretionary authority in determining the appropriate sanction is limited by the principle that discovery sanctions are meant to be remedial rather than punitive (see Kahn v. Kahn (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 372, 381). Put another way, the discretionary imposition of a sanction is proper when it is suitable and necessary to enable the party seeking discovery to obtain the objects of the discovery sought, but not when it places the prevailing party in a better position than if discovery had been obtained. (See Wilson v. Jefferson (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 952, 958.)

Finally, non-monetary sanctions are imposed upon an incremental bases depending upon the severity of the violation. (See Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at 992.) “If a lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse.” (Id., internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)

B. Analysis

As an initial matter, there is no dispute that Giotti is affiliated with Defendant for the purposes of section 2025.450, subdivision (h). Thus, if the Court finds that non-monetary sanctions are appropriate for Giotti’s failure to comply with the Court’s 20 December 2013 order, sanctions may be directed at Defendant. (CCP, § 2025.450, subd. (h) [sanctions may be imposed upon party for party-affiliated deponent’s failure to attend deposition in compliance with a court order].) Additionally, it is undisputed that Giotti did not produce a PMQ for a deposition within 20 days of the Court’s 20 December 2013 order. Thus, the only questions are whether Giotti acted willfully in failing to comply with the Court’s order and whether the sanction requested by Plaintiff is appropriate under the circumstances. These questions are interrelated and addressed below.

The parties’ arguments focus on whether Giotti’s failure to comply with the Court’s order was willful.

In the discovery context, willfulness may be found where the responding party “understood his [or her] obligation, had the ability to comply, and failed to comply.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 787.) “A conscious or intentional failure to act, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary noncompliance, is sufficient to invoke a penalty.” (Id., at pp. 787-788, citing Snyder v. Sup. Ct. (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 579, 587.)

In support of his contention that Giotti’s failure to comply with the Court’s order was willful, Plaintiff directs the Court to the following facts: (1) Giotti had notice of the order when Plaintiff mailed a copy of the order to Defendant, Giotti’s registered agent for service of process; (2) prior to the expiration of the 20-day time period set by the Court for the deposition to occur, Plaintiff proposed three potential dates for the PMQ deposition to take place; and (3) notwithstanding the fact that Giotti was on notice of the order and given three possible dates to choose from for the deposition, nobody from Giotti contacted Plaintiff concerning the deposition until well after the 20-day time period set by the Court.

Plaintiff further contends that Giotti’s failure to comply with the Court’s order is just the latest example of Defendant and his counsel “interfering” and “stalling” with regard to the Giotti information. (Pl.’s Mem. of Ps & As, p. 5.) In support of this contention, Plaintiff points out that, during his deposition, Defendant refused to answer questions about Giotti on the ground that he was not authorized by the company to do so. When asked if he knew of a person that did have authority to answer questions on the company’s behalf, Defendant responded that he “had no idea.” (Id., p. 4.) Similarly, defense counsel has repeatedly maintained that he does not represent Giotti. Notwithstanding the fact that Defendant and his counsel had distanced themselves from Giotti, following the Court’s order, defense counsel indicated that, although he still did not represent the company, he would be coordinating the PMQ deposition, and Defendant was appointed PMQ by the undisclosed “former board” of Giotti.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, Defendant argues that he and his counsel “have done everything in their power to comply with the Court’s Order” and that the only reason the deposition did not go forward within the time frame set by the Court was due to Plaintiff’s counsel’s refusal to coordinate with defense counsel. (Def.’s Opp., p. 5.) Defense counsel points out that he attempted to contact Plaintiff’s counsel multiple times the first week of January 2014, prior to the expiration of the 20-day time period for compliance with the order, to set up the deposition. Further, on 10 January 2014, defense counsel informed Plaintiff’s counsel that the former board of directors of Giotti had appointed Defendant as the company’s PMQ and, on 13 and 15 January 2014, defense counsel contacted Plaintiff’s counsel in an effort to schedule the deposition. Finally, given Plaintiff’s counsel’s refusal to coordinate with defense counsel, on 31 January 2014, Defendant contacted Plaintiff’s counsel directly on behalf of Giotti to schedule the deposition. It appears undisputed that, following the expiration of the 20-day time period, Plaintiff’s counsel refused all of Defendant’s and his counsel’s attempts to set up the deposition.

Given the above facts, the Court finds that Giotti had notice of the Court’s 20 December 2013 order and failed to comply with its obligation. It is somewhat unclear whether Giotti had the ability to comply (i.e., whether it was possible for the members of the board to convene during the holidays to appoint a PMQ), but the reason this issue is unclear rests with Defendant who has been rather “cloak and dagger” about the identity of Giotti’s former board and the circumstances under which Defendant was appointed PMQ. Because Giotti understood its obligation with regard to the Court’s order and has not made a showing that it would have been unable to produce a PMQ within the time frame set by the Court, the Court finds that Giotti’s failure to comply with the 20 December 2013 order was willful. (Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at pp. 787-788.)

Notwithstanding the finding of willfulness, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff that evidence sanctions are warranted under the circumstances presented. As discussed above, non-monetary sanctions are designed to be remedial rather than punitive, (see Kahn, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at p. 381), applied on an incremental basis depending on the severity of the discovery violation, (see Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at 992), and act as a mechanism through which a party seeking discovery may obtain relief where the responding party has refused to supply the requested discovery (Wilson, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d at p. 958).

Here, it appears that Plaintiff is attempting to use evidence sanctions to punish Defendant for Giotti’s failure to comply with the Court’s order. Plaintiff’s complaint that Giotti itself did not contact Plaintiff until after the 20-day time period to comply with the Court’s order does not fall on deaf ears. Indeed, the fact that it was counsel for Defendant—who has repeatedly indicated that he does not represent Giotti—that initially contacted Plaintiff, rather than Giotti, is the principle reason that the Court finds that Giotti’s failure to comply with the Court’s order was willful. The facts surrounding the present discovery dispute, however, cannot be viewed in a vacuum and the fact remains that counsel for Defendant made multiple attempts (including before the 20-day time period had expired) to schedule the PMQ deposition. Had Plaintiff’s counsel made an effort to work with defense counsel on this matter, the PMQ deposition likely would have already occurred.

Plaintiff’s counsel’s refusal to work with Defendant and his counsel on this issue, and the general animosity between counsel for the parties that has been exhibited in this case, does not sit well with the Court.

Plaintiff requests that Defendant be prohibited from introducing any records of Giotti for the purpose of demonstrating that Plaintiff entered into a contract (oral or otherwise) with Giotti for legal services or otherwise agreed to a novation in which Plaintiff assumed representation of Giotti in lieu of Defendant. Plaintiff further requests that Defendant be prohibited from offering testimony at trial to support this theory that the legal services were rendered for Giotti and not Defendant personally. That theory appears to be one of Defendant’s primary defenses to Plaintiff’s claims in this case.

Given Giotti’s willingness to supply Plaintiff with the information sought, and based upon both parties’ unclean hands concerning this matter, the Court finds that evidence sanctions are too severe in relation to the violation. Plaintiff’s motion for non-monetary sanctions is therefore DENIED. However, within 20 calendar days of the date of the filing of this Order, Defendant (as Giotti’s designated PMQ) shall appear for a deposition and provide oral testimony at a time and place to be mutually agreed upon by Giotti and the parties.

II. Requests for Monetary Sanctions

A. Plaintiff’s Request

Plaintiff requests monetary sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $2,990 for Giotti’s failure to comply with the Court’s order. Plaintiff cites Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 as the legal basis for the request. That section authorizes an award of sanctions for the misuse of the discovery process “[t]o the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method.” (CCP, § 2023.030, subd. (a).) Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to monetary sanctions because he has not cited the underlying provision authorizing sanctions. The Court disagrees.

Plaintiff seeks relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, subdivision (h), which provides that, where a party or party-affiliated deponent fails to obey an order compelling attendance at a deposition, “the court may make those orders that are just,” including non-monetary sanctions. The section further provides that, “[i]n lieu of, or in addition to, this sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanctions. . . against that deponent or against the party with whom that party deponent is affiliated . . . .” (CCP, § 2025.450, subd. (h).) For the reasons set forth above, the Court has found that non-monetary sanctions are not appropriate.

However, in light of the fact that Giotti had notice of the order and did not have a representative formally contact Defendant concerning the deposition until more than two weeks after the 20-day deadline for Giotti to comply with the order, the Court finds that monetary sanctions are appropriate in lieu of non-monetary sanctions.

Counsel for Plaintiff declares that he has incurred $210 in legal fees spent in the meet and confer process, $90 in filing fees, and $1,600 in fees associated with drafting the motion. He further anticipates incurring an additional $1,000 in fees associated with drafting a reply brief and appearing at a hearing on the matter.

Sanctions under section 2023.030 are only available for expenses “incurred” as a result of the sanctionable conduct, (CCP, § 2023.030, subd. (a).) Thus, sanctions are not awarded for anticipated expenses as they have yet to be “incurred.” As to the expenses claimed to have been incurred as part of the meet and confer process, Plaintiff’s counsel has not supplied the Court with sufficient information to determine whether these expenses should be awarded. If Plaintiff is seeking compensation for meet and confer efforts that took place prior to the expiration of the 20-day time period in which the parties were to schedule the PMQ deposition, then the expenses claimed would not be compensable because they would not have been incurred as a result of any sanctionable conduct.

On the other hand, if the meet and confer efforts took place after the expiration of the 20-day deadline, the expenses would be compensable because Giotti’s failure to schedule a date for the PMQ deposition is the sanctionable conduct at issue. Because Plaintiff has failed to clarify this issue, the Court will not award the expenses claimed for meeting and conferring. The expenses incurred are otherwise reasonable.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions against Defendant is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $1,780.

B. Defendant’s Request

Defendant requests the imposition of sanctions against Plaintiff and his counsel in the amount of $4,320. Defendant cites Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480, subdivision (j) as the basis for his motion. That section provides that “[t]he court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel an answer or production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (CCP, § 2025.480, subd. (j).)

Code of Civil Procedure, § 2023.040 states: “A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. The notice of motion shall be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, and accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought.”

The section cited by Defendant does not provide a basis for sanctions under the circumstances presented. Plaintiff has not filed a motion to compel an answer to deposition questions. Rather, the motion is one for non-monetary and monetary sanctions for Defendant’s failure to comply with the Court’s 20 December 2013 order.

Because Defendant has failed to cite any authority authorizing the Court to impose sanctions, his request is DENIED.

Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s motion for evidence sanctions is DENIED. However, within 20 calendar days of the date of the filing of this Order, Defendant (as Giotti’s designated PMQ) shall appear for a deposition and provide oral testimony at a time and place to be mutually agreed upon by Giotti and the parties. When the PMQ appears for deposition, Giotti shall produce documents responsive to the records subpoena without objection.

Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions against Defendant for Giotti’s failure to comply with the Court’s 20 December 2013 order is GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $1,780. Thus, Defendant shall pay $3,340 to counsel for Plaintiff within 20 calendar days of the filing of this Order.

Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.