Case Name: Alice Grady v. Woodleaf Commons Homeowners Association, et al.
Case No.: 17CV319809

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This case brought by plaintiff Alice Grady (“Plaintiff”) against defendants Woodleaf Commons Homeowners Association (“Woodleaf”), G&P Enterprises, LLC d/b/a Allied Trustee Services (“Allied”), and Hung V. Lu (“Lu”) (collectively, “Defendants”) arises from the non-judicial foreclosure of Plaintiff’s home.

According to the allegations of the complaint, Plaintiff owns real property located at 2995 Rose Avenue, San Jose, California 95127 (“the Property”). In connection with her purchase of the Property, Plaintiff entered into a contract with Woodleaf, a homeowners association. Allied is a debt collection agency and non-judicial foreclosure trustee utilized by Woodleaf. Woodleaf caused a Notice of Delinquent Assessment to be recorded against the Property for delinquent homeowners association fees, and a lien was placed on the Property. Subsequently, Woodleaf caused a Notice of Default to be recorded. Approximately two years later, Woodleaf caused a Notice of Trustee Sale to be recorded against the Property. Allied was the trustee listed on the Notice of Trustee Sale. Shortly thereafter, the Property was sold to Revestors LLC for $189,300. Revestors LLC then sold it to Lu.

The delinquency was due to Woodleaf and Allied mishandling and misapplying her homeowners association fees. Moreover, Woodleaf’s board failed to properly vote on the lien before placing it on the Property. In addition, Plaintiff did not receive notice of Woodleaf’s meet and confer program or alternative dispute resolution program prior to the recording of the Notice of Delinquent Assessment, was not served with the Notice of Default, and was not notified of the recording of the Notice of Trustee Sale.

Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff asserts causes of action for: (1) violation of Civil Code section 5670; (2) violation of Civil Code section 5673; (3) violation of Civil Code section 5705; (4) violation of Civil Code section 5715; (5) violation of Civil Code section 2924f; (6) violation of Civil Code section 5710; (7) wrongful foreclosure; (8) quiet title; (9) negligence; (10) elder financial abuse; and (11) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. Of these, only the eighth is asserted against Lu.

Currently before the Court is Lu’s demurrer to the eighth cause of action, the only cause of action asserted against him, and a motion to strike several paragraphs from that cause of action. Plaintiff opposes both matters.

II. Request for Judicial Notice

“Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter.” (Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 364.) Matters subject to judicial notice are listed in Evidence Code sections 451 and 452. (Id. at p. 364.) A precondition to judicial notice is that the matter to be noticed must be relevant to a material issue before the court. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2.)

Lu requests judicial notice of real property records related to the foreclosure and court documents from a prior unlawful detainer action.

The real property records, which concern the Property, are: a Certificate of Foreclosure Sale Subject to Redemption recorded in July 2016; a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale recorded in October 2016; a Grant Deed recorded in April 2017; and a Deed of Trust recorded in April 2017.

“Pursuant to [Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (h)] courts have taken judicial notice of the existence and recordation of real property records, including deeds of trust, when the authenticity of the documents is not challenged.” (Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264 disapproved of on other grounds by Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919.) “[A] court may take judicial notice of the fact of a document’s recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document’s legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the document’s authenticity. From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face.” (Id. at p. 265.) Thus, the subject real property records are generally proper subjects of judicial notice.

However, Lu cites only two of the subject records in support of arguments raised in his demurrer or motion to strike, particularly the Grant Deed and the Deed of Trust. The other records are cited for factual background only. As such, they are not relevant to resolving the demurrer or motion to strike and, consequently, are not judicially noticeable.

Lu also requests the Court take judicial notice of the following court records from Revestors v. Grady, Santa Clara County Superior Court Case No. 16CV302109: an Answer filed by Plaintiff in November 2016; an Amended Answer filed by Plaintiff in November 2016; a Minute Order dated in December 2016; and a Judgment entered December 2016. Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d) authorizes judicial notice of court records. These court records are the foundation of Lu’s res judicata argument. Thus, they are proper subjects for judicial notice.

Accordingly, Lu’s request for judicial notice is DENIED as to the Certificate of Foreclosure and Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale, and GRANTED as to all other records.

III. Demurrer

Lu’s demurrer is brought on the grounds of failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action and a defect or misjoinder of parties. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e) and (d)).

A. Failure to State Sufficient Facts

Lu argues the quiet title claim fails to state sufficient facts because: (1) it is barred by res judicata in that defects in the sale and title of the Property were addressed in an unlawful detainer action; and (2) he is entitled to a conclusive presumption the sale was conducted properly as a bona fide purchaser.

1. Res Judicata

“ ‘Res Judicata’ describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal. 4th 888, 896.) Res judicata has two aspects; claim preclusion and issue preclusion. (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 (DKN Holdings LLC).) “Claim preclusion ‘prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.’ ” (Id. at p. 824.) In contrast, issue preclusion—otherwise known as collateral estoppel—prevents relitigation of the same issues but “does not bar entire causes of action.” (Id. at pp. 824-825.) “If all of the facts necessary to show that an action is barred by res judicata are within the complaint or subject to judicial notice, a trial court may properly sustain a general demurrer.” (Planning and Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 225 (Castaic).)

Here, the demurrer is predicated on collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel “applies: (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (DKN Holdings LLC, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 824–25.)

The first and last elements of collateral estoppel may be dealt with summarily. As to the first element, the Court has taken judicial notice of a judgment in the unlawful detainer action dated December 2016. After a judgment is not subject to direct attack by appeal or otherwise the judgment becomes final. (National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stites Prof. Law Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1718, 1726, modified (Nov. 20, 1991).) Here, the time for appeal of the unlawful detainer judgment has elapsed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(C) [longest possible deadline for appeal 180 days].) No party mentions any appeal of the judgment. Thus the judgment has become final, and the first element is met.

The fourth element requires the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted be a party to the first suit, or in privity with them. Here, the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted is Plaintiff. The documents the Court has taken judicial notice of from the unlawful detainer action clearly identify her as one of the parties. Thus, she was a party to the first suit. Therefore, the last element is present.

With respect to the second and third elements, Lu claims the prior unlawful detainer action against Plaintiff under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a necessarily resolved two issues raised in the present case: irregularities in the foreclosure sale and title to the Property.

Lu cites Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251 (Vella), for the proposition that unlawful detainer actions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a necessarily litigate the issue of title. Thus, Lu asserts the unlawful detainer action prevents subsequent fraud or quiet title suits based on irregularities in the sale or title.

In Vella, a home was foreclosed on and the creditor purchased the home at a trustee’s sale. (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 254.) The homeowner later brought a civil suit against the creditor for injunctive relief. The defendant—creditor—filed a motion to strike the complaint asserting that a prior unlawful detainer action barred the debtor’s action. (Ibid.) The motion was unsuccessful. (Ibid.) After trial the court ruled for the plaintiff, reasoning that the defendant’s fraud had caused her to default. (Ibid.) Both parties appealed on res judicata and other issues. (Ibid.) The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, and ruled for the defendant. (Ibid.) The court of appeal reasoned the debtor’s fraud claim had been conclusively adjudicated, and cut off the right to independent relief. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court considered to what extent an unlawful detainer action resolves issues of title.

The California Supreme Court stated that unlawful detainer actions generally have little res judicata effect on the issue of title because of their summary nature. (Vella, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 254.) The California Supreme Court described Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a as a limited exception to the rule that unlawful detainer actions did not reach the issue of title. (Id. at pp. 255–256.) It remarked courts had found unlawful detainer cases necessarily included some litigation of title and defects in sale. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court went on to identify an exception to this exception: “Where, however, the claim sought to be asserted in the second action encompasses activities not directly connected with the conduct of the sale, applicability of the res judicata doctrine, either as a complete bar to further proceedings or as a source of collateral estoppel, is much less clear.” (Ibid.) Thus, the California Supreme Court states unlawful detainer actions may resolve title issues that stem from the conduct of the sale, and other issues of title. However, this rule was limited. Some issues related to title are not ordinarily addressed in unlawful detainer proceedings: “ ‘Matters affecting the validity of the trust deed or primary obligation itself, or other basic defects in the plaintiff’s title, are neither properly raised in this summary proceeding for possession, nor are they concluded by the judgment.’ [Citation.] ” (Id. at p. 257.)

In Malkoskie v. Option One Mart. Corp. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 968, the court summarized the Vella holding as creating a distinction between quiet title suits based on defects in the sale, and other wrongdoing: “The Supreme Court in Vella acknowledged the decisional law holding that ‘subsequent fraud or quiet title suits founded upon allegations of irregularity in a trustee’s sale are barred by the prior unlawful detainer judgment.’ [Citation.] Vella explained that the propriety of applying collateral estoppel to an underlying unlawful detainer judgment brought pursuant to section 1161a became doubtful only if the claims in the second action involved activities or alleged wrongdoing not ‘directly connected’ with the conduct of the foreclosure sale. [Citation.]” (Malkoskie v. Option One Mortgage Corp. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 968, 974.) Other cases relied on by Lu follow the distinction stated in Vella between defects in title based on the conduct of the sale and other claims. (See Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 982, 1011, reh’g denied (Mar. 11, 2016), as modified (Mar. 11, 2016 [“Because the claim is ‘founded upon allegations of irregularity in [the] trustee’s sale,’ it is ‘barred by [Big Sur’s] prior unlawful detainer judgment’ ”].)

Here, the complaint raises at least two issues that would not ordinarily be litigated in an unlawful detainer action. First, the issue of the validity of the underlying debt. Plaintiff alleges that she was not actually deficient in her fees, but that the deficiency was due to some “mishandling and misapplying” of her fees by Woodleaf and Allied. (Complaint, ¶ 12.) This argument is a challenge to the validity of the underlying debt; it not related to the conduct of the sale. Thus, the prior unlawful detainer action would not address this type of challenge to title.

Second, the issue of the validity of the lien that was the basis for the foreclosure. Plaintiff alleges the lien based on the delinquent fees was improperly created—it was not voted on by Woodleaf’s board—rendering the lien invalid. The process used to create the lien, and the potential invalidity of a lien is not a defect in the sale procedure. Thus, this does not fall within the limited title issues resolved in an unlawful detainer hearing.

To sustain a demurrer on the basis of collateral estoppel the pleadings or matters subject to judicial notice must show the issue or issues raised were actually litigated. (See Castaic, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 225; see also People v. Garcia (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1070, 1092 [discussing certainty required for to apply estoppel].) Here, neither the complaint nor the matters subject to judicial notice include information stating the underlying debt or the validity of the lien was litigated at the unlawful detainer hearing.

In reply, Lu asserts that Plaintiff challenged the underlying validity of her debt during the unlawful detainer action, and thus title was litigated in that case. He relies on Plaintiff’s answer and amended answer filed therein. In her amended answer, Plaintiff stated she believed she was being overcharged with miscellaneous fees. The answer and amended answer state that the monthly dues were $255 or $263, but Woodleaf was demanding $677 per month.

First, a statement in an answer does not show an issue was actually litigated. Second, even assuming that these statements in the answers somehow show the issue of the validity of the debt was fully litigated during the unlawful detainer action, this still leaves the defective lien. There is nothing before the Court indicating that the unlawful detainer action addressed the issue of whether the lien was improper because Woodleaf did not conduct a formal vote to place it on the Property.

Therefore, the demurrer is not sustainable based on collateral estoppel.

2. Conclusive Presumption

Lu contends “Plaintiff’s claim for quiet title is barred by the conclusive presumption in favor of a bona fide purchaser for value.” (Pts. & Auths. ISO Dem., p. 4:21-22.)

The conclusive presumption provides protection for innocent buyers against claims of irregularities in the sale:

The purchaser at a foreclosure sale takes title by a trustee’s deed. If the trustee’s deed recites that all statutory notice requirements and procedures required by law for the conduct of the foreclosure have been satisfied, a rebuttable presumption arises that the sale has been conducted regularly and properly; this presumption is conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser. [Citation.] [¶] Since the presumption is rebuttable as to purchasers other than bona fide purchasers, the purchaser’s title may in some instances be recovered by the trustor in an attack on the validity of the sale. [Citation.] As to a bona fide purchaser, however, the presumption is conclusive. Thus, as a general rule, a trustor has no right to set aside a trustee’s deed as against a bona fide purchaser for value by attacking the validity of the sale. [Citation.] The conclusive presumption precludes an attack by the trustor on a trustee’s sale to a bona fide purchaser even though there may have been a failure to comply with some required procedure which deprived the trustor of his right of reinstatement or redemption. [Citation.]

(Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 831-832.)

Lu’s assertion the eighth cause of action is subject to demurrer because he is a bona fide purchaser is problematic in two respects.

First, the pleadings and matters subject to judicial notice do not show he is a bona fide purchaser. An essential element of being a bona fide purchaser is that the party “had no knowledge or notice of the asserted rights of another.” (Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1253 (Melendrez) [italics in original].) The demurrer does not contain allegations regarding Lu’s knowledge or notice. Nor does any document subject to judicial notice. Thus, whether Lu is a bona fide purchaser entitled to the conclusive presumption cannot be determined on demurrer.

Second, as discussed with respect to res judicata, this case is only partly predicated on procedural irregularities in the sale. Thus, even if the conclusive presumption applies, it would apply to only part of the cause of action. A demurrer does not lie to a part of a cause of action. (See, e.g., PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682; Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) Thus, whether Lu is a bona fide purchaser cannot resolve the demurrer.

Lu claims Plaintiff must affirmatively allege he is not a bona fide purchaser. This argument is incorrect. Lu himself cites authority limiting the requirement a plaintiff plead the defendant is not a bona fide purchaser to situations where it would determine their rights. (See Firato v. Tuttle (1957) 48 Cal.2s 136, 138 [stating plaintiff must plead the opposing party is not a bona fide purchaser “if such fact would be determinative of the respective rights of the parties”].) As discussed above, whether or not Lu is a bona fide purchaser is not determinative of the rights of the parties here where part of the claim is based on the underlying debt and the lien. Therefore, Lu’s argument Plaintiff must plead he is not a bona fide purchaser is not well-taken.

In reply, Lu asserts his status as a bona fide purchaser applies to more than procedural defects. In support, he cites Melendrez for the proposition that the bona fide purchaser doctrine is broader than the conclusive presumption of procedural regularity. Melendrez does in fact state a bona fide purchasers are protected from more than procedural defects. The case shows they are also protected from fraud prior to their purchase. (Melendrez, supra, 127 Cal.App. 4th at pp. 1256-1257.) The instant case does not include any allegation of fraud by Lu or his predecessors. Thus, Melendrez is distinguishable.

Therefore, the demurrer is not sustainable based on the conclusive presumption.

Accordingly, the demurrer on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action is OVERRULED.

B. Failure to Join an Indispensable Party

A party may demur to a pleading on the ground “[t]here is a defect or misjoinder of parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (d.) A demurrer on this ground is implicated in two situations: an improperly joined party or the nonjoinder of an indispensable party. (See Anaya v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 228, 231, fn. 1; see also Law Offices of Dixon R. Howell v. Valley (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1105 [noting misjoinder of defendants should be raised by demurrer].)

Lu argues that his lender, CYT Financial Group, is an indispensable party, and unless they are joined the case may be dismissed.

In the demurrer Lu uses the terms necessary and indispensable as if they are interchangeable. (See Pts. & Auths. ISO Dem., p. 6:4-12 [citing authorities mentioning necessary parties in support of argument a party is indispensable].) The terms overlap but are not interchangeable. The distinction between a necessary party and an indispensable party is significant to Lu’s argument because if CYI Financial Group is merely a necessary party and not an indispensable party the case can potentially continue without it. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 389; see Miracle Adhesives Corp. v. Peninsula Tile Contractors’ Ass’n of San Mateo, Santa Clara and San Benito Counties (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 591, 593; Code Civ. Proc., § 389.)

The test for whether a party is indispensable comes from Code of Civil Procedure section 389. Before deciding whether a party is indispensable, the Court must determine if they are a necessary party to the action. Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (a) describes parties that shall be joined to a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (a).) It states: “A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (a).)

If a party meets this standard, they must be joined and are, at a minimum, a necessary party. If a necessary party cannot be joined—for instance because of difficulty with service or maintaining the court’s jurisdiction—the Court must determine whether “in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed without prejudice, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (b).) Thus, only after a party is necessary and cannot be joined does the court consider if they are indispensable. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (b) [“If a person described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) cannot be made a party, the court shall determine … ”].)

Lee argues, correctly, that a beneficiary or lender on a deed of trust is a necessary party to an action involving the underlying security. (See Monterey S. P. Partnership v. W. L. Bangham, Inc. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 454, 461 [“We disagree that former section 369 created an exception to the general rule that beneficiaries are necessary parties to an action affecting the security of a deed of trust”]; Diamond Heights Village Assn., Inc. v. Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corp. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 290, 304 citing with approval Monterey S. P. Partnership v. W. L. Bangham, Inc.)

Here, the Court took judicial notice of a Deed of Trust identifying CYT Financial Group as the lender, Lu as the borrower, and the Property as the security for the loan. (RJN, Ex. I.) Thus, CYT Financial Group has an interest in the Property, and a ruling to quiet title in favor of Plaintiff may impair or impede that interest. Therefore, CYT Financial Group is a necessary party. Accordingly, it must be joined if possible. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (a) [“…shall be joined as a party … ”].)

With this in mind, the Court need not reach the issue of whether CYT Financial Group is indispensable. The difference between a necessary party and an indispensable party only becomes relevant if that party cannot be joined to the action. If a necessary party cannot be joined the case continues, whereas if an indispensable one cannot it should be dismissed. Both types of parties must be joined if possible. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (a).)

Here, the Court has no information regarding whether CYT Financial Group can be joined. Neither the complaint nor matters subject to judicial notice provide any information on this issue of whether CYT Financial Group can be joined. Therefore, absent some assertion CYT Financial Group cannot be joined the difference is unimportant. In either case CYT Financial Group must be joined if possible.

Moreover, Plaintiff does not contest this issue on the merits. In opposition, she does not argue that CYT Financial Group should not be joined or cannot be joined. Instead, she asserts she is entitled to an opportunity to add CYT Financial Group to the lawsuit. She also cites Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 634 (Irwin) for the proposition that summary dismissal is inappropriate without giving a plaintiff a chance to bring parties into the proceedings.

Irwin does so state: “An action may not be dismissed summarily whenever it appears there are parties whose presence is indispensable, without affording the plaintiff an opportunity to bring them in. Proceedings should be suspended for that purpose.” (Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 634, 638.)

Other cases also support this principle. (See Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons (1964) 61 Cal.2d 750, 761 [reversing trial court decision to sustain demurrer without leave to amend]; Simonelli v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 480, 486 [demurrer sustained without leave to amend on ground of failure to add indispensable party was error where party could have been added] as modified on denial of reh’g (Sept. 28, 2015).) Moreover, leave to amend is routinely granted where a plaintiff can amend the complaint. (See Angie M. v. Sup.Ct. (1995) 37 CA4th 1217, 1227 [“Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given”].)

Here, Lu does not present any argument why Plaintiff cannot add CYT Financial Group as a party. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to an opportunity to add it if it is subject to service of process and joinder will not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 389, subd. (a).)

Accordingly, the demurrer on the ground of misjoinder is SUSTAINED, with 25 days’ leave to amend.

IV. Motion to Strike

A motion to strike lies to remove “any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or to “all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

Lu moves to strike paragraphs 63, 64, and 65 of the complaint on the ground they are irrelevant and immaterial. He also moves to strike paragraph 60 of the complaint on the grounds of irrelevance and improper matter.

With respect to paragraphs 63, 64 and 65, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 436 the Court may strike irrelevant allegations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) Lu argues the subject paragraphs merely consist of legal argument, not facts and therefore are not essential to the case. He generally cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 431.10, subdivision (b), which defines an immaterial allegation as: “(1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense. (2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense.(3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).)

These paragraphs are, as Plaintiff admits in opposition, almost exclusively legal argument. Yet this does not resolve the issue. Lu’s position is predicated on the assumption that legal citations or arguments in a complaint are necessarily irrelevant.

In reply, Lu presents a century-old case for the position that a complaint may contain only facts and not argument. (Green v. Palmer (1860) 15 Cal. 411, 414 (Green).) In Green, the California Supreme Court discussed several basic rules of pleading. First among them, “Facts only must be stated. This means * * the facts, as contradistinguished from the law, from argument, from hypothesis, and from the evidence of the facts.” (Green, supra, 15 Cal. at p. 414.)

While the rules of pleading laid down in Green—including the rule a complaint must contain only facts–pre-date modern pleading practices, research reveals no case contravening the principle or overruling the case. Thus, a complaint must contain only facts. Accordingly, paragraphs 63. 64, and 65 should be stricken..

Turning to paragraph 60, Lu argues it includes allegations that are irrelevant because it incorporates all the other allegations into the eighth cause of action. Many of these incorporated allegations describe acts by others that occurred before Lu was purchased the Property. Moreover, the quiet title cause of action is alleged only against Lu, and not the other Defendants who committed these other acts.

While this cause of action is asserted against Lu alone, allegations concerning conduct engaged in by other parties are material to this particular cause of action. Code of Civil Procedure section 761.020 lists what must be alleged in a complaint for quiet title, including “[t]he date as of which the determination is sought.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020, subd. (b).) If a plaintiff alleges “a date other than the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall include a statement of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought.” (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks “ a determination they [sic] hold title to the Property and seek to quiet title as of July 26, 2016, the date Defendants wrongly sold Plaintiffs’ [sic] Property at foreclosure.” (Complaint, ¶ 62.) She requests a determination as of a date in 2016 but this action was filed in 2017. Thus, she must allege why she is seeking a determination as of that date. The other allegations help explain the reason she seeks a determination as of that specific date.

Furthermore, as Plaintiff asserts in opposition “the wrongdoings by Defendant WOODLEAF and Defendant ALLIED give rise to the cause of action against Defendant LU.” (Opposition, p. 5:8-9.) The Court agrees that the other allegations, although directed at other defendants, provide the factual background for the quiet title claim against Lu. Plaintiff does not allege Lu took improper actions himself, but that the improper actions of other Defendants call into question who owns the Property.

Therefore, the Court does not agree that the other allegations are irrelevant or immaterial to the cause of action for quiet title.

Also, Lu contends paragraph 60 should be stricken because it incorporates by reference improper requests for relief. He asserts “plaintiff’s complaint contains no facts whatsoever supporting her claims for money damages, let alone attorneys’ fees and punitive damages against Lu.” (Pts. & Auths. ISO MTS, p. 3:5-6.) Lu moves to strike paragraph 60 not because it discusses any remedy, but because it incorporates remedies listed elsewhere in the complaint.

Admittedly, there are allegations of money damages, attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages elsewhere in the complaint. However, read in context these allegations are tied to the other causes of action. This conclusion is consistent with Plaintiff’s position in opposition, where she admits that she does not seek money or punitive damages from him.

Moreover, it is unclear why paragraph 60 should be stricken because it incorporates allegations regarding remedies. If a remedy is insufficiently supported it can be stricken in its own right. (See Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1271 [reviewing trial court decision to strike a prayer for attorneys’ fees].) Here, Lu asks the Court to strike paragraph 60, but ignores the supposedly improper remedies themselves. For example, he does not move to strike the prayer for compensatory damages or attorneys’ fees. Thus, even if paragraph 60 is stricken, the remedies he insists are unsupported would remain in the prayer.

Therefore, the argument paragraph 60 should be stricken because it incorporates improper remedies is not well-taken.

Accordingly, the motion to strike is GRANTED as to paragraphs 63, 64, and 65, and DENIED as to paragraph 60.