Case Name: Amelito A. Derecho, et al. v. Wholesale Motor Group, Inc., et al.

Case No.: 1-13-CV-239475

Motion by defendants Wholesale Motor Group, Inc. and Euro Auto Imports, Inc. for Summary Judgment or [sic] in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Issues on the Complaint of Plaintiffs Amelito Derecho and Sandra Derecho

According to the Complaint, on August 25, 2012, Amelito Derecho (“Plaintiff”) was riding his motorcycle on Monterey Highway near Palm Avenue in the city of San Jose when he was struck from behind by a motor vehicle owned by defendants Wholesale Motor Group, Inc. (“WMG”) and Euro Auto Imports, Inc. (“EAI”). Plaintiff sustained injury to his left kneecap, left shoulder, left elbow, and left eye, as well as a closed head injury. Plaintiff’s wife, Sandra Derecho, sustained a loss of consortium.

Defendants admit that they are the owners of the vehicle which struck Plaintiff and that they permitted Garcia to drive the vehicle. Defendants recognize that, as owners, they have potential statutory liability for any injury that occurred as a result of Garcia’s wrongful operation of the vehicle pursuant to Vehicle Code section 17150. “By statute, the owner of a motor vehicle is vicariously liable for death or injury to person or property resulting from the wrongful (negligent or intentional) operation of the vehicle by any person using it with the owner’s express or implied permission.” (Haning, Flahavan & Kelly, CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: PERSONAL INJURY (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶2:371, p. 2-118 citing Veh. Code, §17150.) “The statute is an outgrowth of the overriding public policy interest in protecting innocent third parties from injury at the hands of careless drivers: ‘This protection should be paramount to the rights of an owner who has permitted the use of his car by others even though he, personally, was not guilty of negligence.’” (Id. citing Burgess v. Cahill (1945) 26 Cal.2d 320, 323.) “The liability of the operator and the owner are, to the extent of the financial limitations of the statute, coextensive. In other words, for the purposes of Proposition 51, they are a single tortfeasor. Whatever noneconomic damages are properly charged to the operator are likewise the burden of the owner.” (Rashtian v. BRAC-BH, Inc. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1847, 1854; italics removed.)

Because of the potential statutory liability pursuant to Vehicle Code section 17150, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., §437c, subd. (a).) Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

The motion in the alternative seeks adjudication of two factual issues: that driver Garcia was not an employee of Defendants, and that Defendants did not negligently entrust the vehicle in question to Garcia. However, the motion does not completely dispose of a cause of action, defense, damage claim or duty issue, nor is it made pursuant to stipulation. (See Code Civ. Proc., §437c, subd. (f) and (s).) Accordingly and for the additional reasons stated above, the motion in the alternative is denied.