Case Name: Angela Marie Bernal v. Lisa Clair Radloff, et al.
Case No.: 19CV344927

This action arises from a multi-vehicle collision on Interstate 280 in Santa Clara, California. In the operative form complaint, plaintiff Angela Marie Bernal (“Bernal”) asserts four causes of action against defendants Lisa Clair Radloff (“Radloff”), Chris Feng Ding, and Grace Xiaoqing Wu for various species of negligence, including motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, negligence per se, and negligent entrustment.

Bernal and Radloff have a discovery dispute over Radloff’s responses to requests for admissions, set one (“RFA”) and a related form interrogatory (“FI”) propounded by Bernal. More specifically, the parties dispute whether Radloff properly responded to RFA Nos. 1–4, 7–8, 12, and 29 as well as FI No. 17 .1, which concern negligence, causation, damages, and apportionment of fault. Bernal maintains Radloff’s objections and substantive responses are improper and moves to compel Radloff to provide further responses to these requests; she also seeks an award of monetary sanctions against Radloff and her counsel. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290.) Radloff opposes the motion. For the reasons that follow, Bernal’s motion and accompanying request for monetary sanctions are GRANTED.

At the outset, the Court dispels a number of fallacious assertions made by Radloff in her responses and repeated in her opposition to the motion before addressing the sufficiency of each response at issue. First, under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.010: “Any party may obtain discovery…by a written request that any other party to the action admit the genuineness of specified documents, or the truth of specified matters of fact, opinion relating to fact, or application of law to fact. A request for admission may relate to a matter that is in controversy between the parties.” Because a party may request that another party admit or deny a legal contention or conclusion, requests for admissions are often used to “‘set at rest triable issues….’ [Citation.]” (Orange County Water Dist. v. The Arnold Engineering Co. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 96, 115.) Contrary to what Radloff asserts, this does not mean a request must concern a triable issue or an element of a cause of action. The RFA at issue permissibly ask Radloff to admit or deny issues of liability, causation, and damages. Second, as related to this first point, none of the requests are susceptible to a relevance objection because relevance for the purpose of discovery is not the same as relevance under the Evidence Code. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; Gonzalez v. Super. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546–47.) With these clarifications in mind, the Court turns to Radloff’s response to each request at issue.

“Each answer in a response to requests for admission shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (a).) A party may: “(1) Admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party. [¶] (2) Deny so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue. [¶] [or] (3) Specify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (b).) “If a responding party gives lack of information or knowledge as a reason for a failure to admit all or part of a request for admission, that party shall state in the answer that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (c).) While a party may also object to a request for admission, the objection must be set forth clearly and with specificity. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.230, subd. (b).) And, if a request is only objectionable in part, the party must respond to the remainder of the request. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.230, subd. (a).) As the responding party, Radloff bears the burden of justifying her objections and responses. (See generally Kirkland v. Super. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

Radloff objected to each of the RFA at issue. But none of her objections are meritorious. As discussed above, Radloff errs in asserting the RFA concern irrelevant questions that cannot be propounded in the form of requests for admissions. And so, her objections on those bases lack merit. Radloff’s remaining objections on numerous grounds lack merit because she either does not address them at all (work product, ambiguity) or provides insufficient analysis to substantiate them (privacy, compound). Radloff’s conclusory assertion that a request to admit usage of a cellphone during the collision intrudes on her right to privacy is insufficient to substantiate an objection on that ground. (Williams v. Super. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552, citing Hill v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35.) And, the Court is not otherwise aware of authority recognizing a right to privacy in such information. Additionally, Radloff fails to establish any of the requests are impermissibly compound. (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1287–88.) None of the requests are compound on their face. And, in any event, such a technical violation is insufficient standing alone. (Ibid.) For these reasons, Radloff may not rest on her objections; they are undefended, unsubstantiated, and unmeritorious.

Radloff also provided some substantive responses notwithstanding her objections. With respect to RFA Nos. 2–3, Radloff stated she “admits that she contributed to the cause of the subject accident” but “lacks sufficient information/knowledge with regard to the remainder of the request.” (Valenzuela Decl., Ex. D at pp. 2–3.) Radloff’s responses to RFA Nos. 2–3 are not code-compliant because they are not straightforward and complete responses to the requests. RFA No. 2 asks Radloff to admit her negligence was the cause of the “impact,” while RFA No. 3 asks her to admit she was operating her vehicle negligently. Radloff has partially admitted and qualified her responses in a way that is unclear and nonresponsive. This is to say that, while a party may make a qualified or partial admission, he or she must still do so in a clear and straightforward manner that is responsive the request. As for RFA No. 2, it is not apparent whether Radloff is contending she was “a” cause but not “the” cause and, if so, what the remainder of the request is that she lacks sufficient information to admit or deny. As for RFA No. 3, the same problems persist as she provided an identical response to that request. Moreover, her response is problematic because it is nonresponsive to the substance of the request, which seeks an admission of negligence (breach of the duty of care) as compared to an admission as to causation. Put differently, Radloff did not provide a reasonably and clearly qualified admission in response to RFA No. 3 because the request seeks a distinct admission from RFA No. 2. Because Radloff did not provide code-compliant substantive responses to RFA Nos. 2–3, further responses to those requests are warranted. As for the remaining requests, namely RFA No. 1, 4, 7–8, 12, and 29, Radloff did not admit, deny, or provide a code-compliant representation that she lacked sufficient information to admit or deny the requests. And so, further responses to RFA Nos. 1, 4, 7–8, 12, and 29 are warranted as well.

Because further responses to the RFA are warranted, it is necessary for Radloff to update her response to corresponding FI No. 17.1 as well.

Based on the foregoing, Bernal’s motion to compel Radloff to provide further responses to RFA Nos. 1–4, 7–8, 12, and 29 is GRANTED. Radloff shall serve further responses to these requests, without objections, within 30 calendar days of the Court’s order and update her response to FI No. 17.1 accordingly.

Because Bernal succeeded in her motion, she is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions against Radloff and her attorney absent a finding of substantial justification or injustice. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subdivision (d).) Radloff was not substantially justified in opposing the motion as reflected by the fallacious objections she asserted and the limited responsive analysis in her opposition. Additionally, the Court does not find other circumstances would make the imposition of sanctions unjust. Accordingly, Bernal is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions.

Bernal seeks an award of $4,460 consisting of $4,400 in actual and anticipated attorney’s fees and the $60 filing fee for the motion. While Bernal may recover the $60 filing fee, she does not establish she is entitled to recover $4,400 in attorney’s fees. Anticipated expenses—expenses that have yet to be incurred—are not recoverable, particularly in the absence of a supplemental declaration establishing they have since been incurred. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a); Tucker v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1551.) For this reason, Bernal can only recover fees for the four hours of attorney time already expended. Bernal’s counsel states he charges a reasonable hourly rate of $550 per hour, which he states is commensurate with the rate charged by other similarly-qualified attorneys in Southern California. Radloff’s counsel vociferously disputes the reasonableness of this rate and offers his own rate of $142.70 as contrary evidence. But Radloff’s counsel, although perhaps more experienced, practices in a different area. And so, his statement is not particularly helpful. On this record, and in light of the Court’s significant experience, the Court finds $400 is a reasonable hourly rate. Bernal is, thus, entitled to an award of monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,660 against Radloff and her counsel. Her request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED. Radloff and her counsel shall pay Bernal, through Bernal’s counsel, $1,660 within 30 calendar days of the Court’s order.