2013-00147591-CU-PA

Armondo Glinton vs. Adam Keith Watts Armondo Glinton vs. Adam Keith Watts

Nature of Proceeding: Hearing on Demurrer (General Motors LLC)

Filed By: Thomas, Anthony S.

Defendant General Motors, LLC’s (“GM”) demurrer to Plaintiffs Rosalie Ancheta as
Guardian Ad Litem for Armondo Glinton, a minor, and Alfonso Glinton, III is overruled.

GM’s request for judicial notice is granted, though as discussed below, the Court only
takes judicial notice of the existence of the documents filed in the United States
Bankruptcy Court and the Los Angeles County Superior Court.

This is a wrongful death action brought by Plaintiffs arising out of a 2002 incident in
which their father was killed when hit by a van manufactured by GM. In the second
cause of action, Plaintiffs assert a products liability cause of action against GM alleging
that the van which struck their father was manufactured by GM and was defective.

GM demurs to the second cause of action on the basis that it is not a proper party to
the cause of action. It argues that it only assumed the liability for “accidents or
incidents” occurring after July 10, 2009, when it purchased the assets of General
Motors Corporation in that entity’s bankruptcy proceeding pursuant to a purchase
agreement (“MSPA”). Critically, the MSPA is not before the Court on this demurrer.
GM asks that the Court take judicial notice of an order from the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York which, based upon an
interpretation of the MSPA, found that GM did not assume certain liabilities for
accident or incidents occurring before the closing date of the MSPA in the context of a
wrongful death claim made by a plaintiff in a Los Angeles County Superior Court
action. The Bankruptcy Court’s order was a ruling on a motion to enforce a US
Bankruptcy Code § 363 bankruptcy sale order to protect GM against liabilities it did not
assume in the bankruptcy sale. GM also requests that the Court take judicial notice of
a request for dismissal which GM asserts was the request for dismissal of the wrongful
death action in the Los Angeles Superior Court.

In order for the demurrer to be sustained, the Court would have to take judicial notice
not only of the existence of the Bankruptcy Court order, but also the truth of the
matters asserted therein, including the findings of fact and law with respect to the
existence, content, and interpretation of the MSPA made by the Bankruptcy Court, a
document which is not even before the Court on the demurrer. “It appears to us,
however, that neither a finding of fact made after a contested evidentiary hearing nor a
finding of fact made after any other type of hearing can be indisputably deemed to
have been a correct finding. As we have noted, ‘[u]nder the doctrine of judicial notice,
certain matters are assumed to be indisputably true, and the introduction of evidence
to prove them will not be required.’ [Citation.] Taking judicial notice of the truth of a
judge’s factual finding would appear to us to be tantamount to taking judicial notice that
the judge’s factual finding must necessarily have been correct and that the judge is
therefore infallible. We resist the temptation to do so.” (Kilroy v. State of California
th th
(2004) 119 Cal.App.4 140, 148 [quoting Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4 1548,
1568.)

Here, at most, the Court can take judicial notice of the existence of the documents
from the Bankruptcy Court and the Los Angeles Superior Court but cannot take judicial
notice of the truth of any factual findings in those documents, for example, that GM
entered into the MSPA containing certain terms and provisions which may insulate it
from certain liabilities, specifically the second cause of action for products liability in
this case. Ultimately, a hearing on a demurrer cannot be turned into a contested
evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of
documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable. (Unruh-Haxton
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 365.) As a result, the
demurrer must be overruled.

This is quite unlike the situation set out in the authority cited by GM. (Performance
Plastering v. Richmond American Homes of California, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th
659.) On a demurrer to a complaint which specifically referenced a settlement
agreement, the court properly took judicial notice of the contents of a settlement
agreement and transcript from a settlement conference as there was no dispute as to
the contents of the documents and the issue was whether the plaintiff had standing to
sue by virtue of being a party to the settlement or a third-party beneficiary. By contrast
here, the complaint does not reference the MSPA, the MSPA is not even before the
Court on this motion, and there is no issue as to whether Plaintiffs are parties to the
MSPA.

Given the above, the Court need not consider Plaintiffs’ additional argument that the
documents for which judicial notice were sought were not properly certified.

The demurrer is overruled. GM shall file and serve its answer to the complaint no later
than June 3, 2014.

The notice of demurrer does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system
as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). GM’s counsel is ordered to notify Plaintiffs’ counsel
immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing, in person
or by telephone, in the event Plaintiffs’ counsel appears without following the
procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule
3.1312 or other notice is required.