Case Name: Bojorquez v. General Motors, LLC, et al.
Case No.: 17CV312143

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This action arises from the purchase of a purportedly defective motor vehicle. According to the allegations of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), around 2012, plaintiff Ashley Bojorquez (“Plaintiff”) purchased a 2012 Chevrolet Equinox (the “Vehicle”) which was manufactured and/or distributed by defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”). (FAC, ¶ 6.) In connection with the purchase, Defendant provided Plaintiff with an express warranty that it would maintain the utility or performance of the Vehicle or provide compensation if the vehicle failed during a specified period of time. (Id. at ¶ 7.)

During the warranty period, the Vehicle developed numerous problems arising from a defective engine including: oil leaks; oil consumption issues; defective illumination of the check engine light; exhaust camshaft actuator issues; solenoid valve issues; rattling noise coming from the engine; timing chain issues; tensioner issues; a rough idle; valve cover gasket issues; engine issues; and electrical system issues. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Despite these problems, Defendant and its representatives failed to service or repair the Vehicle in conformity with the express warranty. (Id. at ¶ 9.) They also did not promptly replace the Vehicle or make restitution to Plaintiff as required by Civil Code sections 1793.1, subdivision (a)(2) and 1793.2, subdivision (d). (Ibid.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant knew as early as 2012 that the 2.4L engine installed on the Vehicle was defective and would cause it to be susceptible to sudden and premature failure. (Id. at ¶ 46-47, 50.) Defendant had knowledge of this defect through pre-production and post-production testing data, early consumer complaints about the engine defect made directly to it and its network of dealers, testing it performed in response to these complaints, aggregate warranty data compiled from its dealer network, as well as warranty repair and part replacements data it received from its dealer network. (Id. at ¶ 49.) Defendant even issued various internal technical bulletins to its dealers regarding the engine defect. (Id. at ¶ 47.) Despite these facts, Defendant concealed and failed to disclose the defect to Plaintiff at the time of the sale. (Id. at ¶ 50.) Had she known of the Vehicle’s defect, Plaintiff would not have purchased it. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff’s FAC asserts causes of action against Defendant for violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and fraud by omission.

Defendant previously demurred to Plaintiff’s claim for fraud by omission in July 2017, and moved to strike her request for punitive damages. The Court found her fraud allegations were generally sufficient and sustained the demurrer solely on the basis that Plaintiff did not specifically allege where she purchased her Vehicle. The Court also granted the motion to strike on the ground that the demurrer to the fraud claim had been sustained and punitive damages were not available under the Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss Acts.

In October 2017, Plaintiff filed the FAC in which she added an allegation stating she purchased the Vehicle at the Tracy Chevrolet located at 3400 Auto Plaza Way, Tracy, California. (See FAC, ¶ 6.)

Currently before the Court is Defendant’s motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages from the FAC. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

II. Merits of the Motion

The motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 435 and 436. Under these statutes, a party may move to strike “irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 435, 436.) If a claim for punitive damages is not properly pleaded, the claim and/or related allegations may be stricken. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 164.)

Defendant argues that none of the causes of action contained in the FAC can support a claim for punitive damages. With respect to the claim of fraud by omission, Defendant contends the FAC does not state facts sufficient to demonstrate fraud under Civil Code section 3294 (“Section 3294”). With respect to the Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss causes of action, Defendant submits that, as held by this Court on its previous motion to strike, these statutory schemes do not permit recovery of punitive damages. In opposition, Plaintiff argues its request for punitive damages should not be stricken because her claim for fraud is actionable and punitive damages are recoverable under the Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss Acts.

Plaintiff’s argument that punitive damages are available under the Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss Acts is erroneous. As previously held by the Court, punitive damages are not available under the Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss Acts. (See Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Indust. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 218, 228 [punitive damages not available under Song-Beverly Act]; Kelly v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (9th Cir. 2004) 377 F.3d 1034, 1039 [punitive damages not independently available under the Magnuson-Moss Act].) To the extent she argues her fraud allegations are sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages, this assertion is well-taken.

In order to plead a claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the defendant was guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud and the ultimate facts underlying such allegations. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a); Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) The FAC does not contain an allegation specifically charging Defendant with malice, oppression or fraud for purposes of punitive damages. It does however include a cause of action for fraud by omission. As malice or oppression are not otherwise pled, the parties only discuss the issue of fraud, and Plaintiff does not suggest her request for punitive damages is predicated on malice or oppression, the question presented is whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged fraud within the meaning of Section 3294.

Fraud means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant to deprive a person of property or legal rights or a resulting injury. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)
Defendant argues Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud are insufficient because she does not factually substantiate her assertion that Defendant concealed the Vehicle’s engine defects at the time of the sale. Specifically, it contends the FAC does not allege the specific representations it made to Plaintiff, what omissions occurred, and whether the person making the representations was Defendant’s agent. This argument is misplaced.

Defendant’s arguments essentially amount to a contention that Plaintiff has not stated facts sufficient to state a cause of action for fraud. In fact, it previously raised arguments similar to these in its prior demurrer to the fraud claim and these arguments were rejected by the Court. Defendant does not cite and the Court is not aware of any authority supporting the proposition that the types of allegations it references are required for purposes of adequately pleading a punitive damages request as opposed to an underlying cause of action for fraud. (See e.g. Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73 [enumerating the fraud pleading requirements for purposes of surviving a demurrer].) Defendant’s attempt to advance these arguments again in the present motion to strike is therefore essentially a challenge to the propriety of the fraud claim. This is improper. (See Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1281 [where a whole cause of action is subject to a challenge, the proper procedural vehicle is a demurrer and not a motion to strike]; see also CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1146 [motion to strike is not the appropriate vehicle for raising defects properly raised by demurrer].) Furthermore, since a cause of action for fraud has been stated in the FAC, that pleading is sufficient to support a request for punitive damages. (See Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 610.)

Accordingly, the motion to strike is DENIED.