Case Number: 19STCV11890 Hearing Date: September 09, 2019 Dept: 78

Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Department 78

AVIS COPELIN, et al.;

Plaintiff,

vs.

REHABBERS FINANCIAL, INC., et al.;

Defendants.

Case No.:

19STCV11890

Hearing Date:

September 9, 2019

[TENTATIVE] RULING RE:

Plaintiffs Avis Copelin, Placemark Properties, LLC, Placemark Assets LLC, and Dauphin LLC’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

Plaintiffs Avis Copelin, Placemark Properties, LLC, Placemark Assets LLC, and Dauphin LLC’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.

Factual Background

This is an action for wrongful foreclosure. The Complaint alleges as follows. Plaintiffs Avis Copelin, Placemark Properties LLC, Placemark Assets LLC, and Dauphin LLC (“Plaintiffs”) own properties in Arcadia, Palm Desert, Studio City, and Laguna Hills. (Complaint ¶ 2.) Defendants originated mortgage loans against these properties and initiated foreclosure proceedings against them despite not being licensed to originate mortgages under federal law. (Complaint ¶¶ 1–11.)

procedural history

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on April 8, 2019, alleging nine causes of action:

Unlicensed Activity

Set Aside Foreclosure Sales

Breach of Written Contracts

Slander of Title

Cancel Trustee’s Deeds

Quiet Title

Accounting

Unlawful Self-Help Lockout

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

On April 24, 2019, this Court denied Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application for Injunctive Relief.

On June 6, 2019, this Court granted Lloyd White’s Ex Parte Application for Leave to File Complaint in Intervention, which was filed that same day.

Plaintiffs filed the present Motion for Preliminary Injunction on July 19, 2019.

On July 23, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Motion for Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction.

On July 25, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Second Supplemental Motion for Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction, prior to the hearing.

On July 25, 2019, this Court continued the hearing to September 9, 2019 to allow defendants’ counsel to be served with the motion and to respond.

Defendants have not filed a response.

Discussion

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Code of Civil Procedure, section 526, subdivision (a) provides that the court “may” grant an injunction in the following cases:

(1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.

(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury, to a party to the action.

(3) When it appears, during the litigation, that a party to the action is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the rights of another party to the action respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

(4) When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief.

(5) Where it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation which would afford adequate relief.

(6) Where the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.

(7) Where the obligation arises from a trust.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a).)

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a trial court considers: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of its case at trial, and (2) the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. (Donahue Schriber Realty Group, Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1177.) “‘The latter factor involves consideration of such things as the inadequacy of other remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity of preserving the status quo.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction “staying [Defendant] Rehabbers [Financial Inc.’s] unlawful possession of Plaintiffs’ properties. (Motion at p. 4.) Trustee’s Sales have occurred for the properties at issue, which Plaintiffs argue are invalid because Rehabbers was not the named beneficiary on the mortgages, and because it was not licensed lacked standing to bring any action in this state or collect a debt. (Motion at p. 11.)

This motion, including its supplemental iterations, is defective.

First, on July 25, 2019, this Court directed Plaintiffs to serve the instant motion in accordance with statute, and continued the hearing to allow Plaintiffs to serve Defendants and Defendants to respond. However, Plaintiffs have failed to serve the instant motion (as well as the supplemental motions) on Defendants. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b), motions must be served and filed 16 court days before a hearing. Here, Plaintiffs have not served the instant motion, nor its supplements, within the prescribed statutory time nor by the prescribed statutory method. Defendants have not filed express authorization, or otherwise manifested consent, for electronic service pursuant to California Rules of Court Rule 2.251.

Second, the substance of Plaintiffs’ motion is defective, because they have shown neither probability of success nor a likelihood of suffering irreparable harm if an injunction is not issued. The sole evidence of either comes from a brief declaration submitted by Avis Copelin, who offers a conclusory characterization of Defendants’ activities as “unlawful,” and then states in equally conclusory terms that Plaintiffs “will be irreparably harmed if the properties are not restored.” (Copelin Decl. ¶¶ 2–3.) The motion furnishes no basis to grant an injunction.[1]

Accordingly, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.

DATED: September 9, 2019

________________________________

Hon. Robert S. Draper

Judge of the Superior Court

[1] Additionally, all Plaintiffs, including the corporate plaintiffs, purport to represent themselves in this action through Plaintiff Avis Copelin. But corporations must be represented by counsel in court proceedings, and “the court retains authority to dismiss an action if an unrepresented corporation does not obtain counsel within a reasonable time.” (CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1150.) Unless Avis Copelin is an attorney, he may not represent the corporate defendants.