Defendant Maryanne A. Wong a.k.a. Mary Wong a.k.a. Mary M. Au-Yeung d.b.a. University Gifts Collectiables Etc. (“Defendant”) moves to quash service of summons. (See Code Civ. Proc. [“CCP”], § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).) Defendant argues that substitute service at an address in Palo Alto (“Palo Alto Address”) was ineffective because it is not her usual residence, place of business, or mailing address. (See CCP, § 415.20, subd. (b) [substitute service is accomplished “by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address . . . and by thereafter mailing a copy . . . to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left”].)

Plaintiff Blue Whale International, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) must show by a preponderance of the evidence that service was valid. (See Boliah v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 984, 991.) Plaintiff relies on declarations submitted by its registered process server and argues that the summons and complaint were validly served by leaving them at the Palo Alto Address. (See American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390 [declaration from registered process server creates a rebuttable presumption], citing Evid. Code, § 647 and Floveyor Internat., Ltd. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 795.) Defendant argues that these declarations do not create a rebuttable presumption that the Palo Alto Address is Defendant’s usual residence, place of business, or mailing address because the registered process server stated that a resident at that address advised him that Defendant did not live there. However, the declarations and proof of service also clearly state that the Palo Alto Address is Defendant’s “dwelling house or usual place of abode.” (POS, ¶ 5(b)(2).) Therefore, there is a rebuttable presumption that the summons and complaint were served by substitute service at Defendant’s dwelling house or usual place of abode.

Defendant declares that she and her husband own a house at the Palo Alto Address, but lease it to tenants who are not authorized to accept service and did not notify Defendant that substitute service had been attempted. (Wong Decl., ¶¶ 2 & 5.) Defendant further declares that she does not have an office or accept mail at the Palo Alto Address, and she never received the summons and complaint by mail. (Id., ¶¶ 3 & 5.) These facts are sufficient to rebut the presumption that the Palo Alto Address is Defendant’s dwelling house or usual place of abode.

Plaintiff presents documents demonstrating that Defendant owns the property at the Palo Alto Address and receives her property tax statements for that residence at the Palo Alto Address. However, these facts do not support the contention that the Palo Alto Address is Defendant’s usual residence, usual place of business, or usual mailing address. Plaintiff argues that the Court should deny the motion to quash because Defendant has appeared in this action and has actual notice of this lawsuit. The “appearance” to which Plaintiff refers is Defendant’s previous motion to quash service of summons at the Castro Valley Address. A motion to quash is not an “appearance” and does not confer personal jurisdiction over the moving party. (CCP, § 418.10, subd. (e)(1)-(2).) Furthermore, the fact that Defendant has actual notice of this lawsuit is immaterial to the issue of whether substitute service at the Palo Alto Address was effective. (See, e.g., Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1466-1467 [notice “is not satisfied by actual knowledge without notification conforming to the statutory requirements,” internal citations and quotation marks omitted].) Therefore, Plaintiff’s arguments lack merit.

The Court notes that this is the second successful motion to quash service of summons brought by Defendant in this action, Defendant admits in her declaration to monitoring this case through the Santa Clara County Superior Court’s website, and Plaintiff contends that it knows of no other address for Defendant. However, such facts do not indicate that the substitute service at the Palo Alto Address was effective, and Plaintiff has not requested an order for publication of the summons pursuant to CCP, section 415.50, subdivision (a).

Accordingly, the motion to quash service is GRANTED.