Case Number: 19STCV07765 Hearing Date: August 21, 2019 Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

Brandi Andrews,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Charles August Lindle,

Defendant.

CASE NO: 19STCV07765

[TENTATIVE] ORDER

Re: Defendant’s motion to strike Punitive damages

Dept. 3

1:30 p.m.

August 21, 2019

1. Background Facts

Plaintiff, Brandi Andrews, filed this action against Defendant, Charles August Lindle for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiff’s complaint contains a prayer for punitive damages. The request for punitive damages is premised on the contention that (a) Defendant was driving under the influence at the time of the accident, and (b) the accident was a hit-and-run.

2. Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Request for Punitive Damages

Defendant moves the court for an order striking Plaintiff’s requests for punitive damages.

Legal Standard

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. CCP § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. CCP § 436(b).

To succeed on a motion to strike punitive damages allegations, it must be said as a matter of law that the alleged behavior was not so vile, base, or contemptible that it would not be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228-1229. Civil Code section 3294 provides punitive damages are available in non-contract actions where defendant is guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud, defined as follows:

(c) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.

(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

A demand for punitive damages for the commission of any tort requires more than the mere allegation of the “wrongfully and intentionally,” “oppression, fraud, and malice” sort of language found in Civil Code section 3294. Perkins v Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7. The allegations of fact must, in their totality, describe a state of mind and a motive that would sustain an award of punitive damages. Ibid. The mere allegation that an intentional tort is committed is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. Ibid.

Discussion

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant was driving under the influence are insufficient to show “malice” pursuant CCP § 3294(c)(1). Rather, Defendant contends that the accident was caused by Plaintiff’s negligence.

In discussing the availability of punitive damages in an automobile collision where a driver was intoxicated, the Court held that “[i]n order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 890, 895–96. “A conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code.” Id. at 895.

However, Taylor fell short, however, of holding that punitive damages are always appropriate in cases involving driving while intoxicated. The Court noted, “we have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under §3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” Id. at 892.

Notably, a subsequent decision held that driving while intoxicated does not always give rise to a claim for punitive damages. “[W]e do not agree that the risk created generally by one who becomes intoxicated and decides nevertheless to drive a vehicle on the public streets is the same as the risk created by an intoxicated driver’s decision to zigzag in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area at 1:30 in the afternoon on a Sunday in June. The risk of injury to others from ordinary driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not necessarily probable. The risk of injury to others from Mardian’s conduct under the circumstances alleged was probable.” Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82.

In 1987, after all of the foregoing cases were decided, the legislature amended Civil Code §3294 to include a requirement that conduct in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others be “despicable” in order to support imposition of punitive damages. Absent additional allegations, the Court cannot find Defendant’s alleged behavior to meet the standard for imposition of punitive damages.

(i) Hit and Run

This Court previously granted Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damages based on the hit-and-run, but with leave to amend “if and only if Plaintiff can allege that the hit and run caused additional damages to Plaintiff over and above the damages sustained due to the accident itself.” (05/30/2019 Order).

The First Amended Complaint alleges no such damages. Plaintiff alleges that “Plaintiff suffered serious injuries” but fails to factually plead such allegations. The original complaint similarly alleged “harms inflicted on Plaintiff” without factual allegations. No specific injury, physical or emotional, is pled in the FAC, neither is any aggravation of the injuries because of the hit-and-run.

Therefore, Plaintiff has not pled that the hit-and-run caused additional damages over and above the damages sustained due to the accident itself.

(ii) Intoxicated Driving

The First Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant was operating a motor vehicle with a “blood alcohol leve [sic] of 0.15% or higher at the time of the subject collision, which is double the legal limit . . .” (FAC p.6). The FAC also alleges that immediately prior to the collision, Defendant “drove dangerously, swerving in and out of traffic, and engaged his brakes erratically . . .” (Id. p.5). Plaintiff also attaches to the FAC a copy of Defendant’s subsequent guilty plea for his DUI charge. (Id. Exh. A).

This case may be distinguished from Taylor, where the Court noted that

[t]he complaint further alleged that Stille had previously caused a serious automobile accident while driving under the influence of alcohol; that he had been arrested and convicted for drunken driving on numerous prior occasions; that at the time of the accident herein, Stille had recently completed a period of probation which followed a drunk driving conviction; that one of his probation conditions was that he refrain from driving for at least six hours after consuming any alcoholic beverage; and that at the time of the accident in question he was presently facing an additional pending criminal drunk driving charge.

24 Cal.3d at 893.

Defendant’s level of intoxication is an aggravating factor. However, by itself, the level of intoxication fails to demonstrate a conscious disregard for the safety of others. As previously held by this Court when ruling on Defendant’s motion to strike the initial complaint, intoxication at the time of the incident and a subsequent pulling-over for swerving and driving under the influence are insufficient to find malice. (05/30/2019 Order). In a similar reasoning, the subsequent guilty plea for DUI demonstrates simply that Defendant was intoxicated, which is not an aggravating factor for purposes of this analysis. The FAC merely pleads that Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the incident, and was subsequently arrested for driving while under the influence.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’ request for punitive damages is GRANTED.