2016-00202650-CU-CR

Brandon Coleman vs. Sacramento City Unified School District

Nature of Proceeding: Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint

Filed By: Newman, Daniel S.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and opposing counsel of the causes of action that will be addressed at the hearing. The parties are also reminded that pursuant to local court rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

*** If oral argument is requested in an attempt to obtain leave to amend, plaintiff shall be prepared to specifically discuss the new or different facts which may now be alleged in good faith to overcome the deficiencies noted below. ***

Defendant Sacramento City Unified School District’s (“District”) demurrer to plaintiff Coleman’s Fourth Amended Complaint (“4AC”) is SUSTAINED without leave to amend, as follows.

Factual Background

This is an action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff alleges that he was a student of National University. The District and National University entered into an agreement to provide qualified and competent students as interns to the District. Student interns are classified as probationary employees. Plaintiff began the 2013-2014 school year in the position of substitute teacher and transferred to Intern on November 21, 2014 pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding between National University and the District. Plaintiff was never subject to a classroom observation or evaluation. On March 11, 2015 plaintiff was notified that the District would not re-employ him for the 2015-2016 school year.

Analysis

Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. District demurs to this cause of action on the grounds that (1) plaintiff cannot pursue this common law cause of action against a public entity which is under Government Code §815 immune from liability unless provided by statute, (2) plaintiff was neither employed nor terminated by District, (3) plaintiff has failed to identify any established fundamental public policy which is alleged to have been violated by District, and (4) plaintiff cannot establish any causal nexus between his alleged “protected activity” and the alleged adverse employment action.

The court will sustain the demurrer to the first cause of action. District is correct that Government Code §815 shields all public entities from liability except where liability is specifically provided by statute (see, e.g., Harshbarger v. City of Colton (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1335, 1339 (citing Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 405, 409)) and since a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is a common law cause of action established by the judicial branch, it cannot be asserted against a public entity like District. (See, e.g., Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 901 [Government Code §815 bars Tameny actions (e.g. common law claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy) against a public entity; Lloyd v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 320, 329) [holding that Tameny claim for violation of public policies espoused in Labor Code §1102.5 failed because §815 bars such common law actions against public entities].) For this reason alone, the first cause of action fails and the opposition’s reference to various provisions of the Education Code is unavailing since none creates

a statutory basis for tort liability against the District and since the 4AC fails to plead facts which establish that District’s alleged decision to “terminate” plaintiff’s internship contravened any public policy advanced by the Education Code provisions.

Moreover, plaintiff cannot prevail on this cause of action because he was neither employed nor “terminated” by District and because plaintiff has failed to identify any established fundamental public policy which District is alleged to have violated when it “terminated” his internship. Although not specifically raised in connection with this cause of action, the court finds that the 4AC also fails to plead plaintiff’s compliance with the requirements of the Government Claims Act, which is a pre-requisite to all tort and contract claims against a public entity and without which this lawsuit is subject to demurrer.

For all these reasons, District’s demurrer to the wrongful termination claim must be sustained.

Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith. District demurs to this cause of action on the grounds that plaintiff failed to allege he was a party to a contract with District and was a third party beneficiary of the contract between District and National University, which contract is attached to the 4AC and which expressly states in Paragraph 21 it shall not be enforceable by any individual who is not a party to the contract. District adds that plaintiff has failed to plead compliance with the Government Claims Act at Government Code §810 et seq., which is pre-requisite to a suit against a public entity based on an alleged breach of contract (or tort).

The court agrees on both counts and will therefore sustain the demurrer to the second cause of action as well. As explained in the ruling on the prior demurrer, a contract made expressly for the benefit of a third person may be enforced by him/her but California does not permit enforcement of a contract by persons who are only incidentally or remotely benefitted by it and that a person’s “third party beneficiary status is a matter of contract interpretation.” In this case, the contract which plaintiff attached to the 4AC plainly states that it may only be enforced by the parties (i.e., District and National University) and not by any other individual or organization, such as plaintiff in the case at bar. The court also finds in the 4AC no allegation that plaintiff timely presented the requisite government claim pursuant to the provisions of Government Code §910 et seq. before filing the present lawsuit against District, without which this cause of action fails (as well as the first for wrongful termination) as a matter of law.

It is also worth noting that except in the context of an insured-insurer relationship, a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith does not gives rise to an award of tort damages but rather only to contract damages. (See, e.g., Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1393-1399.)

Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the demurrer to the 4AC is sustained.

Since plaintiff has now had five opportunities to plead his claims against District, since he has not shown a reasonable possibility of overcoming the above-cited defects and since the court is persuaded that plaintiff cannot now state a valid cause of action against District, leave to amend is denied.

*** If oral argument is requested in an attempt to obtain leave to amend, plaintiff shall be prepared to specifically discuss the new or different facts which may now be alleged in good faith to overcome the deficiencies noted above. ***

Pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312, District to prepare a judgment of dismissal of the entire action.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)