Case Number: BC508258 Hearing Date: April 14, 2014 Dept: 34

Moving Party: Defendants John Branca and John McClain, executors of the Estate of Michael J. Jackson (“defendnats”)

Resp. Party: Plaintiffs Broderick Morris, Qadree El-Amin, Raymone Bain, and Adean King (“plaintiffs”)

The Motion for Abatement is GRANTED.

The Demurrer is TAKEN OFF-CALENDAR AS MOOT.

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice of Exhs. 1-27. (See Evid. Code, § 452(d).) However, the Court declines to take judicial notice of the truth the statements made therein. (See Day v. Sharp (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1565.)

The Court SUSTAINS Defendants’ Objection No. 1

BACKGROUND:

Plaintiffs Broderick Morris and Qadree El-Amin commenced this action on 5/7/13 against defendants John Branca and John McClain, executors of the estate of Michael J. Jackson, for breach of contract and accounting. On 1/8/14, plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and accounting. The First Amended Complaint also added to additional plaintiffs, Raymone Bain, and Adean King. The action pertains to business dealings between the plaintiffs and the late Michael Jackson (“Jackson”), specifically, the formation of a new company, The Michael Jackson Company (“TMJC”). There is a dispute as to the parties’ ownership interests in TMJC.

ANALYSIS:

Motion to Abate:

Defendants primarily present this argument as a motion for abatement under the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. (See Dem., pp. 12-14.) The exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule is broader than a statutory plea of abatement because there is no requirement of absolute identity of the parties, causes of action, or remedies sought between the two actions. (Weil & Brown, Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2013) ¶ 7:74.) Defendants have filed a petition for an order determining that Jackson is the sole member and owner of TMJC. (See RJN, Exh. 2.) This 850 petition was filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court on January 28, 2013, approximately three months prior to the filing of this action. The two actions were deemed related on 6/13/13, but then were subsequently deemed unrelated on 6/27/13 after a CCP 170.6 was filed against the judge to which both related matters had been assigned. (See RJN, Exhs. 6, 7.)

“The state Constitution (art. VI, sec. 6) provides for but one superior court in each county, and that for each of said courts at least one judge shall be elected; it further provides that there may be as many sessions of said court at the same time as there are judges elected, appointed or assigned thereto, and that the judgments, orders and proceedings of any one session of the superior court held by any one or more of the judges thereof shall be equally effectual as though all the judges of said court presided at such session. Accordingly, it has been held that jurisdiction is vested by the Constitution in the court and not in any particular judge or department thereof; and that whether sitting separately or together, the judges hold but one and the same court. [Citation.] It follows, therefore, that where a proceeding has been duly assigned for hearing and determination to one department of the superior court by the presiding judge of said court in conformity with the rules thereof, and the proceeding so assigned has not been finally disposed of therein or legally removed therefrom, it is beyond the jurisdictional authority of another department of the same court to interfere with the exercise of the power of the department to which the proceeding has been so assigned. [Citation.] In other words, while one department is exercising the jurisdiction vested by the Constitution in the superior court of that county, the other departments thereof are as distinct therefrom as other superior courts. [Citation.] If such were not the law, conflicting adjudications of the same subject-matter by different departments of the one court would bring about an anomalous situation and doubtless lead to much confusion.” (Williams v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County (1939) 14 Cal.2d 656, 662.)

“The first department ‘ “to assume and exercise jurisdiction over a matter acquires exclusive jurisdiction.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ellison (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1366.) One department of the superior court cannot enjoin, restrain, or otherwise interfere with the judicial act of another department of the superior court. Even between superior courts of different counties, having coequal jurisdiction over a matter, the first court of equal dignity to assume and exercise jurisdiction over a matter acquires exclusive jurisdiction.” (Ford v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 737, 742.)

The section 850 petition and the instant action seek a determination of the same issue, i.e., the ownership interests in TMJC.

Allowing both matters to proceed could result in inconsistent judgments on the same issue. Plaintiffs’ argument that the claims should not be addressed in the section 850 petition is not well taken. In both their opposition to the demurrer (see Opp., p. 8:2-6) and in the First Amended Complaint itself (FAC, ¶ 37), plaintiffs cite In re Estate of Yool (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 867 for the following proposition:

“Expressly excluded from the definition of a claim is “a dispute regarding title of a decedent to specific property alleged to be included in the decedent’s estate.” (§ 9000, subd. (b).) Such claims properly can be resolved under section 850. That statute permits the personal representative or any interested person to file a petition in probate requesting a court order “[w]here the decedent died in possession of, or holding title to, real or personal property, and the property or some interest therein is claimed to belong to another.” (§ 850, subd. (a)(2)(C).” (Yool, at p. 873-874.)

Further, the Court shares Plaintiffs’ concern – as expressed in their Petition for Writ of Mandate – that “separately trying the two cases at issue here — a probate petition and a breach-of-contract action — would ‘likely require substantial duplication of judicial resources incurred by different judges.’” (Exh. 25, p. 1.)

Plaintiffs’ main concern seems to be that abating the action would “deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional right to a jury trial.” (Opp., p. 17:25.) Not so.

Plaintiffs have sued under three causes of action: for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and for an accounting. Plaintiff’s main cause of action is for declaratory relief, asking for a “judicial declaration of their ownership rights in TMJC, including, but not limited to, (a) the specific percentage of ownership that is attributable to each individual plaintiff.” (FAC, ¶ 43.) This cause of action (as well as the third cause of action for accounting) is equitable in nature and would be tried to the court. Normally, such a court trial would precede a jury trial on the remaining causes of action. (See, e.g., Hoopes v. Dolan (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 146, 157.) And it is certainly not unheard of “that the trial of the equitable issues may dispense with the legal issues and end the case.” (Id.)

Further, abating the action does not dismiss the case; should the breach of contract cause of action still remain to be litigated after adjudication of the 850 petition, plaintiffs will not have lost their right to a jury trial.

The Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for abatement. This case is abated until the there is a final adjudication of the 850 Petition, BP 117321.

Given the Court’s decision on the Motion to Abate, the court need not reach the merits of the demurrer. The demurrer is TAKEN OFF-CALENDAR AS MOOT. Defendants may refile their demurrer should it become necessary after the stay of action is lifted.

Defendants to prepare the Order.