Ca Department of Education vs. Pittsburg Pre-School

Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Summary Adjudication

Filed By: Ohler, Terrence B.

The California Department of Education’s (“CDE”) motion for summary adjudication is
granted.

CDE’s request for judicial notice is granted.

In the CDE’s second cause of action for breach of contract which is the subject of the
instant motion, CDE alleges that it entered a contract with the Pittsburg Pre-School
and Community Council, Inc. (“PPSCCI”) with respect to creating a reserve account
wherein child care and development (“CCD”) funds could be deposited pursuant to
Education Code § 8450. CDE alleges that PPSCCI was overpaid CCD funds which it
has yet to repay.

CDE’s separate statement includes the following facts. CDE and PPSCCI entered
contract #CCTR5041 related to CCD services. On July 28, 2008, CDE served PPSCI
with its “Default Decision and Order and Notice of Appeal Rights” related to
overpayment to PPSCCI on the contract. In that decision, CDE found that PPSCCI
had been overpaid, that CDE served PPSCCI with a statement of issues dated August
2, 2007, related to the overpayment, and that PPSCCI was in default for failing to
submit a Notice of Defense and Petition for Hearing by the statutory deadline. CDE
also found that PPSCCI owed CDE $75,257, offset by $15,218 owed to PPSCCI on
another contract, for a total payment due CDE of $60,039 payable within 90 days of
the default decision. PPSCCI has not paid the $60,039. The subject decision was
conducted in accordance with the California Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
PPSSCI did not file a petition for writ of mandate to challenge the decision despite its
statutory right to do so under the APA. Interest has accrued at a daily rate of $16.44
from November 4, 2008, the date by which PPSCCI was to pay the $60,039.

CDE has met its burden to show it is entitled to judgment as matter of law on its
second cause of action for breach of contract. The default decision demonstrates that
PPSCCI owes CDE $60,039 pursuant to the parties’ contract. Given PPSCCI’s failure
to challenge the default decision as it was permitted to do pursuant to Government
Code § 11523, that decision is final and establishes the CDE’s right to relief. Indeed,
pursuant to the judicial exhaustion doctrine, “unless a party to quasi-judicial
proceeding challenges the agency’s adverse findings made in that proceeding, by
means of a mandate action in superior court, those findings are binding in later civil
th
actions.” (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4 61, 69-70.) As a result, the
CDE’s decision establishes that the parties had a contract pursuant to which PPSCCI
owes $60,039 to CDE which it has failed to pay. That decision is dispositive in this
action and demonstrates that PPSCCI owes CDE $60,039 plus pre-judgment interest
at the daily rate of $16.44 from November 4, 2008 until the date judgment is entered in
this action.

While PPSCCI opposed the motion, it failed to file an opposition separate statement
responding to CDE’s undisputed material facts as required by CCP § 437c(b)(3).
Indeed, the failure to comply with the “requirement of a separate statement may
constitute a sufficient ground, in the court’s discretion, for granting the motion.” (CCP
§ 437c(b)(3).) On this basis alone, the Court concludes that PPSCCI failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. In any event, even if the
Court excused this failure, PPSCCI has not demonstrated the existence of a material
fact. Indeed, it simply argued that money sought by CDE is based on an auditor’s
error, and attached to its opposition brief an apparent request from the PPSCCI in
November 2007, to have the CDE consider a late notice of defense and petition for
hearing. Even if the Court considered this evidence, it could not overcome the basis
for this motion. That is, PPSCCI never challenged the CDE’s default decision through
a mandate action. PPSCCI has failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue
of material fact.

As a result, CDE is entitled to summary adjudication on its second cause of action for
breach of contract

CDE’s evidentiary objections are ruled upon as follows: Objection 1 is overruled and
Objection 2 is sustained.

CDE’s counsel shall prepare for this Court’s signature and order pursuant to CCP §
437c(g) and CRC Rule 3.1312.

Item 6 2011-00108989-CU-BC

Ca Department of Education vs. Pittsburg Pre-School

Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Summary Judgment

Filed By: Ohler, Terrence B.

The California Department of Education’s (“CDE”) motion for summary judgment on
Pittsburg Pre-School and Community Council, Inc.’s (“PPSCCI”) cross-complaint is
granted.

CDE’s request for judicial notice is granted.

CDE initiated this action seeking to recover money allegedly owed to it by PPSCCI
pursuant to the parties’ contract. PPSCCI filed a cross-complaint for breach of
contract alleging that it has a right to payment of $15,218 which the CDE took control
of as a setoff against an overpayment CDE determined was owed by PPSCCI.

CDE’s separate statement includes the following facts. CDE and PPSCCI entered
contract #CCTR5041related to CCD services. On July 28, 2008, CDE served PPSCCI
with its “Default Decision and Order and Notice of Appeal Rights” related to
overpayment to PPSCCI on the contract. In that decision, CDE found that PPSCCI
had been overpaid, that CDE served PPSCCI with a statement of issues dated August
2, 2007, related to the overpayment, and that PPSCCI was in default for failing to
submit a Notice of Defense and Petition for Hearing by the statutory deadline. The
CDE also found that PPSCCI owed CDE $75,257, offset by $15,218 owed to PPSCCI
on another contract for a total payment due CDE of $60,039 payable within 90 days of
the default decision. The subject decision was conducted in accordance with the
California Administrative Procedure Act (APA). PPSSCI did not file a petition for writ of
mandate to challenge the decision despite its statutory right to do so under the APA.
PPSCCI’s cross-complaint seeks recovery of the $15,218 but does not allege
compliance with the Government Claims Act. PPSCCI did not file a claim with the California Victims Compensation and Government Claims Board.

CDE moves for summary judgment on PPSCCI’s cross-complaint for breach of
contract on the basis that PPSCCI did not file a petition for writ of mandate challenging
the CDE’s default decision and also that PPSCCI did not file a claim with the VCGCB.
CDE has met its burden to show that it is entitled to judgment on PPSCI’s cross-
complaint for breach of contract. The default decision demonstrates that PPSCCI
owes CDE $60,039 pursuant to the parties’ contract, and that CDE would not be
paying PPSCCI the $15,218 owed to it on another contract as it used that money to
offset the $75,525 owed CDE. Given PPSCCI’s failure to challenge the default
decision as it was permitted to do pursuant to Government Code § 11523, that
decision is final and establishes that PPSCCI has no right to the $15,218 it seeks in its
cross-complaint. Indeed, pursuant to the judicial exhaustion doctrine, “unless a party
to quasi-judicial proceeding challenges the agency’s adverse findings made in that
proceeding, by means of a mandate action in superior court, those findings are binding
th
in later civil actions.” (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4 61, 69-70.) As
a result, the CDE’s decision establishes that the parties had a contract pursuant to
which PPSCCI owed CDE $75,525, which CDE off-set with the $15,218 owed PPSCCI
on another contract and that CDE would not be paying PPSCCI that $15,218. That
decision is dispositive in this action and demonstrates that PPSCCI has no right to the
$15,218 and thus cannot establish a breach of contract claims against CDE for failing
to pay PPSCI that money.

In addition, CDE also showed that it is entitled to judgment as a result of PPSCCI’s
failure to file a claim with the VCGCB. CDE’s evidence shows that PPSCCI never filed
a claim. Compliance with the Government Claims Act is an essential element of
PPSCCI’s breach of contract cause of action. (Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist.
th
(2007) 42 Cal.4 201, 209.) CDE is thus entitled to judgment on this additional basis.

While PPSCCI has opposed the motion, it failed to file an opposition separate
statement responding to CDE’s undisputed material facts as required by CCP § 437c
(b)(3). Indeed, the failure to comply with the “requirement of a separate statement
may constitute a sufficient ground, in the court’s discretion, for granting the
motion.” (CCP § 437c(b)(3).) On this basis alone, the Court concludes that PPSCCI
failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. In any event,
even if the Court excused this failure, PPSCCI has not demonstrated the existence of
a material fact. Indeed, it simply argued that money sought by CDE is based on an
auditor’s error, and attached to its opposition brief an apparent request from the
PPSCCI in November 2007, to have the CDE consider a late notice of defense and
petition for hearing. Even if the Court considered this evidence, it could not overcome
the basis for this motion. That is, PPSCCI never challenged the CDE’s default
decision through a mandate action and never filed a claim with the VCGCB. PPSCCI
has failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

As a result, CDE is entitled to summary judgment on PPSCCI’s cross-complaint.

CDE’s evidentiary objections are ruled upon as follows: Objection 1 is overruled and
Objection 2 is sustained.

CDE’s counsel shall prepare for this Court’s signature and a judgment of dismissal
pursuant to CCP § 437c(g) and CRC Rule 3.1312.