CASE#: MSN14-0453
CASE NAME: DOZIER-LIBBEY vs. AUSD
HEARING ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE & COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE &
DECLARATORY RELIEF / FILED BY DOZIER-LIBBEY MEDICAL HIGH SCHOOL, et al.
* TENTATIVE RULING: *
The application for preliminary injunction by Plaintiffs Dozier-Libbey Medical High School, an unincorporated association, Robert Young, Vicki A. O’Connor, Jeanne Stuart-Chilcote & Lucas Stuart-Chilcote (“Plaintiffs”), to stop Antioch Unified School District, Donald Gill and Stephanie Anello (“Defendants”) from converting anything related to Dozier-Libbey Medical School to the Dozier-Libbey Medical School, a Dependent Charter School, during the pendency of the action, is granted.
Factual and procedural history: Dozier-Libbey Medical High School (“DLMHS”) opened in 2008 as a unique high school focused on readying its students for a medical career. Many of the original faculty is still teaching at the school. On February 26, 2014, due to dissatisfaction with the Antioch Unified School District (“District”) the majority of teachers at DLMHS filed a Conversion Petition with the Antioch Unified School District Board of Education (“Board”) to convert the high school to an independent charter school. On March 14, 2014, the school district filed a competing petition to establish Dozier-Libbey Medical High School, Dependent Charter School (“DLMHS-DCS”), through a Startup Petition. On March 19, 2014, the Board heard both petitions after a lengthy public meeting. The Board unanimously rejected the Conversion Petition and approved the Startup Petition. Plaintiffs appealed the denial to the County Board of Education on March 27, 2014.
The District immediately began soliciting students to attend and teachers to teach at the DLMHS-DCS. They sent letters to teachers and students to determine who wished to remain at the school, to affirm they wished to continue their employment. The letters indicate the startup school will remain at the current location of Dozier Libbey. Students and teachers were given the initial deadline of April 4, 2014 and April 8, 2014, respectively, to confirm whether or not they would like to continue going to Dozier Libby.
Plaintiffs filed their petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief on April 4, 2014. Plaintiffs concurrently filed an Ex Parte Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction. At the hearing, Defendants, the District, Donald Gill and Stephanie Anello (“Defendants”) at the request of the Court, agreed to postpone the deadline to register at the new school and the Application for Preliminary Injunction was moved to April 28, 2014.
Plaintiffs Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief states causes of action for 1) Writ of Mandate Pursuant to CCP § 1085, 2) Declaratory Relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1060. In Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief, they request a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and permanent injunction compelling Respondents to refrain from taking any action to convert anything associated with the existing Dozier-Libbey Medical High School to the Dozier-Libbey Medical High School Dependent Charter School, including: 1) using the name Dozier-Libbey or Dozier-Libbey Medical School for the development or implementation of the Dependent Charter School; 3) using the Dozier-Libbey Medical High School website for the development or implementation of the Dependent Charter School; 4) taking any action to develop or implement the Dependent Charter School on the school site of Dozier-Libbey Medical High School 5) enrolling or taking any action to enroll currently enrolled and accepted incoming students of Dozier Libbey Medical High School into the Dependent Charter School; and 6) employing or taking any action to employ current teachers at Dozier-Libbey Medical High School at the Dependent Charter School.
Specifically, in Plaintiffs Application for Preliminary Injunction, they allege Defendants illegally converted DLMHS to a charter school under the guise of a startup charter and requests the Court to enjoin defendants from converting anything associated with DLMHS to the dependent charter school.
Analysis:
Code of Civil Procedure section 527(a) authorizes the issuance of injunctions before trial only if sufficient grounds exist. In determining whether a preliminary injunction should issue, a court must evaluate two interrelated factors: 1) the likelihood the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial; and 2) the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the injunction is issued. Lubavitch congregation v. City of Long Beach (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1392. A trial court should deny an injunction if the applicant fails either to satisfy the balance of hardships analysis or to demonstrate the applicant’s likelihood of eventual success. Id.
Here, plaintiffs seek to prevent defendants from starting the Startup Charter school on the theory the school is actually a conversion school and did not comply with Education Code section 47605(a)(2). Furthermore, plaintiffs allege both students and teachers will suffer irreparable harm if the startup charter school is allowed to start because they are faced with the choice of staying in the new charter school or being transferred to a different school in the district which lacks the unique medical education offered at Libbey.
Defendants allege, in opposition, that they complied with the statutory requirements in their startup petition (Education Code section 47605(b)) and that, on balance, the startup school, which has begun its school in many respects, will suffer much greater harm than plaintiffs, whose student body and teachers would be faced with the same dilemma of choosing to stay in a new charter school or attend another regular school in the district.
Conversion Charter School: The Education Code contemplates two types of charter schools; startup charter schools and conversion charter schools. California School Bds. Assn. v. State Bd. of Education (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 530, 574. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s unfairly converted DLMHS to a charter school to undermine the teachers’ attempt to form an independent charter. A conversion charter school converts an existing public school to a charter school. Ed. Code section 47605(a)(2). To determine what a statute means, courts first look to the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1143, 1155. Black’s Law Dictionary defines conversion as “the act of changing from one form to another.” Therefore, Plaintiffs argue any taking of DLMHS’ physical structure is a de facto conversion charter, which requires at least 50% of the teachers at DLMHS’ to approve of the conversion petition. Ed. Code section 47605(a)(2). Currently, DLMHS-DCS plans to take over the majority of the DLMHS campus, the name curriculum, most of the staff, as well as many other aspects of DLMHS.
Defendants maintain DLMHS-DCS was formed in accordance with all requirements contemplated in Education Code section 47605. The startup charter school was started with the support of 123 teachers, in excess of the number required by the Education Code. In addition, the charter school will provide a new means of organization and parent involvement. Defendants only argument against the alleged conversion is that the school may be located at the current DLMHS. However, through his declaration, defendant Donald Gill admits the new charter school will be located at the same location as DLMHS. Defendants cite no law in support of their position.
Plaintiffs have shown that the Defendants have performed a de facto conversion of DLMHS.
Denial of Conversion Petition: Defendants argue Plaintiffs conversion petition was lawfully denied by the Board. Education Code section 47605(b) provides District’s Board of Education with the authority to approve or deny a charter school petition. The Board must make any denial with specific accordance to Education Code section 47605(b)(1), (2), (3), (4) or (5). The Board unanimously denied Plaintiffs’ application in compliance with all aspects of 47605(b) et seq. Defendants cite Tahoe Keys Property Owners Ass’n v. State Water Resources Control Board, (1994) 23 Cal. 4th 1459, 1471, for the general rule that courts should not interfere with acts normally committed to the discretion of other departments or officials. Therefore, Defendants maintain Plaintiffs should not ask the Court to stop public officials from starting DLMHS-DCS, as granted by the Board. Therefore, Plaintiffs should lose their underlying action.
Plaintiffs counter this argument by clarifying Tahoe Keys – that courts retain authority to enjoin unlawful and void acts of public officials. Id. Plaintiffs are challenging the validity – that Defendants’ application was unlawfully granted by the Board, which, under Tahoe Keys, makes it appropriate for the Court to enjoin Defendants.
Administrative Remedies: Defendants argue Plaintiffs are required to exhaust their administrative remedies, which are provided for in Education Code section 47605(j)(l) and California Code of Regulations, Title V section 11967, to obtain the necessary standing to bring an application for a preliminary injunction. 3 Witkin, California Procedure (4th Ed. 1997) section 308, page 392. Plaintiffs contend they have no administrative remedies because the underlying action is to stop the DLMHS-DCS, not to ask the court to approve their conversion petition. Plaintiffs’ position is correct, as they have no administrative remedies to stop the Defendant’s charter school.
Legal Claim to DLMHS Name and Logo: Defendants argue they have the exclusive right to use the name Dozier-Libbey and Dozier-Libbey Medical High School under trademark law. “It is axiomatic in trademark law that the standard test of ownership is priority of use. To acquire ownership of a trademark is not enough to have invented the mark first or even to have registered it first; the party claiming ownership must have been the first to actually use the mark in the sale of goods or services.” Sengoku Works Ltd. V. RMC International, Ltd. 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996). It is undisputed the District began using the name Dozier-Libbey in 2008. Defendants make a similar argument with respect to the Dozier-Libbey website.
Plaintiffs counter that this argument is irrelevant, as their concern is to stop the allegedly illegal conversion of the school and everything associated with it.
Right to Start-Up Charter: Defendants next argue Plaintiffs have no right to prevent the startup charter or a right to use the facilities. With the approval of the Board, DLMHS-DCS must start enrolling students and setting its faculty as soon as possible. Furthermore, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs could not have their conversion petition approved and therefore have no right to use the school facility. Specifically, Defendants argue Plaintiffs had to submit a Proposition 39 application for facility use by November 1, 2013. Tit. 5, C.C.R. section 11969.9(b). “All charter schools must make an annual facilities request… and, in doing so, they annually express where they ‘wish to locate,’ even if it is in reality a wish to remain. Read as a whole, the sentence applies to all charter schools, regardless of whether they are start-up or conversion charters.”
While Plaintiffs do not respond to this argument, this only makes the legality of DLMHS-DCS more questionable. Defendants filed their petition for a startup charter school on March 14, 2014, several months after the November 1, 2013 deadline to file a request for facilities.
Complete or Near Complete Action: Defendants maintain an injunction cannot be granted to prohibit an act already completed. “[A]n injunction will not be granted to restrain the destruction of a ditch already destroyed, or to prevent the opening of a street already opened, or to prohibit the erection of a building previously built.” McManus v KPAL Broadcasting Corp. (1960) 182 Cal. App. 2d 558. Furthermore, Defendants maintain preliminary injunctions may also be inappropriate to restrain acts that are nearly completed. Flood v. Goldstein (1910) 158 Cal. 247, 250 and Griffith v. Department of Public Works (1959) 52 Cal. 2d 848, 850. Defendants maintain they have already undertaken substantial action in furtherance of the Boards approval of DLMHS-DCS. The District has 611 students who signed Intent to Enroll Forms, 16 out of 17 District classified staff stated their intent to work at the school and one DLMHS teacher and 126 other District teachers have expressed interest in working at DLMHS-DCS. (Gill Decl. ¶25).
Plaintiffs argue DLMHS-DCS is not near complete. The District has hired one person, no one has enrolled, it is ineligible to receive funds and has yet to take over the school site. (Plaintiffs’ RJN in Support of TRO, Ex. 5, p. 0000219).
Plaintiffs’ position is logically supported by the case law. It is clear that DLMHS-DCS has not been completed and appears to be far from completion.
Doctrine of Laches: Defendants claim Plaintiffs’ Application for a Preliminary Injunction is barred by the Doctrine of Laches. A plaintiff’s delay in asking for relief while the defendant expends efforts and money, or incurs substantial obligations, is another strong reason for denying an injunction. Schwarts v. Arata (1920) 45 Cal. App. 596, 602 and Vesper v. Forest Lawn Cemetery Ass’n (1937) 20 Cal. App. 2d 157, 165. Defendants point out the Plaintiffs’ waited from March 19, 2014 to April 4, 2014, to file their petition. Defendants claim the Plaintiffs waited in bringing the petition is unjustified because Plaintiffs are aware of the money being spent by the District to start the charter school.
Plaintiffs argue they acted reasonably in bringing their ex parte application for temporary restraining order ten business days after the Board made its decision to approve the District’s charter petition. Plaintiffs cite Peterson v. Superior Court of Ventura County (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, to show courts have refused to apply laches even after a seven month delay in filing a complaint.
Plaintiffs brought their temporary restraining order approximately two weeks after the Board’s decision. The Doctrine of Laches is clearly inapplicable in this situation.
Harm Suffered: Plaintiffs argue they will suffer significantly more harm if the injunction is not granted than the Defendants will if it is granted. Even so, Plaintiffs stress that the more likely it is that the applicant will ultimately prevail, the less sever the harm that must be shown, especially when the injunction maintains, rather than alters, the status quo. Right Site Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 336, 341-342. Plaintiffs allege harm in that teachers and students are currently faced with the choice going another school in the district, away from their specialized curriculum, or stay enrolled at an “unlawful new conversion charter school” which may have less qualified teachers than those currently teaching at DLMHS. Plaintiffs, with their strong belief that the startup school is unlawful, maintain that the harm will be catastrophic if the Court grants the writ of mandate to rescind the District’s action of converting DLMHS because students and staff will be unable to attend the school of their choice. Plaintiffs assert Defendants will suffer no harm because the injunction will maintain the status quo – the Defendants will not have to do anything out of the ordinary to DLMHS and the entire faculty, staff and students will remain.
Defendants argue they will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is granted. As support, they show the work they have had to do quickly to obtain a list of meaningfully interested teachers and procure a group of willing students, which they have. Defendants point out that the Plaintiffs would have put the students in the exact same position had their conversion charter been granted in that they would be forced to choose between what school to attend. Additionally, Defendants state the Plaintiffs might not ever successfully have their conversion petition approved, and if they did, the District may not have an available site for the conversion charter school. Furthermore, the District does not believe there would be enough students to populate a new charter school, because so many have signed a letter of intent to enroll at DLMHS-DCS.
While the Defendants are correct the Plaintiffs may not obtain a conversion charter school anytime soon, they fail to consider the likelihood Plaintiffs will prevail on their underlying action. Plaintiffs have presented an abundance of evidence that Defendants were granted a Startup Charter when in fact it is a Conversion Charter School. Furthermore, by Defendants own admission, they did not comply with the Proposition 39 requirement of making a facility request by November 1, 2013. With the likely success of Plaintiffs’ underlying action, it would create significantly more harm to deny the preliminary injunction.
Because Plaintiffs’ underlying action is likely to succeed and they seek to maintain the status quo, under Right Site Coalition v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 336, 341-342, they need only show less severe harm, which they have. Plaintiffs’ Application for an Injunction is granted.
Evidentiary Rulings
Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice is granted as to Exhibits 1-14. Defendants’ object to Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit 15, is sustained. Evid. Code § 352. Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice of a trial court’s decision, “is improper.” Bolanos v. Superior Court (State Department of Health Care Services) (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th, 744, 761; citing In re Molz (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 836, 845.
Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice is denied as to Exhibit 1. Plaintiffs’ objection is sustained. Defendants request Judicial Notice of a PowerPoint presentation, which is not “capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy,” as required by Cal Evid. Code section 452(h).
Defendant’s Objections:
Objections to Supplemental Declaration of Robert Young:
Objection 1: overruled. The court exercises its discretion to consider the declaration. The court has established its own timelines for this hearing and the information included in the declaration was discovered after the initial filing.
Objection 2: overruled. The information is properly used to illustrate the alleged harm on the DLMHS campus.
Objection 3: sustained. Mr. Young’s statement is based on hearsay and is also violative of the best evidence rule. Evid. Code sections 250, 1523
Objection 4: sustained at to paragraph 5, overruled as to paragraph 6. As to paragraph 5 Mr. Young’s claims about pressure the parents are facing lacks in foundation and is an improper opinion. As to paragraph 6, Mr. Young established foundation and properly uses the information to illustrate the relevant harm he allegedly suffers.
Objection 5: sustained. Mr. Young lacks foundation to attest to what clarifications the District has provided the DLMHS parents.
Objection 6: sustained. Mr. Young offers lacks foundation and improperly uses his opinion.
Objections to Declaration of Jeanne Stuart-Chilcote
Objection 1: sustained. Ms. Stuart-Chilcote states no foundation for her opinion, which is also an improper use of a declaration.
Objection 2: overruled. Declarant mailed the completed enrollment form, making it impossible for her to offer the actual document as evidence.
Objection 3: sustained. The statement is inadmissible hearsay.
Objection 4: overruled. Ms. Stuart-Chilcote establishes foundation and states facts relevant to the action.
Objection 5: sustained: The statement is violative of the best evidence rule.
Objections to Declaration of Paul C. Minney
Objection 1: sustained. Lack of foundation. Mr. Minney states no foundation for how he knows why the District developed its own charter petition and also states no foundation for how he knows 90% of the teachers at DLMHS will not submit their employment declaration form.
Objection 2: sustained. Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice of the Trial Court Statement of Decision is denied because a trial court decision cannot be used as precedent.
Objections to Declaration of Janet McDaid
Objection 1: overruled. The court exercises its discretion to consider the declaration. The court has established its own timelines for this hearing and the information included in the declaration was discovered after the initial filing.
Objection 2: sustained. The statement is violative of the best evidence rule.
Objection 3: overruled. Ms. McDaid states adequate foundation for her opinion and states facts supporting her opinion, which are relevant to the issue of harm.
Objections to the Declaration of Robert Young
Objection 1: sustained. Lack of foundation and assertions as to anyone’s intent other than his own are inadmissible. Mr. Young states no foundation for his having knowledge of the District’s intent, the lower graduation rate for protected class students and the District’s distribution of staffing and financial resources.
Objection 2: sustained. Mr. Young is making a hearsay statement and improperly uses the declaration to argue the District’s intent.
Objection 3: overruled as to paragraph 14, sustained as to paragraphs 15-16. As to paragraph 14, Mr. Young states an adequate foundation for his opinion, which is relevant to show the plaintiffs’ alleged harm. As to paragraph’s 15-16, Mr. Young offers legal conclusions, makes improper conclusions as to other’s intent and he states no facts forming an adequate foundation.
Objection 4: Overruled to the extend Mr. Young states proper foundation authenticating the pictures he took. Sustained insofar as Mr. Young offers his opinion as to the District’s intent without stating a proper foundation for his conclusion.
Objection 5: sustained. Mr. Young states no foundation for his improper legal conclusion that nothing will be left to convert to a charter school if an injunction is not issued.
Objections to Declaration of Alice Miller
Objection 1: overruled. The court exercises its discretion to consider the declaration. The court has established its own timelines for this hearing and the information included in the declaration was discovered after the initial filing.
Objection 2: overruled. Ms. Miller states an adequate foundation for her opinion.
Objections to Declaration of Lucas Stuart-Chilcote
Objection 1-3: sustained to the extent Declarant does not set an adequate foundation for opinions about the District and relies on hearsay evidence.
Objects to Declaration of Nancie Castro
Objection 1: overruled. The court exercises its discretion to consider the declaration. The court has established its own timelines for this hearing and the information included in the declaration was discovered after the initial filing.
Objection 2: overruled. Ms. Castro sets an adequate foundation for her knowledge of what happens at her school.
Objection 3: sustained. Ms. Castro set no foundation to support making a legal conclusion and she lacks foundation to state the District’s intent.
Objection 4: sustained. Ms. Castro relies on hearsay in making her statement.
Objection 5: sustained. Ms. Castro relies on hearsay in stating what the District is asking DLMHS teachers and staff.
Objection 6: sustained. Ms. Castro’s statement relies on hearsay and violates the best evidence rule.
Objection 7: overruled. Ms. Castro offers the document in question as evidence and set an adequate foundation for her opinion in paragraph 1.
Objection 8: overruled. Ms. Castro set an adequate foundation for her opinion based on her position as principal at DLMHS.
Objection 9: overruled. Ms. Castro set an adequate foundation for her opinion based on her position as principal at DLMHS.
Objection 10: sustained. Ms. Castro relies on hearsay evidence to support her statement.
Objection 11: sustained. Ms. Castro relies on hearsay evidence to support her statement.
Objection 12: sustained. Ms. Castro relies on hearsay evidence to support her statement.
Objection 13: overruled. Ms. Castro set an adequate foundation that as Principal, she understands the needs of DLMHS. The information objected to is not hearsay because the document is attached as Exhibit 23.
Objection 14: overruled. Ms. Castro set an adequate foundation based on her experience as principal of DLMHS.
Plaintiffs’ Objections:
Objections to Declaration of Sara Hall-Cottrell
Objection 1: overruled. Ms. Hall-Cottrell’s statements are relevant in that they address the potential harm of an injunction. Furthermore, the declaration, while vague as to the student’s age, clearly indicates the student will be returning.
Objection 2: overruled. Ms. Hall-Cottrell states an adequate foundation for her opinion.
Objection 3: sustained. The statement is not supported by evidentiary facts for which her opinion is based.
Objection 4: sustained. Ms. Hall-Cottrell is based on improper speculation unsupported by facts.
Objection 5: overruled. Ms. Hall-Cottrell set an adequate foundation, as she is parent with an opinion about how her child should be educated.
Objection 6: sustained. The statement lacks foundation, there are no facts stating why Mr. Bergerhouse will be an outstanding principal.
Objections to Declaration of Tracey Slavit
Objection 1: overruled. Ms. Slavit’s statements are relevant in that they address the potential harm of an injunction. Furthermore, the declaration, while vague as to the student’s age, clearly indicates the student will be returning.
Objection 2: overruled. Ms. Slavit states an adequate foundation for her opinion.
Objection 3: sustained. Ms. Slavit states no foundation to support her claim the petitioners are misleading her.
Objection 4: sustained. Ms. Savit states no foundation to support her opinion.
Objections to Declaration of Jason Todd
Objection 1: overruled. Mr. Todd statements are relevant in that they address the potential harm of an injunction. Furthermore, the declaration, while vague as to the student’s age, clearly indicates the student will be returning.
Objection 2: overruled. Mr. Todd states facts supporting his opinion.
Objection 3: overruled. Mr. Todd states facts supporting his opinion.
Objection 4: sustained. Mr. Todd does not set forth a foundation for his opinion.
Objection 5: sustained. Lack in foundation. There is no foundation supporting Mr. Todd’s assertion the petitioners have been dishonest.
Objection 6: sustained. Mr. Todd’s statement is based on hearsay.
Objection 7: sustained. The statement lacks in foundation in that there are no facts indicating the petitioners have provided misinformation or that other parents are upset.
Objections to Declarations of Christine Todd
Objection 1: overruled. Ms. Todd’s statements are relevant in that they address the potential harm of an injunction. Furthermore, the declaration, while vague as to the student’s age, clearly indicates the student will be returning.
Objection 2: overruled. Ms. Todd states facts supporting her opinion.
Objection 3: overruled. Ms. Todd states facts supporting her opinion.
Objection 4: overruled. Ms. Todd states facts supporting her opinion.
Objection 5: sustained. Ms. Todd states no facts to establish foundation.
Objection 6: sustained. Ms. Todd’s statement is based on hearsay and lacks foundation.
Objection 7: sustained. The statement lacks in foundation in that there are no facts indicating the petitioners have provided misinformation or that other parents are upset.
Objections to Declaration off Jeffrey Hall-Cottrell
Objection 1: overruled. Mr. Hall-Cottrell’s statements are relevant in that they address the potential harm of an injunction. Furthermore, the declaration, while vague as to the student’s age, clearly indicates the student will be returning.
Objection 2: overruled. Mr. Hall-Cottrell states facts supporting his opinion.
Objection 3: sustained. Mr. Hall-Cottrell does not state facts supporting his opinion.
Objection 4: sustained. Lack of foundation. Mr. Hall-Cottrell does not set forth any facts establishing foundation.
Objection 5: sustained. No evidentiary facts are used to support Mr. Hall-Cottrell’s opinion.
Objection 6: overruled. Mr. Hall-Cottrell adequately describes the facts supporting his opinion.
Objection 7: sustained. Lack of foundation. Mr. Hall-Cottrell states no facts establishing the foundation for his opinion.
Objection 8: sustained. The statement lacks in foundation in that there are no facts indicating the petitioners have provided misinformation or that other parents are upset.
Objections to Declaration of Bridget Fuchs
Objection 1: overruled. Mr. Fuchs’ statements are relevant in that they address the potential harm of an injunction. Furthermore, the declaration, while vague as to the student’s age, clearly indicates the student will be returning.
Objections to Declaration of Katedra Morales
Objection 1: overruled. Ms. Morales’ statements are relevant in that they address the potential harm of an injunction. Furthermore, the declaration, while vague as to the student’s age, clearly indicates the student will be returning.
Objections to Declaration of Ed Fuchs
Objection 1: overruled. Mr. Fuchs’ statements are relevant in that they address the potential harm of an injunction. Furthermore, the declaration, while vague as to the student’s age, clearly indicates the student will be returning.
Objections to Declaration of Louie Rocha
Objection 1: overruled. Mr. Rocha’s testimony is relevant in evidencing the District’s desire to start a charter school.
Objection 2: sustained. Mr. Rocha does not set forth evidentiary facts to support his opinion.
Objections to Declaration of Amy Gonzalez
Objection 1: overruled. Ms. Gonzalez’s statements are relevant in that they address the potential harm of an injunction. Furthermore, the declaration, while vague as to the student’s age, clearly indicates the student will be returning.
Objection 2: overruled. Ms. Gonzalez sets forth the facts she basis her opinion.
Objection 3: sustained. Ms. Gonzalez does not establish the facts she basis her opinion.
Objection 4: sustained. Lack of foundation, hearsay. Ms. Gonzalez states no facts establishing foundation and impermissibly relies on hearsay.
Objections to Declaration of Kenneth Gardner
Objection 1: overruled. Mr. Gardner’s testimony is relevant in evidencing the District’s desire to start a charter school.
Objection 2: sustained. Mr. Gardner’s statement is based on hearsay.
Objections to Declaration of Donald Gill
Objection 1: overruled. Mr. Gill’s testimony is relevant in evidencing the District’s desire to start a charter school.
Objection 2: overruled. Mr. Gill statements are a recital of facts supported by attached exhibits.
Objection 3: overruled. Plaintiffs provide no legal basis for their objection.