HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
FILED BY ORILYNN GIRON
* TENTATIVE RULING: *

Petitioner Orilynn Giron’s motion to compel arbitration is denied without prejudice. The First Amended Complaint has not yet been served on the nonsignatory Defendant, Israel Giron, and it is premature to decide whether he is an appropriate party to the arbitration at this juncture. Until this issue has been decided, the Court cannot determine whether there is a potential for conflicting rulings on common issues. (See, Code Civ. Proc., section 1281.2, subd. (c).)

As to the other defenses, the court finds that the AAA Rules do not preclude permanent injunctive relief or declaratory relief, the relief requested in this action. See AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, Rule R-47(a) and Section 11.9 (Specific Performance) of the Operating Agreement; see also Pacific Investment Co. v. Townsend (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 1, 10; Swan Magnetics, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1509-1510.

There is also no waiver. Because of the strong public policy favoring arbitration, prejudice is typically found only where the petitioning party has (1) unreasonably delayed in seeking arbitration, or (2) substantially impaired an opponent’s ability to use the benefits and efficiencies of arbitration (e.g., where petitioning party used judicial discovery to obtain information from opponent that could not have been gained in arbitration). See Saint Agnes Medical Center v. PacificCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1203-1204; Augusta v. Keehn Associates (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 331, 338-342.

With respect to impairing Respondents’ ability to use the benefits and efficiencies of arbitration, Petitioner has not done that. The parties agreed to arbitrate under the AAA rules. The AAA’s Commercial Dispute Resolution Procedures, which would likely govern this arbitration, give the arbitrator power to order production of documents and the identification of witnesses to be called, and obligates the parties to disclose documents intended to be offered at the hearing. The arbitrator is expressly given the authority to resolve any disputes regarding the exchange of information. See AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, Rule R-21. Here, the parties have done little in discovery than what would be permitted under the AAA rules. Hence, there is likely little to no prejudice from the fact that the parties engaged in written discovery prior to arbitration. See Saint Agnes Medical Center, supra, 31 Cal.4th at 1203-1204 (prejudice is the determinative issue on waiver)

As for waiver by delay, where no deadline for demanding arbitration is specified in the agreement, a reasonable time is allowed. What constitutes a “reasonable time” is a question of fact depending on the situation of the parties, the nature of the transaction and the facts of the particular case. Among the facts a court may consider is any prejudice the opposing party suffered because of the delay. See Spear v. California State Automobile Association (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1035, 1043.

Here, here is no deadline specified for demanding arbitration. Giron timely demanded arbitration. She demanded arbitration before Respondents even filed their lawsuit. She demanded arbitration in her Cross-Complaint and again on February 5, 2014. Giron did not bring her motion to compel arbitration until February 7, 2014, but she demanded it from the beginning. The only prejudice from filing Defendant’s motion to compel six months after the Complaint was filed comes from the discovery taken by the parties in the interim. As discussed above, the AAA rules under which the parties would be arbitrating allowed similar discovery and hence no prejudice has resulted.