Case Number: YC070821 Hearing Date: March 27, 2020 Dept: SWB

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Southwest District

Torrance Dept. B

KENNETH S. BRADLEY, M.D., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Case No.:

YC070821

vs.

[Tentative] RULING

KASHMIR STEFANI, et al.,

Defendants.

Hearing Date: March 27, 2020

Moving Parties: Plaintiffs Kenneth S. Bradley, M.D. and Southern California Pain Consultants, Inc.

Responding Party: None

(1) Motion for Turnover Order in Aid of Execution and for Order Permitting Seizure of Vehicle in Private Place

(2) Motion for Assignment Order and for Order Restraining Judgment Debtor Harold W. Dickens, III

(3) Motion for Assignment Order re Security Deposit and or Order Restraining Judgment Debtor Harold W. Dickens, III

The court considered the moving papers. No oppositions were filed.

RULING

The motion for turnover order is GRANTED. The motion for assignment order as to Dickens’ interest in payment of attorney’s fees due is GRANTED. The court intends to sign the proposed orders. The motion for assignment order as to security deposit is DENIED.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

Turnover order

CCP §699.030 states: If personal property sought to be levied upon is located in a private place of the judgment debtor:

(a) The levying officer making the levy shall demand delivery of the property by the judgment debtor and shall advise the judgment debtor that the judgment debtor may be liable for costs and attorney’s fees incurred in any further proceedings to obtain delivery of the property. If the judgment debtor does not deliver the property, the levying officer shall make no further effort to obtain custody of the property and shall promptly notify the judgment creditor of the failure to obtain custody of the property.

(b) The judgment creditor may apply to the court ex parte, or on noticed motion if the court so directs or a court rule so requires, for an order directing the levying officer to seize the property in the private place. The application may be made whether or not a writ has been issued and whether or not demand has been made pursuant to subdivision (a). The application for the order shall describe with particularity both the property sought to be levied upon, and the place where it is to be found, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the judgment creditor. The court may not issue the order unless the judgment creditor establishes that there is probable cause to believe that property sought to be levied upon is located in the place described. . . .”

CCP §699.040 (“Turnover order in aid of execution”) states: “(a) If a writ of execution is issued, the judgment creditor may apply to the court ex parte, or on noticed motion if the court so directs or a court rule so requires, for an order directing the judgment debtor to transfer to the levying officer either or both of the following:

(1) Possession of the property sought to be levied upon if the property is sought to be levied upon by taking it into custody.

(2) Possession of documentary evidence of title to property of or a debt owed to the judgment debtor that is sought to be levied upon. An order pursuant to this paragraph may be served when the property or debt is levied upon or thereafter.

(b) The court may issue an order pursuant to this section upon a showing of need for the order.

(c) The order shall be personally served on the judgment debtor and shall contain a notice to the judgment debtor that failure to comply with the order may subject the judgment debtor to arrest and punishment for contempt of court.”

Assignment order

CCP §708.510 states: “(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, upon application of the judgment creditor on noticed motion, the court may order the judgment debtor to assign to the judgment creditor all or part of a right to payment due or to become due, whether or not the right is conditioned on future developments, including but not limited to the following types of payments: (1) wages due from the federal government, (2) rents, (3) commissions, (4) royalties, (5) payments due from a patent or copyright, (6) insurance policy loan value.

(b) The notice of the motion shall be served on the judgment debtor. Service shall be made personally or by mail.

(c) Subject to subdivisions (d), (e), and (f), in determining whether to order an assignment or the amount of an assignment pursuant to subdivision (a), the court may take into consideration all relevant factors, including the following:

(1) The reasonable requirements of a judgment debtor who is a natural person and of persons supported in whole or in part by the judgment debtor.

(2) Payments the judgment debtor is required to make or that are deducted in satisfaction of other judgments and wage assignments, including earnings assignment orders for support.

(3) The amount remaining due on the money judgment.

(4) The amount being or to be received in satisfaction of the right to payment that may be assigned.

(d) A right to payment may be assigned pursuant to this article only to the extent necessary to satisfy the money judgment. . . .”

CCP §708.520 states: “(a) When an application is made pursuant to Section 708.510 or thereafter, the judgment creditor may apply to the court for an order restraining the judgment debtor from assigning or otherwise disposing of the right to payment that is sought to be assigned. . . . (b) The court may issue an order pursuant to this section upon a showing of need for the order. . . . (d) The order shall be personally served upon the judgment debtor and shall contain a notice to the judgment debtor that failure to comply with the order may subject the judgment debtor to being held in contempt of court.”

DISCUSSION

Turnover order

Plaintiffs/judgment creditors request a turnover order pursuant to CCP §§699.030 and 699.040, against judgment debtor defense counsel Harold W. Dickens, III. Plaintiffs seek an order directing Dickens to transfer possession of a 2018 Alfa Romeo Stelvio, VIH ZASFAKNN2J7C01910 to the LA County Sheriff’s Department. They also request an order that Dickens transfer to the LA County Sheriff’s Dept. documentary evidence of legal title to the vehicle and the amount of any loan secured by the vehicle. Plaintiffs further request that the Sheriff’s Dept. be allowed to seize the vehicle in a private place where it is most probably to be found, such as the garages located at Dickens’ place of business or his residence.

On November 2, 2016, the court (Judge Rice) imposed $44,648.66 in sanctions against Dickens and defendants for filing a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion based on knowingly false declarations. Plaintiffs contend that with interest, the amount is more than $59,308.

On October 18, 2019, the court granted a turnover order as to Dickens’ 2018 Alpha Romeo Stelvio. According to plaintiffs, as efforts were underway to seize the vehicle, Dickens filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy on November 1, 2019, which remained in effect past the time that the original writ of execution in this case expired. The bankruptcy was dismissed on February 6, 2020 for Dickens’ failure to appear at a creditor’s meeting. A new writ of execution was issued in this case on February 7, 2020.

There is no opposition.

As in the prior ruling, the court finds that plaintiffs have met their burden under CCP §699.030, in that they describe with sufficient particularity the property sought to be levied upon and the place where it is to be found. Plaintiffs have also shown a need for the order.

The motion is therefore GRANTED.

Assignment order for interest in attorney’s fees due

Under CCP §708.510, plaintiff requests an order assigning to judgment creditor Kenneth S. Bradley, M.D. all of judgment debtor Harold W. Dickens III’s interest in attorney’s fees due or which will become due in the future from: (1) his former or present clients listed in Exhibit B to the declaration of J. Patrick Fleming, Jr., and any other clients, to the extent necessary to pay judgment creditor’s judgment in full, including accrued interest through the date of payment.

Plaintiff also requests an order restraining Dickens and any of his agents, employees or attorneys, and any person acting in concert or participating with him, from encumbering, assigning, disposing, or spending any portion of attorney’s fees due or which will become due from his former or present clients.

Plaintiff contends that plaintiff’s counsel has taken several debtor’s examinations of Dickens, including in mid-2019. Plaintiff asserts that even though Dickens’ bank records indicate he grossed over $250,000 in 2018 and in 2019, he has not made any payments toward the judgment. Plaintiff asserts that Dickens can be expected to attempt to divert or assign his right to payment unless he is ordered to do so.

The court has considered the factors in CCP §708.510(c) in determining whether to order an assignment.

The motion is GRANTED.

Assignment order of security deposit

Plaintiff requests that the court order an assignment to judgment creditor Bradley, the security deposit of judgment debtor Dickens’ apartment at 691 Irolo Street, #312, Los Angeles, subject to whatever legitimate and reasonable claim the landlord may have in the security deposit at the time that Dickens vacates the apartment.

The court finds that a security deposit does not fall under “types of payments” under CCP §708.510(a). Further, plaintiff has not shown that Dickens has a “right to payment due or to become due” of a “security deposit.”

The motion is DENIED.