Defendants’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees is granted in part.

As an initial matter, the court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion was untimely filed and served. CCP §1005(b) requires an opposition to be filed at least 9 court days prior to hearing and served by mail at least 5 calendar days prior to that. Because of the two court holidays in February, the documents were required to be filed by 2/7/14 and served by mail by 2/2/14. The documents herein were filed and served on 2/11/14. However, in the court’s discretion, the pleadings have been read and considered.

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice is granted in its entirety. A court may take judicial notice of the fact of a document’s recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document’s legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the document’s authenticity. From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face. Fontenot v. Wells Fargo (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 265.

In an action on a contract, where the contract specifically contains an attorney’s fee provision, attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the prevailing party. Civil Code §1717(a).

Here, Defendants are clearly the prevailing party. A court ordered dismissal is a judgment that is effective for all purposes entitling the defendant to recover costs. CCP 581d; McMahan’s v. McMahan Serv. Corp. (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 607.

The question, therefore, is whether or not a contract exists that permits attorney’s fees to these moving defendants.

Defendants are not parties or signatories to the Note. However, while Defendants are not signatories to the Deed of Trust, Defendants are parties to the Deed of Trust. “A deed of trust involves three parties: the trustor, the trustee, and the beneficiary.” 4 Miller and Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d Ed.), Deeds of Trusts and Mortgages, §10.3, p. 20. Attorney’s fees may be awarded when a third-party is effectively considered to be a party to the contract even though it is a nonsignator. Pacific Preferred Props. Inc. v. Moss (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1456.

Paragraph 9 of the Deed of Trust provides, in short: if Borrower fails to perform or there is a legal proceeding that might significantly affect Lender’s interest and/or rights under the instrument or Borrower has abandoned the property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is reasonable and appropriate to protect its interest and the actions include paying reasonable attorneys’ fees….

Thus, there is clearly an attorney’s fees provision in the Deed of Trust. Further, where a contract provides that only one party may obtain attorney’s fees in litigation, Civil Code §1717 makes the right to such fees reciprocal, such that the “party prevailing on the contract” claim will be entitled to recovery of the fees, “ ‘whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not.’ ” Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 610, 611; International Industries, Inc. v. Olen (1978) 21 Cal.3d 218, 223.

Moreover, California courts liberally construe the term “on a contract.” Dell Merk, Inc. v. Franzia (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 443, 455. No apportionment of attorney’s fees is required where the claims for which fees are recoverable are those that have common issues, common operative facts, related legal theories, or require the presentation of virtually identical evidence. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 129-130. The court finds that all causes of action set forth in the complaint have the same operative facts and all claims are “on a contract” sufficiently to trigger the reciprocal fees award under Civil Code section 1717. Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 351. Thus, no apportionment is required.

“The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally ‘begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate….’” “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….” Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154. Trial courts properly may use equitable considerations to reduce the lodestar amount of attorney fees, including on the basis that certain fees were unnecessary. EnPalm, LLC v. The Teitler Family Trust, etc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 778.

In the present case, the court finds the reasonable hourly rate for this community is $350 and the reasonable number of hours for this litigation is 240 hours. Thus, attorney’s fees are awarded in favor of Defendants against Plaintiffs Michael Nuti, Jill Nuti, and Casey Decarlo, jointly and severally, in the amount of $84,000. Defendants are also entitled to costs in the sum of $1,908.