Case Name: Garcia, et al. v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority, et al.

Case No.: 16CV297131

Defendant the City of San Jose (the “City”) moves to strike portions of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by plaintiffs Lauro Garcia (“Garcia”), Sandra Linares Ramirez (“Ramirez”), individually and as guardian ad litem for Camila Alvarez (“Alvarez”), a minor (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Defendants Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority (“VTA”) and William Welch (“Welch”) demur to the FAC and also move to strike portions contained therein.

I. Background
II.

A. Factual
B.

This is an action for wrongful death and negligence. According to the allegations of the FAC, on June 20, 2015, plaintiff Garcia was a passenger in a vehicle being driven by Aldo Alvarez (the “Decedent”) southbound on Capitol Avenue in San Jose. (FAC, ¶ 15.) While at the intersection of North Capitol and Madden, the vehicle was struck by a VTA light rail vehicle operated by Welch, resulting in the Decedent’s death and serious injuries to Garcia. Plaintiffs allege that there was inadequate signage, warning lights, gates and other safety designs present at the intersection to prevent the accident. (Id., ¶¶ 18-32.)

C. Procedural
D.

Based on the foregoing allegations, on June 30, 2016, Plaintiffs (Garcia, Ramirez, Decedent’s spouse, and Alvarez, Decedent’s child) filed the Complaint asserting the following causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) wrongful death; and (3) negligent entrustment.

On March 13, 2019, the VTA and Welch filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. The City filed its own similar motion two days later on March 15, 2019. Plaintiffs opposed both motions. The Court held oral argument on the VTA/Welch’s motion on June 11 and on the City’s motion on August 1, and then took the entire matter under submission. The Court subsequently issued an order on August 12, 2019, which did the following: (1) granted summary judgment as to the VTA, Welch and the City on all claims asserted by Ramirez and Alvarez; (2) granted summary adjudication as to the VTA and the City as to Garcia’s third cause of action for negligent entrustment; and (3) treated the VTA and the City’s motions for summary judgment/adjudication as motions for judgment on the pleadings as to Garcia’s first cause of action for negligence.

On September 3, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the FAC asserting claims the VTA, Welch and the City for (1) dangerous condition of public property and (2) wrongful death/survivor action. After a subsequent motion for reconsideration of the foregoing motions for summary judgment/adjudication by Plaintiffs was denied, judgments were entered pursuant to the Court’s August 12th order on January 3 and January 9, 2020.

On September 3, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the FAC asserting claims against the VTA, Welch and the City for (1) dangerous condition of public property and (2) wrongful death/survivor action. On September 9, 2019, the City filed the instant motion to strike portions of the FAC. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 435 and 436.) On October 1, 2019, the VTA and Welch filed their own motion to strike, followed by a demurrer on October 4th. (Id.; Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.) Plaintiffs oppose all of these motions.

III. The City’s Motion to Strike
IV.

With the instant motion, the City moves to strike the following from the FAC: (1) all references to Ramirez and Alvarez (pp. 1:27-2:1; ¶¶ 4, 41-51; Prayer for Relief, nos. 5-11 on pp/ 15:27-16:11); (2) ¶ 20; and (3) all references to pedestrians in ¶¶ 36(a) and (c) and 37. The thrust of the City’s motion is that the operative pleading does not conform with the Court’s order on the City’s motion for summary judgment.

As the City notes, upon entry of the Court’s order granting its motion for summary judgment, Ramirez and Alvarez ceased to be parties to this action. Thus, the City asserts, they must be stricken from the FAC. Further, the City continues, the second cause of action for wrongful death/survivor action must also be stricken because Ramirez and Alvarez are the only plaintiffs that could maintain such a cause of action.

As set forth above, subsequent to the filing of the City’s motion to strike, judgment was entered in the City’s favor and against Ramirez and Alvarez (and Garcia, in part) in accordance with the Court’s August 12th order on the City’s motion for summary judgment/adjudication. Consequently, the City’s motion to strike is moot with respect to references to Alvarez and Ramirez, as well as the second cause of action.

As for items 2 and 3, the Court agrees with the City that these allegations qualify as irrelevant and improper under Code of Civil Procedure section 436, subdivision (a), as they consist of a copied portion of Plaintiffs’ expert’s declaration (¶ 20) and references to pedestrians, despite the fact that this case does not involve them. These allegations are therefore stricken from the FAC.

In accordance with the foregoing, the City’s motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART.

V. The VTA and Welch’s Motion
VI.

A. Request for Judicial Notice
B.

In support of their demurrer to the FAC, the VTA and Welch request that the Court take judicial notice of the following: (1) the VTA’s status as a public entity; (2) the FAC; (3) the VTA and Welch’s motion for summary judgment; and (4) the Court’s Amended Order Concerning Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. These items are all proper subjects of judicial notice as court records, legislative enactments or facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (b), (d) and (h).) Accordingly, the VTA and Welch’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

C. Motion to Strike
D.

The VTA and Welch’s motion to strike, which they request be addressed by the Court first, is nearly completely identical to the City’s motion to strike in that it seeks to strike from the FAC the exact same allegations. The only difference is the reasoning; the VTA and Welch maintain that the FAC contains improper/no specific allegations against Welch as the only allegation pertaining to him is contained within the second cause of action for wrongful death, which the defendants insist should be stricken because the Court ruled in its favor on the negligent entrustment claim contained within that cause of action. The VTA and Welch additionally explain that the remaining claim against them is that relating to an alleged dangerous condition of public property at the site of the collision (due to inadequate signage, warning lights, gates and other safety designs), but the FAC provides no nexus between Welch and such a condition, and thus no cause of action has been stated against him.

As judgment has been entered in accordance with the Court’s order on the VTA and Welch’s motion for summary judgment since the instant motion was filed, it is moot with respect to allegations pertaining to Welch and the wrongful death/survivor action. The remaining items are stricken for the same reasons discussed above in the Court’s ruling on the City’s motion to strike. Accordingly, the VTA and Welch’s motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART.

E. Demurrer
F.

Given the foregoing ruling on the motion to strike, the only issue remaining in connection with the VTA’s demurrer is the claim relating to the alleged dangerous condition of public property as alleged under Government Code section 830, et seq.

The VTA contends that no such claim has been pleaded against it given the allegations of the FAC because such allegations constitute an admission that the subject intersection where the collision took place was not being used with due care by the Decedent, who was making an admittedly illegal U-turn when the VTA train collided with his vehicle. (FAC, ¶¶ 15, 18.)

Government Code section 835 (“Section 835”) sets forth the circumstances under which a governmental entity may be held liable for maintaining a dangerous condition of public property. The term “dangerous condition” is defined by Government Code section 830, subdivision (a), to mean “a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property … is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” [Emphasis added.] Cases interpreting the foregoing statutes have stated that a public entity is only required to maintain its property in a way that is safe for “careful use.” (Chowdhury v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1196.) “Although public entities may be held liable for injuries occurring to reasonably foreseeable users of … property … liability may ensue only if the property creates a substantial risk of injury when it is used with due care.” (Schonfeldt v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1466.)

The VTA maintains that Garcia cannot state his claim because he undoubtedly did not use the intersection with due care in making a prohibited turn across the tracks and emphasizes Government Code section 830.2, which qualifies the definition of a dangerous condition of public property in stating:

A condition is not dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter if the trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.

Whether liability may be imposed under Section 835 is ordinarily a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact; however, if can be decided as a matter of law where reasonable minds can only come to one conclusion. (Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa County Transit Authority (2003) 30 Cal.4th 139, 148.)

While it is undisputed that the Decedent was making an illegal U-turn when the collision occurred, the fact that he arguably failed to use due care does not necessarily, by itself, absolve the VTA of liability and thus defeat Garcia’s cause of action. Critically, “[t]he status of a condition as ‘dangerous’ for purposes of the statutory definition does not depend on whether the plaintiff or other persons were actually exercising due care but on whether the condition of the property posed a substantial risk of injury to persons who were exercising due care.” (Cole v. Town of Los Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 768 [emphasis in original]; see Castro v. City of Thousand Oaks (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1451, 1459 [“the fact the particular plaintiff may not have used due care is relevant only to his or her comparative fault and not to the issue of the presence of a dangerous condition”].) Here, it is alleged in the FAC that the subject intersection lacked clear and properly placed traffic control devices to prohibit the left/U-turn movement that the Decedent made, resulting in a dangerous condition and the fatal collision. (FAC, ¶ 22.) Thus, Plaintiff is essentially arguing that if the VTA had placed such devices at the intersection, the Decedent would not have made the illicit turn to begin with. Whether this is true is a question that the Court cannot answer as a matter of law on demurrer, as evidence could conceivably support the conclusion that the condition of the intersection at the time of the collision posed a substantial risk of injury to persons who were exercising due care by failing to make it more clear that left/U-turns were prohibited at that location. Consequently, the fact that the Decedent made a prohibited turn does not necessary defeat Garcia’s remaining claim. Therefore, the VTA’s demurrer to the FAC on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is OVERRULED.

– oo0oo –

Calendar line 3