2017-00221110-CU-PO

Shunna Nicola Randall vs. Chandi’s Petroleum, Inc.

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to File Amended Complaint

Filed By: Morin, Richard

Plaintiff Shunna Nicola Randall’s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint is ruled upon as follows.

This action arises from Plaintiff’s assault and battery while at an Arco AM PM. Plaintiff is disabled and has a support animal. Plaintiff alleges that one of Defendants’ employee began harassing her about the presence of the support animal. The employee threatened Plaintiff by stating that he would stomp on Plaintiffs support animal; taser Plaintiff; pepper spray Plaintiff; and call the police on Plaintiff. The employee violently grabbed Plaintiffs dreadlocks and dragged her out of the AM PM by her hair.

Plaintiff filed this action on 10/23/2017.

Her complaint asserts causes of action for assault, battery, IIED, Respondeat Superior, and Negligent Hiring/Training/Retention.

Plaintiff desires to add a new defendant, Prabhjot Singh (“Singh”), as well as allegations of a partnership and joint venture with co-defendant Chandi’s Petroleum, Inc. (“CPI”), and allegations of liability against each as a partner and the alleged partnership and joint venture.

This is Plaintiff’s second motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. The Court denied the first motion without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with CRC Rule 3.1324(a).

Plaintiff filed the instant motion on 8/22/2019. On 8/23/2019, co-defendant BP West Coast Products, LLC (“BP”) filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, which is set for 11/7/2019.

Trial was initially scheduled for 8/26/2019. On 6/17/2019, BP filed a motion to continue trial. The parties stipulated to a trial continuance because BP obtained new counsel and the “recent discovery of new evidence by Plaintiff.” The motion was granted and trial is now scheduled for 12/10/2019.

Both CPI and BP oppose the motion.

Analysis

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion now satisfies CRC Rule 3.1324(a).

On 6/18/2019, CPI produced Singh as its PMQ. According to Plaintiff, Singh testified that he was personally responsible for the hiring, training, and supervision of the AM PM employees, that employee called to inform him of the incident, and that it was normal for employees to contact him regarding incidents where employees of AM PM felt threatened. He does not have a title or position at CPI, but is in the hierarchy of authority at CPI, below his father, and above the managers and clerks. He is not the owner of CPI and does not have any ownership interest in the corporation. He is not an employee, is not paid by, and is not a corporate officer or director of CPI. (Declaration of Richard Moran.)

CPI insists that the motion should be denied because it identified Singh as its manager in March 2018, and that Plaintiff fails to justify her unreasonable delay in seeking the amendment. It also argues that the new amendments fail to state sufficient facts, that trial will need to be continued again and that Singh will be prejudiced because he will not have sufficient time to file a motion for summary judgment.

BP opposes on the ground that Plaintiff proffers “no evidence” to support a joint venture or partnership with CPI. It further contends that it will be prejudiced since trial will most likely need to be continued.

“It is the general policy that courts should exercise liberality in permitting the filing of supplemental pleadings when the alleged ‘occurring-after’ facts are pertinent to the case.” (Flood v. Simpson (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 644, 647.) “Trial courts are vested with the discretion to allow amendments in the furtherance of justice… That trial courts are to liberally permit such amendments, at any stage of the proceeding, has been

established policy in this state…resting on the fundamental policy that cases should be decided on the merits.” (Hirsa v Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488-489.) Judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters between the parties in the same lawsuit. Thus, the court’s discretion will usually be exercised liberally to permit amendment of the pleadings. (See Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920,939; Mabie v. Hyatt (1998) 61 Cal. App.4th 581, 596.) A trial court has discretion to deny a motion for leave to amend where both “inexcusable delay and probable prejudice” is shown. (Magpali v. Farmers Group (1998) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487-488 [leave to amend made on the eve of trial properly denied in the trial court’s discretion where the new cause of action would have greatly expanded the case after the “trial date was set, the jury [was] about to be impaneled, counsel, the parties, the trial court, and the witnesses [had] blocked the time, and the only way to avoid prejudice to the opposing party is to continue the trial date to allow further discovery…”].)

The motion is GRANTED.

The validity of a proposed amendment is generally not considered in deciding whether to grant leave to amend. (California Casualty General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 280-281 disapproved on other grounds in Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390, 407.) Such challenges to the pleadings are more properly addressed in a demurrer or a motion to strike rather than in an opposition to a motion to amend. It is axiomatic that “the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings.” ( California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co., supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at 281.) Nor is the Court persuaded by CPI’s argument that its mere identification of Singh in 2018 as a “person with knowledge” should have placed Plaintiff on notice of his possible partnership/joint venture with CPI. This is not the situation wherein a party attempts to amend its pleading on the “eve of trial.” The Court is also not convinced that defendants will be prejudiced by a trial continuance, and Singh will have an opportunity to file a dispositive motion with a trial continuance.

Plaintiff may file and serve a first amended complaint (“FAC”) by no later than September 30, 2019, Response to be filed and served within 30 days thereafter, 35 days if the FAC is served by mail. (Although not required by any statute or rule of court, Plaintiff is requested to attach a copy of the instant minute order to the FAC to facilitate the filing of the pleading.)

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.