Case Name: Claudia Hartke v. Andre Y. Segal, et al.

Case No.: 18CV333942

This is an action for negligence and related claims arising from extensive damage to plaintiff Claudia Hartke’s property as a result of a fire that started on property owned by some of the defendants (the “Loma Fire”). Before the Court is plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended complaint (“SAC”), which is unopposed.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

According to the operative First Amended Complaint for Damages (“FAC”), the Loma Fire started on September 26, 2016 on property (the “Segal Property”) owned by defendants Andre Y. Segal and Suzanna G. Segal—along with defendants Ran Ben Vais, SAAS, LLC, Green Acres Farm, Inc., CAYA Group, LLC, Wish River, LLC, and/or Integral Earth, LLC—and quickly spread to neighboring properties, destroying a total of 4,474 acres that included plaintiff’s property (the “Hartke Property”). (FAC, ¶¶ 5-11, 22.) The fire was not contained until October 12, 2016. (Id., ¶ 22.) The Hartke Property was completely destroyed, including damage to plaintiff’s residence, five outbuildings, a producing vineyard, an olive orchard, and twenty acres of natural and landscaped foliage. (Id., ¶ 23.)

Plaintiff alleges that the Loma Fire started as a result of a defective gasoline powered generator located on the Segal Property and/or defendants’ misuse of such a generator. (FAC, ¶ 24.) She alleges that defendants failed to use and/or maintain the Segal Property in a reasonably safe manner, allowing trash such as computer equipment, lead acid batteries, electrical debris, electrical extension cords, gas fuel tanks, and three portable gasoline powered generators to accumulate among trees, leaves, and shrubs. (Id., ¶ 25.) Defendants’ tenant was found to have been using one of the generators to supply electricity to a trailer he occupied, using a long electrical extension cord that ran through flammable foliage. (Ibid.)

Based on these allegations, plaintiff brings claims against the Segals, Vais, Saas, Green Acres, Caya, Wish River, and Integral Earth for (1) negligence, (2) premises liability, (3) violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 733 and Civil Code section 3346, (4) trespass, and (5) nuisance, as well as (6) a claim for products liability against defendants American Honda Motor Company, Inc., Briggs & Stratton, Inc., and MTD Consumer Group, Inc. and MTD Products Company Inc. (licensed and qualified to do business in California as Tech-Bilt, LLC).

Plaintiff filed the instant motion on October 18, 2019, and it was initially scheduled to be heard in Department 8. On October 25, 2019, this matter was deemed complex and reassigned to Department 1. Plaintiff’s motion was rescheduled to be heard in this Department.

II. Legal Standard

Section 473, subdivision (a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part: “[t]he court may … , in its discretion after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars ….” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 76.) In considering a motion for leave to amend, “courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial.” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761.) “[I]t is a rare case” in which a court will be justified in denying a party leave to amend his pleadings. (Morgan v. Superior Court (Morgan) (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.) “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.)

While often paramount, the policy of liberality in permitting amendments should be applied only where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party. (Atkinson v. Elk Corp., supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 761.) Where an amendment would require substantial delay in the trial date and substantial additional discovery; would change not only the specific facts and causes of action pled, but the tenor and complexity of the complaint as a whole; and where no reason for the delay in seeking leave to amend is given, refusal of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion. (See Magpali v. Farmers Group (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488 [affirming denial of request to amend made during trial].) “Even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form, unwarranted delay in presenting it may – of itself – be a valid reason for denial,” which “may rest upon the element of lack of diligence in offering the amendment after knowledge of the facts, or the effect of the delay on the adverse party.” (Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 926, 939-940 [trial court appropriately denied request to amend answer made during trial]; see also P & D Consultants, Inc. v. City of Carlsbad (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1345 [plaintiff did not seek leave to amend until after the trial readiness conference, amendment would require additional discovery and might prompt a demurrer or other pretrial motion, and plaintiff’s explanation for the delay was inadequate].)

III. Analysis

Plaintiff seeks leave to file the proposed SAC to correct deficiencies in the FAC, including by clarifying the defendants against which the third cause of action is alleged, alleging additional facts in support of the claim pursuant to Civil Code section 3346, and replacing references to Tech-Bilt, LLC with the correct defendant, Troy-Bilt, LLC. No party opposes her motion, and it does not appear that plaintiff delayed in seeking leave to amend or that permitting the proposed amendment will unfairly prejudice any party. Plaintiff’s motion will therefore be granted.

IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file the SAC is GRANTED. The SAC, attached as Exhibit 4 to the Declaration of Anna DiBenedetto supporting plaintiff’s motion, shall be deemed filed as of the date the Court’s order is filed.

The Court will prepare the order.