Case Name: Anna Wydra v. Kenji Leonti et al.

Case No: 19CV348749

I. Background
II.

Plaintiff Anna Wydra (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against defendant Kenji Leonti (“Leonti”) and defendant State of California Department of Transportation (“Caltrans”) for damages associated with a car accident that killed Plaintiff’s husband.

According to the allegations of the first amended complaint (“FAC”), Thomas Wydra was killed when his vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by Leonti. (FAC, 2d COA.) At the time of the accident, Leonti was driving in the course of his employment with Caltrans. (Ibid.) Plaintiff is Thomas Wydra’s husband, and she alleges that she suffered multiple damages as a result of the death of her husband.

Therefore, she alleges two causes of action for: (1) motor vehicle negligence; and (2) general negligence.

Before the Court are demurrers brought by Leonti and Caltrans.

III. Demurrer
IV.

Caltrans demurs to both causes of action, and Leonti demurs to the first cause of action on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

A. Legal Standard
B.

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading, but not the truth of a plaintiff’s allegations or the accuracy with which he or she describes the defendant’s conduct. (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 958; citing Committee on Children’s Television Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213.) A demurrer reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters subject to judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (a); South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, citations omitted.) “It is not the ordinary function of a demurrer to test the truth of the [ ] allegations, or the accuracy with which [they] describe the defendant’s conduct” and the facts alleged are deemed to be true, however improbable. (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 958.)

C. Caltrans’ demurrer
D.

Caltrans argues that the two causes of action fail to state a viable cause of action against it as a government entity.

As Caltrans argues, the scope of government tort liability is defined by the Tort Claims Act which established that public entities are liable only pursuant to a specific statute imposing liability. (Gov. Code, §§ 810 & 815.)

Here, the FAC identifies Caltrans as a “public entity” (see FAC, p. 2, ¶ 5), thus, the Tort Claims Act applies. The first cause of action for motor vehicle negligence and the second cause of action for general negligence are asserted against Caltrans “per California Government Code § 820.” (FAC, 1st COA, & 2d COA.) Caltrans argues that Government Code section 820 applies only to government employee negligence, and the second cause of action for negligence cannot be alleged against a public entity at all because it is not based in statute.

Government Code section 820 states “a public employee is liable for injury caused by his [or her] act or omission to the same extent as a private person” while Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a) states that “a public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee…”

Plaintiff has alleged claims pursuant to both of these sections. However, she transposed the code sections relevant to each party, so the entity liability statute is alleged as to Leonti, while the employee statute is alleged as to Caltrans. Nonetheless, she alleges the entity as employer is liable, as is the employee. Each of the applicable code sections are pleaded in each cause of action, in fact right next to each other in the complaint, sufficient to meet the requirements of the Government Tort Claims Act.

Given the requirement of liberal construction of pleadings, the Court declines to sustain a demurrer on the basis of this obvious error. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 452 [In the construction of a pleading, for purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties] see also Rickley v. Goodfriend (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1141 [complaints are to be liberally construed… and disputes should be resolved on their merits].)

Substantial justice requires that the issues here be resolved on their merits. Plaintiff’s claim that Caltrans is liable for the death of her husband pursuant to Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a), for injuries proximately caused by its employee, is not too far an inferential leap for Caltrans to meet and defend, notwithstanding the transposed code sections. Thus, Plaintiff has not failed to state her causes of action against Caltrans.

Consequently, Caltrans’ demurrer to the first and second causes of action is OVERRULED.

E. Leonti’s Demurrer
F.

Leonti also demurs to the first cause of action on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.

However, his limited argument is that there are no facts “as to how Leonti caused or contributed to the subject motor vehicle accident,” and that there is “no mention of the fact or how Leonti was, in any way, negligent.” These statements are not further supported with reference to statutory or case law regarding pleading requirements for a negligence cause of action, thus the demurrer cannot be sustained. (See Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1113, subd. (a) & (b) [A memorandum of points and authorities shall contain a statement of facts, a concise statement of the law, evidence and arguments relied on and a discussion of the statutes, cases, and textbooks cited in support of the position advanced. The court may construe the absence of a memorandum in support of a demurrer as a waiver of grounds not supported].)

As a result, Leonti’s demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED.

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