Case Name: Lynda Valero v. Spread Your Wings, LLC, et al.
Case No: 18CV338394

I. Background

Plaintiff Lynda Valero (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Sabrina Dellard (“Dellard”), Spread Your Wings, LLC, Spread Your Wings for Mental Health (collectively, “SYW”), Andrew Serry Dumbuya (“Dumbuya”) and Michael Barton (“Barton”) for damages associated with a false police report.

According to the allegations of the complaint, Plaintiff was hired to provide in-home care for Barton, who has physical disabilities and limited mental capacity. (Complaint, ¶ 12.) At some point, SYW, which is owned and operated by Dumbuya, was hired to provide additional in-home care for Barton. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Dellard, an employee of SYW, provided the care during regular overnight shifts while Plaintiff continued to care for Barton during the day. (Ibid.)

At some point, the relationship between Plaintiff and Dellard soured, and Dellard developed a strong dislike for Plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶ 14.) On one particular day, Plaintiff finished her shift with Barton and left though Dellard was running late. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Thereafter, Dellard called law enforcement and falsely reported that she witnessed Plaintiff attempting to smother Barton to death with a pillow. (Ibid.) Barton was also influenced or pressured by Dellard to give the same account. (Ibid.)

The false police reports led to Plaintiff’s arrest and she was charged with attempted murder. (Complaint, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was incarcerated for 28 days, however, evidence proving her innocence came to light and she was released and the charges were dismissed. (Ibid.)

As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff alleges a single cause of action for malicious prosecution.

Before the Court is Dellard and SYW’s (hereinafter collectively, “Defendants”) motion for judgment on the pleadings.

II. Judicial Notice

In support of their motion, Defendants seek judicial notice of two matters: (1) a printout from a superior court case in Stanislaus Superior Court; and (2) Valley Mountain Regional Center POS Independent Contractor Contract with SYW. The request is made pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (d) and (h).

Judicial notice may be taken of any matter authorized or required by law. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113, citing Evidence Code §§ 451 & 452.) A matter is subject to judicial notice only if it is reasonably beyond dispute. (Ibid.) Furthermore, any matter judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2.)

Here, the matters for which judicial notice is sought are not relevant to any material issue and are referred merely as background or to provide information that is already alleged in the complaint.

Consequently, the request for judicial notice is DENIED.

III. Judgment on the Pleadings

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) They argue that the cause of action for malicious prosecution fails because they have absolute immunity as reporters of dependent/elder adult abuse.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent of a general demurrer, but is made after the time to file a demurrer has expired. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (f); Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 548.) Judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant is appropriate when the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) As with a demurrer, all material facts properly pleaded are deemed true, as well as any matters that may be judicially noticed, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d); Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146; Kapsimallis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672.)

Defendants first argue that the call made by Dellard to the police qualifies as a mandated report of dependent/elder abuse as defined by the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (the “Act). (Welf. & Inst. Code § 15630, subd. (a).) The Act provides that “[a]ny person who has assumed full or intermittent responsibility for the care or custody of an elder or dependent adult… is a mandated reporter.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, “where the suspected abuse does not result in serious bodily injury, a telephone report shall be made to the local law enforcement agency within 24 hours of the mandated reporter observing, obtaining knowledge of, or suspecting the physical abuse.” (Welf & Inst. Code § 15630, subd. (b)(1)(A)(ii).)

As pleaded, the facts allege that Defendants SYW was “hired to provide additional in-home care for Defendant Barton.” (Complaint, ¶ 13.) As an employee of SYW, it is further alleged that Dellard “provided this care, staying with Mr. Barton in his home overnight…” (Ibid.) It is also alleged that Barton is an “adult over the age of 18”, who “needed care due to physical disabilities and limited mental capacity.” (Id. at ¶ ¶ 6, 12.) Therefore, the face of the complaint shows that Defendants were mandated reporters under the Act, required to report any suspected physical abuse to law enforcement.

Defendants also argue that as mandated reporters, they have complete immunity from civil suits based on their report of abuse, even if it was false.

Mandated reporters of elder or dependent adult abuse are immune from civil or criminal liability under the Act. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15634, subd. (a).) Furthermore, the immunity for a mandated reporter is absolute. (Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 491 (“Easton”.) “The plain meaning of the statutory language is that for mandated reporters the truth or falsity of the report is of no moment—the privilege is absolute.” (Id. at 492.)

Therefore, Defendant contends that, where here it is pleaded that Dellard falsely reported to law enforcement that Plaintiff attempted to smother Barton with a pillow, Defendants are immune from civil liability as mandated reporters.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues for her own statutory analysis and ultimate conclusion that “immunity applies unless known to be false.” (Pl. Opp to Def. JOP, p. 8:23-24.) However, the Easton decision provides a detailed statutory analysis, comparing the construction of the Act to child abuse reporting laws and case law in that context, and comes to a contrary conclusion. While Plaintiff cites Easton, she does not acknowledge the very clear holding which found “absolute immunity” even for false reports.

Plaintiff also argues that the immunity does not apply to reports under the Act that are made with “malicious intent.” As she notes, there is no case law precisely on point. In support, she cites the “Purposes” section of the Act which states one purpose is to “Provide for protection under the law for all those persons who report suspected cases of abuse, provided that the report is not made with malicious intent.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15601, subd. (c), emphasis added.) By contrast, she argues, the child abuse reporting laws make no such qualifying statement. (See Pen. Code, § 11164, et seq.)

However, appellate courts examining the Act have consistently consulted the child abuse reporting laws as an interpretive aid. (See Easton, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 485; see also Santos v. Kisco Senior Living, LLC (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 862.) In so examining the Act, these courts have concluded that the immunity conferred is absolute. (Ibid.) As a result, it follows that it would extend to even reports made with malicious intent. (See e.g. Arce v. Children’s Hospital Los Angeles (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1485 citing Storch v. Silverman (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 671, 681 [the immunity extends even to negligent, knowingly false, or malicious reports of [child] abuse].) In support, these authorities cite the purpose of the mandated reporting laws, and the need to promote reports of abuse by shielding mandated reporters from liability. (Ibid.)

This is also consistent with the Sixth District Court of Appeals’ view on the effect of prefatory preamble language in a statute. (See Jackpot Harvesting Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 125, 153.) “’In general, statements regarding the scope or purpose of an act that appear in the preamble may aid in the construction of doubtful clauses, but they cannot control the substantive provisions of the statue’” and the express language of the relevant subdivision must control. (Id. at 153-154, citation omitted.)

As already described above, the court in Easton concluded, after a thorough analysis of the legislation, that the immunity provided by the Act is absolute. (Easton, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 495.) That the preamble appears to qualify it by reference to “malicious” reports would therefore contradict this, and thus the language of the relevant subdivision must control.

Finally, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments that attempt to take the report out of the realm of mandated reports by arguing that “Dellard did not know or suspect the abuse” because she fabricated the entire allegation. This argument again ignores the holdings described above which have found absolute immunity for mandated reporters or the parallel holdings in cases involving child abuse reports where immunity is acknowledged for even knowingly, false reports. (See e.g., Arce v. Children’s Hospital Los Angeles, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1485.)

Consequently, based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, with 10 days leave to amend.